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In contemporary times, policy makers and risk managers find themselves required to 
make decisions about how to prevent or mitigate complex risks that face society. Risks, such as 
global warming and energy production, are considered complex because they require knowledge 
from multiple scientific and technical disciplines to explain the mechanisms that cause and/or 
prevent hazards. This dissertation focuses on these types of situations: when experts from 
different disciplines and professions interact to coordinate and legitimize risk characterizations.   
A review of the risk communication literature highlights three main critiques: (1) Risk 
communication research historically treats expert groups as uniform and does not consider the 
processes by which they construct and legitimize risk understandings. (2) Risk communication 
research tends to privilege transmissive and message-centered approached to communication 
rather than examine the discursive management and coordination of different risk 
understandings.  (3) Rather than assuming the taken-for-granted position that objective scientific 
knowledge is the source of legitimacy for technical risk understandings, risk communication 
research should examine the way that expert groups legitimate their knowledge claims and 
emphasize the transparency of norms and values in public discourse.  
 This study performs an in-depth analysis of the case of cesium chloride. Cesium chloride 
is a radioactive source that has several beneficial uses medical, research, and radiation safety 
 iv
applications. However, it has also been identified as a security threat due to the severity of its 
consequences if used in a radiological dispersal device, better known as a “dirty bomb.” A recent 
National Academy of Sciences study recommended the replacement or elimination of cesium 
chloride sources. This case is relevant to the study of risk communication among multi-
disciplinary experts because it involves a wide variety of fields to discuss and compare terrorism 
risks and health risks. 
 This study uses a multi-perspectival framework based on Bakhtin’s dialogism that 
enables entrance into the discourse of experts’ risk communication from different vantage points.   
Three main implications emerge from this study as seen through the lens of dialogism. (1) Expert 
risk communication in cross-disciplinary situations is a tension-filled process. (2) Experts who 
interact in cross-disciplinary situations manage the tension between discursive openness and 
closure through the use of shared resources between the interpretative repertoires, immersion and 
interaction with other perspectives, and the layering of risk logics with structural resources. (3) 
The emergence of security risk Discourse in a post-9/11 world involves a different set of 
resources and strategies that risk communication studies need to address.  
 In the case of cesium chloride issue, the interaction of experts negotiated conflict about 
the characterization of this isotope as a security threat or as being useful and unique. Even 
though participants and organizations vary in how they characterize cesium chloride, most 
maintained some level of balance between both characterizations—a balance that was 
constructed through their interactions with each other. This project demonstrates that risk 
characterizations risks shape organizational decisions and priorities in both policy-making and 
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A nuclear engineer, a computer scientist, and an industrial psychologist walk into a 
room. This sentence sounds like the beginning of a joke in the classic genre of “Three people 
walk into a room: a doctor, a lawyer and an officer…” or “a priest, a rabbi, and an atheist…” The 
humor of this genre stems from the human tendency of various groups to engage situations in 
different ways and solve problems using different approaches. However, in the case of this 
study, the opening sentence does not begin a joke—it describes the types of expertise called 
upon to address the risks of working with nuclear power. Each expert represents a distinct 
disciplinary tradition toward knowledge creation that focuses on different aspects of the risk 
under question. 
In contemporary times, policy makers and risk managers find themselves required to 
make decisions about how to prevent or mitigate complex risks that face society. Risks, such as 
global warming and energy production, are considered complex because they require knowledge 
from multiple scientific and technical disciplines to explain the mechanisms that cause and/or 
prevent hazards (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). Due to this complexity, decision makers 
frequently call upon technical experts across multiple disciplines to share information and make 
formal risk judgments (Bier, 2001; Renn, 1998). They subsequently use the experts’ risk 
judgments to justify actions and policies that prevent and mitigate risks. Experts, decision 
makers, and policy makers do more than exchange objective information in these situations; 
rather, they assign meaning to the risks under consideration. However, due to disciplinary 
differences that provoke methodological disagreements and challenges to professional identity, it 
can be difficult to coordinate cross-disciplinary risk understandings (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 
                                               
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Applied Communication Research. 
1  
2 
2004; Thompson, 2009). Even when experts have similar backgrounds in nuclear physics and 
engineering, they may reach different conclusions about the legitimacy of models regarding 
adverse health effects of radiation for use in policy decisions (Silva, Jenkins-Smith, & Barke, 
2007). This dissertation focuses on these types of situations: when experts from different 
disciplines communicate with each other about risks and how they characterize, coordinate, and 
legitimize risk understandings.   
Experts have traditionally characterized risk by explicating cause and effect relationships 
in mechanical, ecological, and biological systems. Several professional, governmental, and 
scientific associations and institutions have attempted to address concerns associated with 
methodological variations in technique due to differences in disciplinary expertise. Since the 
1980’s, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers has been working to develop standards 
for probabilistic risk assessment. In 2006, the U. S. Office of Management and Budget published 
standards for judging the quality of risk assessment methods and results across different 
disciplines. An ongoing collaborative project between government agencies from Europe, 
Canada, and the U. S. is attempting to integrate different risk assessment methodologies to 
develop a unified tool that prioritizes risks in a manner that aids risk decision making. Such 
efforts at integration and unification illustrate the concern that policy makers have about 
divergent assessments and characterizations of risk due to disciplinary differences in 
methodology and technique. The ability to construct a unified tool or common foundation for 
assessing risk and conducting risk analysis is constrained by varying quality of models for 
representing the systems under investigation (Adair, 2002). These constraints include different 
scientific methods to address physical phenomena and uncertainty about how the different input 
values of the models impact its outcomes. When discussing the case of the degraded reactor 
pressure vessel at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station that was not predicted by the models (or 
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even considered “credible,” Perin (2005) writes that “even though model-makers themselves 
may be aware of the limits of their simplifications, models may find themselves doing more 
heavy lifting than intended when the world goes its own way” (p. 203).  
In addition to methodological difficulties, experts who address multi-disciplinary risk 
problems face these common characteristics: (1) uncertain facts, (2) disputed social values, and 
(3) high stakes, which make decisions urgent (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). Given the 
incommensurability of several disciplines and the complex characteristics of multi-disciplinary 
risks, it is unlikely that a unified or common set of standards for assessing risks across multiple 
disciplines can be developed or is even desirable.  As a result, it becomes increasingly important 
for individuals associated with risk and risk analysis to understand how certain understandings of 
risk are introduced and developed, and become the basis for making risk decisions and policies. 
Instead of trying to address the incommensurability of the expertise by presuming that a common 
methodological approach will achieve consensus, decisions about complex risks need be 
negotiated and managed among disciplinary experts, managers, and other stakeholders (Horlick-
Jones & Sime, 2004). 
Scientific and risk analysis methods allow experts to gain insight about characteristics of 
the physical hazards present in the system under investigation, but the experts must articulate 
this knowledge in a legitimate form and coordinate it with others’ expertise. In this way, the 
communication process extends scientific and risk assessment methods in a way that enables 
experts to impact the quality of decisions made about risk policy. For example, Tompkins’ 
(1977) research at NASA demonstrates that only “easy” decisions were made by demonstrations 
of scientific evidence and the “difficult” decisions were made through rhetorical processes. The 
information from the multiple scientific perspectives about “the difficult decisions created in fact 
an exigence of ambiguity” (Tompkins, 1977, p. 24). In these situations, “the limits of ‘scientific’ 
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decision making, [call] for a self-conscious approach to rhetorical arguments from the topoi of 
reliability, schedule and cost, making tradeoffs but avoiding the ‘foul compromise’” (Tompkins, 
2005, p. 18). This means that communication processes are critical in the negotiation of what 
counts as risk and how it should be managed.   
The next three sections provide a backdrop to understand the context in which risk 
communication practices invoke expertise to coordinate and legitimize decisions about managing 
risk. The first section defines risk and briefly discusses the evolution of risk assessment for the 
purpose of highlighting how the reliance on quantitatively-oriented risk assessment procedures 
create technical presentations and risk justifications that mask the sources of legitimacy for 
different expert understandings risk. The next section discusses how processes of risk 
communication negotiate the ontological dialectic between materialism and constructivism. The 
final section discusses how the practices of risk management create resources that experts may 
use to legitimize certain risk understandings. 
Risk and the Evolution of Risk Assessment 
People potentially face many different types of natural and technological risk in 
contemporary life including hurricanes, cancer, global warming, terrorist attacks, heart disease, 
effluents from chemical plants, nuclear proliferation, and swine flu. Despite the seemingly 
infinite list of potential risks that people may experience and their variations in mechanism of 
action or the degree of their consequences, these risks share a common definitional element. A 
risk consists of the “possibility that human actions or events lead to consequences that affect 
aspects of what humans value” (Renn, 1998, p. 51). This definition captures three features 
common to risk: (1) a notion of probability or likelihood, and (2) a future orientation, and (3) a 
formula or mechanism to make a judgment about possible future outcomes with their 
probabilities (Elliot, 2003; Renn, 1998). Additionally, most researchers consider these future 
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events as having adverse outcomes (Elliot, 2003; Linell, et al., 2002; McComas, 2006; Slovic, 
1999), although Renn (1998) provides a discussion for why the term ‘risk’ should be used for 
“uncertain outcomes regardless of whether they are positive or negative” (p. 51).  
From ancient times to the industrial revolution to the present, members of society have 
always had ways to identify and manage risks (Covello & Mumpower, 1985). For example, in 
the fifth century B.C.E. people associated malaria with swamps (although they did not know 
why), in the first century Romans observed adverse effects from lead exposure, and in the 
eighteenth century Sir Percival Pott linked juvenile chimney sweeps with increased incidence of 
scrotal cancer. Throughout the years, societal members have always had the ability to identify 
and articulate dangers to their health and well being. Despite an ever changing menu of potential 
risks, both ancient and contemporary ways of talking about risk function rhetorically to place 
blame and attribute morality in society (Douglas, 1990). For example, the taboos linked with 
certain sexual behaviors rhetorically functioned to make them seem immoral in order to protect 
society from adverse consequences such as disease, unwanted pregnancy, and extra-marital 
affairs.  Douglas (1990) writes that "a vocabulary of risk is all we have for making a bridge 
between the known facts of existence and the construction of a moral community" (p. 5). 
Our contemporary notions of risk result from two major developments in society: (1) the 
Enlightenment, and (2) Industrialization. In the seventeenth century, the thinkers in the 
Enlightenment developed the basic mathematical and scientific tools used in contemporary 
technical risk analysis (Covello & Mumpower, 1985; Taylor-Gooby, 2008).  During the 16th 
century, in the field of mathematics, theoreticians such as Pascal developed formal probability 
theories. In the 17th century, mathematicians first applied probability theories to develop life 
expectancy tables. Meanwhile, the scientific disciplines improved methods to infer cause and 
effect in the natural world. However, these scientific explanations for hazards and adverse 
6 
outcomes developed slower, especially for medical explanations, due to a lack of scientific 
research and popular beliefs attributing adverse health events to religious beliefs.  Although 
insurance practices have used mathematics since Roman times, during the 18th and 19th centuries 
insurance practices combined probability theory and improved cause and effect inferences to 
develop formal risk assessments which experts subsequently applied  to other types of risks 
(Covello & Mumpower, 1985). As the source of societal risks shifted to human technologies 
(e.g., chemical plants, pesticides, nuclear power, oil spills) and the methods of risk assessment 
became more technically sophisticated, decision makers struggled with how to use this 
knowledge in risk management (Renn, 1998).   
While the mathematical and scientific fields developed methods to analyze risk, the 
industrialization of society fundamentally changed the source of hazards to humans. Beck (1992) 
claims that people now exist in a “reflexive modern” society that has become aware of the 
unintended consequences of technological development. These unintended consequences consist 
of pervasive technological risks that impact health, safety, and the environment. The 
industrialization of society has brought about a systematic production of risks that calls for more 
systematic risk management (Ale, 2005; Covello & Mumpower, 1985; Löfstedt, 2005). In the 
later part of the twentieth century, as methods and computing tools improved, the practice of risk 
management began to rely more on results of risk assessments to guide decisions. One way this 
happens is that policy makers set criteria and an industry uses risk assessment to demonstrate 
that it meets the criteria (Ale, 2005). Another example of the use of risk assessment is how the 
U.S. nuclear industry began using probabilistic risk assessment as a tool for gaining insight about 
risk priorities in nuclear power plants and using this information to make cost-beneficial safety 
decisions before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) began using it as a tool for 
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oversight and regulation--despite the fact NRC pioneered the probabilistic risk assessment 
technique (Garrick, 2004; Kadak & Matsuo, 2007; Keller & Modarres, 2005).  
As quantitative risk management methods and techniques have taken greater prominence 
in society, critics have voiced concern over the practices of risk assessment and criteria standards 
because they presume that an acceptable level of hazard exposure exists (Beck, 1992). 
Furthermore, the current practice of risk assessment functions in a system of knowledge 
production that masks how experts characterize risk and important differences about different 
expert risk understandings (Beck, 1992; Renn, 1998). Despite its methodological uncertainties, 
the results of risk assessment have received relatively unchallenged legitimacy which affords this 
procedure significant influence over risk decisions. As Levenson writes: “the belief grows that 
the numbers actually have some relation to the real risk of accidents, rather than being a way to 
evaluate specific aspects of the design” (as quoted in Perin, 2005, p. 202). These critiques 
suggest that research is needed that help unmask the technical presentation and justification of 
risk in order to gain insight into the sources of legitimacy for different expert understandings of 
risk.  
Materiality and Risk Communication 
McComas (2006) defines risk communication broadly as the “iterative exchange of 
information among individuals, groups, and institutions related to assessment, characterization, 
and management of risk” (p. 76). This definition describes the content and process of risk 
communication and McComas’ further discussion addresses how “inherent to the understanding 
of risk, and the practice of risk communication, is an awareness that risk encompasses both 
objective and subjective qualities and that risk judgments are, to some degree, a by-product of 
social, cultural, and psychological influences” (p. 76). Thus, risk communication not only 
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contains messages about risk, communication is the process through which the social 
construction of risk occurs.  
Several disciplines study risk and risk communication—political science, psychology, 
risk assessment, public relations, public administration, communication, ecology, science, and 
engineering (McComas, 2006; Wardman, 2008). With so many disciplines interested in risk 
communication, and each bringing their own ontological and epistemological assumptions, one 
should not be surprised about the variety of approaches. However, the ontology constituting 
these various approaches can generally be divided into two categories that treat risk as a material 
reality or as a social construction (Metzner-Szigeth, 2009). As a growing body of empirical 
research differentiated several rationalities by which people understand risk, the social 
constructionist approach has gained traction (Renn, 1998; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2004). However, this is not an uncontested position as policy-makers continue to 
rely on realist models of risk and risk communication in their guidance (Horlick-Jones, 1998; 
Kristensen, Aven, & Ford, 2006) and several researchers try to bridge the realist and 
constructivist positions on risk (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992; Metzner-Szigeth, 2009; Rosa, 1998).  
Latour (2004) addresses the ontological question of science in general by drawing 
attention to how Western society privileges a subject/object distinction in knowledge production 
to the point that separate groups of people address questions of fact and questions of value—
scientists and politicians accordingly. This separation of fact and value prevents 
science/technical groups and policy/decision-making groups from having meaningful 
conversations with each other and limits the scope for how the material and symbolic worlds 
interact with each other. In the case of understanding risk, the subject/object divide artificially 
separates technical experts and non-technical groups such as policy makers and lay citizens.  
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At its very essence (separated from analysis, communication, and management), the 
concept of “risk” appears dialectical because its distinctions between the concepts of “danger” 
and “risk” hint at a balance between reality and possibility: danger is ontologically real and risk 
is socially constructed (Renn, 1998). In other words, the physical occurrence of danger can really 
exist, but interactions among people socially construct the meanings and possibilities associated 
with this occurrence (Metzner-Szigeth, 2009; Renn, 1998; Slovic, 1999). Beck (1992) describes 
this tension as “the not-yet-event as stimulus to action” that draws “a distinction between already 
destructive consequences and the potential element of risk” (p. 33). Taylor and Kinsella (2007) 
express the relationship between social construction and material danger by calling researchers 
to consider how “the nuclear word contributes to… the nuclear world” in ways that imbue 
material and social objects “with qualities such as necessity, inevitability, legitimacy, priority, 
authority, and validity” (p. 3). Approaches to studying communication about risk must embrace 
the underlying symbolic/material tension through careful study of how humans’ social 
constructions interact with natural realities and vice versa (Metzner-Szigeth, 2009; Peterson, 
2007; Peterson, Peterson, & Grant, 2004).  
Establishing a position about the dialectical nature of risk corrects the assumption that 
experts only deal with material reality because the dialectical nature of risk forces them to also 
grapple with its social construction. Beck (1992) uses spatial imagery to illustrate this aspect of 
risk overlapping in societal spaces: 
Risks lie across the distinctions between theory and practice, across the borders of 
specialties and disciplines, across specialized competences and institutional 
responsibilities, across the distinction between value and fact (and thus between ethics 
and science), and across the realms of politics, and the public sphere, science and the 
economy, which are seemingly divided by institutions. (p. 70) 
 
 Goodnight’s (1982; 1987) theory of the public sphere helps to envision the rhetorical 
implications of this boundary spanning by drawing attention to choices that “appear as patterns 
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of differentiated activity, spheres in which some practices are emphasized and others 
discounted” (Goodnight, 1987, p. 428). A sphere “denotes branches of activity—the grounds on 
which upon which arguments are built and the authorities to which arguers appeal” (Goodnight, 
1982, p. 216). Goodnight distinguishes three spheres of argument (technical, public, and private) 
which contain different forms of reasoning, evidence, functions, and uses of time. One example 
that he discusses is how Rachel Carson introduced the discussion of environmental risks in the 
public sphere but “as the implications of public interest demanded trade-offs that could be made 
only by technical judgments, ecology was given over to the technical sphere” with “public 
leaders [providing] parameters for scientific argument” (Goodnight, 1982, p. 222). This example 
illustrates how these spheres are not to be used as a taxonomy of rhetoric but rather help 
characterize shifts and overlaps that contribute to or detract from the quality of public 
deliberation. Visualizing overlaps between technical, private, and public spheres helps "to 
recognize existence of rhetoric deployed by professional groups to fulfill number of political 
functions" (Horlick-Jones, 1998, p.84). 
 As technical experts try to express risk by talking explicitly about “invisible causality 
relationships between objectively, temporally, and spatially very divergent conditions” (Beck, 
1992, p. 72), they also find themselves trying to defend their understandings against objections, 
especially in cross-disciplinary interactions, and make them seem legitimate to decision-makers 
who must answer to the public sphere. Hence, technical experts communicating about risk find 
themselves in a liminal space in which they must negotiate the inherent ontological tension 
between realism and constructivism. Ceccarelli (2001) characterizes the relationship between 
rhetorical practice and science “as a convergence of discursive opportunities and material 
constraints” (p. 316).  The experts cannot (and should not) deny the physical, chemical, and 
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biological aspects of the hazards under question, yet their discourse and attempts to make their 
understandings plausible construct the meanings of risk in a social space. 
Risk Management and Legitimation of Risk 
Policy and management decisions about risk form the backdrop against which risk 
communication among technical experts takes place and these conversations usually include risk 
managers. The practice of risk management involves questions about how members of society 
present, justify, and argue about risks (Klinke & Renn, 2002; Löfstedt, 2005). Ultimately 
communication among technical experts results in a risk management decision that legitimizes 
one group’s particular risk understanding. Unfortunately, decisions about risk often mask the 
systemic production of knowledge which becomes the rational and legitimate basis for decisions 
made about the risk (Beck, 1992). Risk management theories recognize the need to negotiate the 
ontological dialectic; however, the rational actor model underlies these theories and practice of 
risk management, giving preference to the perspectives that treat risk and consequences as a 
material reality (Garvin, 2001). 
The process of risk management addresses five main issues: (1) realism versus 
constructivism, (2) relevance of public risk perception as criteria for risk regulation, (3) 
appropriate handling of uncertainty in risk assessments, (4) legitimate role of risk-based and 
precautionary-based approaches, and (5) integration of analytical and deliberative processes 
(Klinke & Renn, 2002). In response to these tensions, Klinke & Renn (2002) suggest three 
general categories of risk strategies. A risk-based strategy relies on the results of risk 
assessments to characterize important risks and set criteria for responding to the risks. A 
precautionary-based strategy relies on preventative measures to minimize the occurrence of 
risks. A discourse-based strategy relies on deliberation and other social processes to characterize 
important risks and responses to them. Risk management strategies generally start with the 
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political regulatory process but, in the face of challenges to the legitimacy of bureaucratic 
institutions, groups developed other strategies (Löfstedt, 2005). Public deliberation, especially 
popular in the U. S., relies on democratic public participation mechanisms for making decisions 
about risks. The technocratic/scientific perspective relies strictly on the results of quantitative 
risk assessments and emphasizes its benefit for weighing risk versus risk priorities. The rational 
process relies strictly on economic priorities by considering how much risk can be managed (i.e., 
how many lives can be saved) for the amount spent. 
In response to the issues and available strategies, scholars have developed numerous 
models to describe the effective processes of risk management that incorporate risk assessment 
with other types of information. Some models emphasize realist perspectives with their 
concomitant preference for technical aspects of risk assessment, uncertainty, and expertise which 
results in a marginalization of feelings, values, and social judgments as consequences rather than 
characteristics of risk (for an example see Kristenson, Aven, & Ford, 2006). Other models 
acknowledge how the “dual nature of risk demands a dual risk management approach” that 
equally incorporates constructivist and realist perspectives of risk (Klinke & Renn, 2002, p. 
1076). 
For example, about ten years ago, the NRC incorporated risk assessment information in 
its regulatory structure – a process they call “risk-informed regulation” (Kadak & Matsuo, 2007). 
The NRC technical staff traditionally relied on deterministic approaches to gauge safety in 
nuclear power plants—defense-in-depth measures engineered into the reactor designs (similar to 
precautionary-based strategy). Initially, they felt hesitant about using probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) in the regulatory structure (similar to risk-based strategy). However, the NRC 
conducted a self-assessment of its organization culture and determined systematic ways to train 
technical staff in how to use PRA and balance it with deterministic judgments (Clark, Caruso, 
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Parry, & Mrwoca, 2008). The risk-informed and deterministic approaches to regulation in 
nuclear power plants illustrate different ways that engineering expertise characterizes a risk. The 
NRC’s experience illustrates one organization’s attempt to incorporate formal risk assessment 
into its risk management practices.  
From a more cynical perspective, Ale (2005) illustrates how industry and local politics 
manipulated risk assessments to produce numbers in ways that allowed them pursue their 
business interests while meeting legal regulatory requirements. Based on this experience, Ale 
cautions against viewing risk purely as a social construction—in this case a mathematical 
construction—because if a risk manifests, it produces real damage and human harm regardless 
risk assessment numbers.  
Regardless of the preferred model, the practice of risk management relies on the 
rational-actor model which assumes that people make decisions based on the “orderly 
administration of objective knowledge” (Garvin, 2001, p. 448; Taylor-Gooby, 2008). The 
emphasis on the rational actor model can be seen in Brewer’s (2005) model of risk decision 
making that accounts for three categories of risk perception and decision making tendencies: 
normative knowledge, availability, and individual specific (NAVIS). The NAVIS model 
provides a thorough review of the cognitive biases, heuristics, and other social influences on 
decision making processes and offers ways to counter these influences to achieve more rational 
decisions. Apostolakis and Pickett (1998) also illustrate the values of the rational-actor model in 
their attempts to quantify public deliberation in a decision analytic tool. Perin’s (2005) study of 
incidents at nuclear reactors uncovers how managers achieve the principle of command and 
control through a tradeoff of underlying “logics”: (1) a calculated logic that relies on metrics to 
promote efficiency and optimization, (2) real-time logic that relies on experiential knowledge to 
make judgments during actual events, and (3) policy logic that relies on corporate, stations, and 
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regulatory orders to deal with the paradoxes of complex technical systems. Her studies 
demonstrate a repeated preference to seek command and control over the alternate principle of 
doubt and discovery by relying on calculated and policy logics. These patterns demonstrate how 
rational types of knowledge have more legitimacy in risk management at nuclear reactors. This 
rational-actor approach to risk management may explain why policy makers formally include 
risk assessment techniques and psychometric approaches risk policy and avoid including 
approaches from other social scientific and critical risk research (Horlick-Jones, 1998; Taylor-
Gooby, 2008).  
This brief review of risk management maps out a spectrum of organizational choices 
about the appropriate process to make risk decisions that ultimately may become resources for 
technical experts to draw upon when trying to legitimize a risk. As long as the rational actor 
model underscores risk management practices, then objective and technical knowledge continues 
to be more legitimate resources in conversations among experts. In these communicative 
processes, the experts construct seemingly objective understandings of risk that mask the 
production of knowledge and make it difficult to challenge a risk judgment. 
Focus and Organization of Dissertation 
This overview of risk, its history, ontological foundations, and risk management 
practices, foregrounds the overlaps and tensions between technical and social information. The 
goal of this dissertation is to explore these overlaps in experts’ risk communication in cross-
disciplinary situations. Experts draw upon different disciplinary assumptions to explain causal 
mechanisms and severity risks which produce divergent conclusions and recommendations that 
are difficult to reconcile. Additionally, the dialectical nature of risk inherently requires the 
experts to negotiate both technical and social knowledge. Risk communication among experts in 
cross-disciplinary situations occurs against a backdrop of risk management, a process that 
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ultimately legitimizes some perspectives over others. Experts and other social actors demonstrate 
awareness of this backdrop by selecting and coordinating forms of evidence and reasoning that 
they believe will be accepted as more legitimate. The high stakes and contentious nature of risk 
decisions warrant a close examination of the processes by which experts communicate with each 
other about risk in order to problematize the taken-for-granted assumptions about their 
seemingly exclusive use of technical knowledge. For this reason, the overarching research 
question for this study considers how experts communicate about risk in cross-disciplinary 
situation. Specifically this study considers the types of evidence and appeals technical experts 
rely on to characterize a risk, the strategies they use to legitimize particular risk understandings, 
and the negotiation and coordination of their different perspectives. 
 Chapter II covers relevant risk communication research and connects it with research 
about interdisciplinary group interaction and the sociology and rhetoric of science. Chapter III 
builds a dialogic, multi-perspectival framework that helps gain insight into the overlaps of 
different types of knowledge used in risk communication. Chapter IV describes the methodology 
this study uses to examine the research questions. Chapters V, VI and VII discuss the findings 




LITERATURE REVIEW OF RISK COMMUNICATION 
The field of risk communication has experienced much growth since its inception in the 
late 1970’s. An important research thread within risk communication has focused on the 
differences between expert and lay groups (e.g., Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Read, 1994; 
Fischoff, 1995; McComas, 2006; Plough & Krimsky, 1987; Renn, 1998; Slovic, 1999; Uggla, 
2008). This literature review focuses on three main processes regarding risk communication 
among experts: how they characterize risk, how they coordinate different understandings, and 
how they legitimize or de-legitimize certain understandings. This chapter also provides 
background concerning the social construction of expertise—a process that impacts risk 
characterization, coordination, and legitimation.  I conclude the chapter by drawing out three 
main critiques to justify my focus on studying risk communication among experts: (1) Risk 
communication research historically treats expert groups as unitary and does not consider the 
processes by which they construct and legitimize risk understandings. (2) Risk communication 
research tends to privilege transmissive and message-centered approached to communication 
rather than examine the discursive management and coordination of different risk 
understandings. (3) Rather than assuming the taken-for-granted position that objective scientific 
knowledge is the source of legitimacy for technical risk understandings, risk communication 
research should examine the way that expert groups legitimate their knowledge claims and 
emphasize the transparency of norms and values in public discourse.  
Expertise and Risk Communication 
 Questions about legitimate meanings of risk are often underscored by concepts of 
expertise and who counts as an expert in the field of risk communication. Historically, risk 
communication research has focused on the expert/lay divide with a special emphasis on 
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understanding lay constructions of risk. This body of research implicitly treats expert groups as 
unitary and does not consider the processes by which they construct and legitimize risk 
understandings. This section discusses the expert/lay divide in risk communication and then 
unpacks notions of expertise as it relates to understandings of risk. 
Expert/Lay Divide 
 A major focus in risk communication research seeks explanations for why “technical 
experts” view risk differently than “lay citizens.” In general, technical experts tend to use 
scientific and/or engineering expertise to quantify risk through formal methods whereas lay 
citizens tend to arrive at risk understandings through affective, experiential, psychological, and 
cultural means (Elliot, 2003). Not surprisingly, technical risk perceptions tend to have more 
legitimacy in decision making among policy makers and social risk perceptions act as a powerful 
force in the public discourse and often drive public resistance to risk technologies. While this 
body of research provides useful insight into why lay citizens tend to view risks differently than 
technical experts, it has inadvertently reinforced the dichotomy between these two groups 
thereby obscuring differences within these two groups (Horlick-Jones, 1998; Lidskog, 2008).  
One dominant approach to the study of risk perceptions of lay groups is the 
psychometric paradigm. Though the majority of studies operating from this paradigm have 
explored lay groups, many of the psychological factors they articulate are germane to expert 
groups. According to the psychometric paradigm, a person forms his or her risk perception based 
on multidimensional factors of dread and fear and depends on the context of the event (Renn, 
1998; Slovic, 1987). The psychological factors spatially fit on two axes called “lack of 
knowledge” and “dread” about the risk.  A greater presence of either factor increases people’s 
perception of risk. The psychometric paradigm seems to improve explanations for human risk 
perception better than the previously favored approach of cost-benefit analysis to explain risk 
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decisions (Kunreunther, Easterling, Desvousges, & Slovic, 1990). In addition to examining the 
underlying factors, the psychometric paradigm examines how affect acts as a heuristic, or 
cognitive shortcut, that focuses a person’s attention and becomes the primary influence on his or 
her risk perceptions (Peters, Lipkus, & Diefenbach, 2006; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). This affect may take the shape of an emotion 
(Lowenstein et al., 2001), a visual image (Peters & Slovic, 1996), trust (Peters, Covello, & 
McCallum, 1997), innumeracy (Reyna & Brainerd, 1998), or a narrative (Finucane & Satterfield, 
2005; Satterfield, Slovic, & Gregory, 2000).  
Several scholars have used the psychometric paradigm to describe how people use 
different cognitive frames to arrive at their risk judgments. Plough and Krimsky (1987) 
characterized risk communication as an interaction between people with “technical” and 
“cultural” ways of understanding risk. Fiorino (1989; 1990) subsequently suggested how risk 
communication could be distinguished according to people’s use of either “technical” or 
“democratic” ways of understanding.  More recently, a growing number of researchers 
differentiate with technical and social frames (Elliot, 2003; McComas, 2006). In general these 
dualistic approaches use research from the psychometric paradigm to characterize experts as 
perceiving risks based on technical and analytic judgments of probability, costs, and trust in 
technology and lay people as perceiving risks based on social judgments that involve 
psychological, cultural, and trust factors. This tendency to categorize individuals according to two 
risk perception frames implicitly assumes an either-or logic, that a person may use one type of 
rationality or another. However, in practice, people most likely use both types of rationalities in a 
“dance of affect and reason” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004, p. 314).  
The psychometric paradigm with its focus on cognitive frames usefully explains why 
technical experts have a difficult time communicating with lay citizens. These groups operate 
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from incommensurate cognitive frames and need some form of translation in order to understand 
each other (Elliot, 2003; Fischoff, 1995, Wardman, 2008).  These kinds of insights from risk 
perception research forced risk professionals to consider other approaches of understanding risk 
beyond risk analysis methods (Fishoff, 1995; McComas, 2006). 
Even though most of this research considers the differences between technical expertise 
and social knowledge between groups, psychometric research recognizes that these types of 
cognition are not limited to particular groups. Rather, technical experts and lay citizens employ 
different types of knowledge in accordance with their values and beliefs about what counts as 
knowledge and risk. Affect organizes and enables individuals’ abilities to use technical 
rationalities when perceiving a risk (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). For 
example, narrative reasoning helped participants make sense of technical information and use 
this information for making a policy decision (Satterfield, Slovic, & Gregory, 2000). More 
specific to technical experts, a few studies demonstrate that values, beliefs, and norms may 
influence scientists’ risk perceptions (Barke & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Wright, Pearman, & 
Yeardly, 2000) and determining a policy preference (Silva, Jenkins-Smith, & Barke, 2007), 
although perhaps to a lesser degree than non-technically trained individuals (Slimak & Dietz, 
2006).  
Despite the insights gained from the psychometric paradigm, three main critiques 
redirect the attention of this study to a discursive approach. First, scholarly emphasis on the two 
frames has “resulted in a strengthening of intractable epistemological positions” (Scherer & 
Juanillo, 2003, p. 229). The different groups may recognize the different understandings of risk, 
but they do not know how to incorporate each others’ perceptions. Researchers can begin to 
remedy this situation by moving beyond a mere acknowledgement of the differences and 
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“recognize the underlying assumptions about the epistemological moorings of each language” 
(Scherer & Juanillo, 2003, p. 229) and attend to dialectical resources available in the discourse.  
Building on the first critique, the second critique challenges the psychometric paradigm 
because it privileges information processing and neglects representation concerned with 
symbols, social reality, and social knowledge (Joffe, 2003). The outcome of risk perception 
research has resulted in a “deficit model” of risk communication which continues to privilege 
technical risk understandings and does not question how the discourse provides resources for 
technical perspectives to become privileged. Research that examines the discursive role of 
language for shaping risk perceptions may help address this concern (Scherer & Juanillo, 2003). 
A final critique of the psychometric paradigm comes from Rowe and Wright’s assertion 
(2001) that much of the research about differences between expert and lay risk perceptions fails 
to problematize the definition of “expert.” Their review of the literature demonstrates that, with 
few exceptions, the “expert” samples of these studies may not really constitute the experts in the 
area of risk assessment or the topic under question—in such cases the participants were 
considered “expert” if they held a position or title of authority. Rowe and Wright suggest that 
scholars can make more meaningful claims about the differences between expert and lay 
perceptions of risk if they create a specific definition of expert and acknowledge experts’ 
variable performance on risk judgment tasks. Indeed, studies that compare expert and lay risk 
perception of industrial risks may have contradictory findings based on the different treatments 
of expertise (Wright, Pearman, & Yeardly, 2000). 
Expertise in Risk Communication 
 Any answer to the question of how technical experts legitimize their risk judgments 
must address what constitutes expertise and how it functions in the study of risk. As pointed out 
in the previous section, much of the risk communication research fails to problematize the 
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concept of expertise (Rowe & Wright, 2001) as well as recognize the heterogeneity of technical 
experts (Garvin, 2001). This section challenges the tendency to treat expertise as a personal trait 
and draws on sociological and rhetoric of science perspectives to lay a foundation for exploring 
the discursive relationships between expertise and knowledge production. 
One alternative to viewing expertise as a personal trait considers the experts’ variable 
performance on judgment tasks—tasks that they can learn about and improve (Bolger & Wright, 
1994; Rowe & Wright, 2001). Expert performance is a function of ecological validity, the degree 
experts make judgments outside field of expertise, and learnability, the degree to which experts 
learn good judgment in a task domain (Bolger & Wright, 1994). If a person positioned in an 
authoritative role, traditionally considered an expert, rates low on either of these characteristics, 
he or she may not make better judgments than a lay person (Rowe & Wright, 2001). This type of 
variation comes from differences in learning and experience rather than personal characteristics 
or traits. Additionally, differences exist between scientific and technical disciplines and 
individuals’ levels of expertise (Horlick-Jones, 1998).  
Scholars from the rhetoric of science perspective challenge the view of expertise as a 
personal trait by highlighting the negotiation of scientists’ ethos (Cochran, 2007; Prelli, 1997). 
Ethos, a concept borrowed and developed from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, considers how individuals’ 
character and credibility influence the effectiveness of communication. Ethos can range from a 
centripetal force, in which the rhetor controls the process of ethos construction, to a centrifugal 
force in which the locus of ethos construction is distributed more or less equally among the 
rhetor, audience, and context (Cochran, 2007). The concept of ethos foregrounds how an 
individual’s ability to produce expert knowledge is contingent on his or her ability to construct a 
credible character (Prelli, 1997).  
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 Scholarship has extended the relationship between character and expertise to include the 
aspect of morals and values which are embedded in the ways that people, even technical experts, 
characterize a risk (Douglas, 1990; Wynne, 1992). For example, Silva, Jenkins-Smith & Barke 
(2007) demonstrate that values, norms, and institutional affiliation partially influenced nuclear 
physicists’ and engineers’ choice of the most realistic model of radiation exposure and preferred 
model for determining policy (for similar research see Barke & Jenkins-Smith, 1993 and Slimak 
& Dietz, 2006). Scholars who study rhetoric of science traditionally argue that the scientific 
rhetoric contains limited sources of rhetorical invention due to epistemological commitments to 
the hypothetic-deductive scientific method (Cochran, 2007). This quality makes it insufficient 
for moral and political issues (Janasoff, 1990) because the rhetoric is inflexible and unable to 
adapt messages for the social context (Cochran, 2007). The case of technical experts during the 
Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident demonstrates how technical experts were unable to 
adapt to the expectations of the public sphere (Farrell & Goodnight, 1981). However, even 
though Cochran supports claims about inflexibility of scientific rhetoric, her research project 
illustrates how experts in research labs construct ethos with their publics—a process that 
necessarily involves adaption to include morals and values. Furthermore, Ceccarelli (2001) 
argues that characteristics that create differences between scientific rhetoric and public discourse 
are illusory and that scientific texts do have polysemic qualities. The relationship between values 
and expertise merits close attention because the study of risk is a science closely linked with 
policy decisions (Horlick-Jones, 1998).  
 Silva, Jenkins-Smith, and Barke (2007) treat values as cognitive artifacts, however a 
discursive approach may help explicate reasons for divergent findings about expertise and 
values. For example, healthcare professionals discursively construct their expertise in varying 
ways that depend on their status (Candlin & Candlin, 2002). Healthcare professionals who have 
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lower status tend to construct expertise implicitly by drawing on contextual resources and 
appealing to the patients’ reasoning while health care professionals with higher status tend to 
construct their expertise with explicit appeals to their knowledge and status (Linell et al., 2002).  
A final observation about the construction of expertise comes from the results of studies 
that document the influence of institutional affiliation on experts’ policy preferences (Barke & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Silva, Jenkins-Smith, & Barke, 2007). For example, in a national physics 
lab, relationships between knowledge and power within two major institutions, the discipline of 
physics and the laboratory organization, shape the production of expert knowledge. In this study, 
two teams produced different results through the rational scientific method, but they relied on 
discursive resources of the lab to negotiate the production of consistent results (Kinsella, 1999).  
The sociological and rhetoric of science perspectives emphasize processes of the social 
construction of expertise (many of the aforementioned scholars hail Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm 
model as a starting point for their scholarship). Contemporary scholars argue for re-definition of 
expertise that breaks down the false divide between values and facts (Latour, 2004) and the 
expert/lay divide (Horlick-Jones, 1998). Such actions might involve “extended peer 
communities” that include interested publics alongside traditional experts (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 
1992) and emphasize social learning and the exploration of underlying values of the knowledge 
claims (Wynne, 1992). In a discussion about expertise and risk assessment, Funtowicz and 
Ravetz (1992) observe that “to experience discomfort at discovery of the uncertainties inherent 
in science is mark of nostalgia for a secure and simple world that will never return" (p. 255) 
because "scientific arguments evolve in a continuous dialogue that is incapable of reduction to 
logic...when a party finds its interests threatened, it can always find a methodological issue with 
which to challenge unwelcome results" (p. 260). Hence, a close examination of the discursive 
strategies of technical risk communication provides a better understanding of how experts, 
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charged with making sense of the uncertainties of risk, negotiate technical knowledge, character 
morals, and values in the construction of their expertise.  
Coordination of Multi-Disciplinary Expertise 
The complexity of the social issues of risk requires cross-disciplinary interaction among 
risk experts and managers but such interactions often unfold in difficult and unproductive ways. 
Many of the difficulties arise from expectations that communication is a transmissive process 
and the presence of epistemological and terminological differences between the disciplines. This 
section discusses the critiques of risk communication from a transmissive model and strategies 
for coordinating multi-disciplinary knowledge. This background helps lay a foundation for a 
constructivist model of risk communication to examine the processes by which expert groups 
manage, negotiate, and coordinate their differences. 
Transmissive and Message-centered Models of Risk Communication 
Originally, practitioners conceived of risk communication as a field to develop 
knowledge about how to explain technical risk understandings to the lay public (Fischoff, 1995; 
Leiss, 1996). Yet, in the public sphere, social groups perceive risks differently than the technical 
experts who produce the risk assessments. The response to the executive summary of the 
landmark “Reactor Safety Study” in 1975, the first probabilistic risk assessment of nuclear 
reactors, illustrates the differences between lay and expert perceptions of risk. Audiences and 
scholars criticized the executive summary for comparing quantitative probabilities of risks of 
death from a reactor accident and risks of death from other causes such as smoking or a meteor 
strike (Covello, 1991; Keller & Modarres, 2005). Such comparisons seemed rational to the 
engineers because they compared mathematically calculated probabilities; however, they 
provoked strong reactions and disagreement in the public sphere because people felt that they 
unfairly compared voluntary and involuntary risks.  
25 
The apparent differences for how people understand a risk demonstrated the need for 
research in risk communication through persuasive or participatory processes (Fischoff, 1995; 
Leiss, 1996).  Most notably, Fischoff (1995) characterized the history of risk communication 
through attempts to persuade audiences about a risk perception and attempts to invite audiences 
to participate in deciding about a risk perception. He notes how, as risk communication practices 
matured, institutions have shifted from more persuasive approaches to more participatory 
approaches.  
Chess (2001) suggests that organizations’ institutional environments offer a better 
explanation for why they use persuasive or participatory approaches rather than maturity. This 
perspective represents how scholars and practitioners often view risk communication as a public 
relations activity by which industries can legitimize their activity to the public (Chess, 2001; 
Chess, Saville, Tamuz, & Greenburg, 1992; Leiss, 1996; Wardman, 2008). The practice of risk 
communication emerged, in part, as a response to industrial accidents such as Bhopal (Chess, 
2001) and Three Mile Island (Dionisopoulas & Crable, 1988; Sandman & Paden, 1979). Chess 
(2001) used institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987) to illustrate how 
organizations operate in a taken-for-granted environment of rules, norms, roles, and expectations 
and strategically use communication to achieve legitimacy, a congruence between social values 
attributed with activity and acceptable norms in larger society. Communication studies also 
illustrate how the oil and gas industry (Crable & Vibbert, 1983) as well as the nuclear industry 
(Diosinopoulas & Crable, 1988) strategically placed rhetorical resources in the public sphere in 
order to draw on them later in times of crisis. 
Rowan (1994) recasts the persuasive and participatory question from classical rhetorical 
point of view by emphasizing that all communication functions to inform, persuade, and build 
credibility. Risk communication is a meaning-making activity in addition to a decision-making 
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activity (Hamiton & Wills-Toker, 2006; Rowan, 1994). In this vein, the social amplification of 
risk model describes interaction among psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural 
processes that heightens the collective public perception of risk (Kasperson, Renn et al., 1988). 
As information moves through these social institutions, it gains greater amplification and the 
public becomes more aware and concerned about a risk. Trust in institutions plays an important 
role in mediating the amplification effects (Kasperson et al., 1988). Social trust is the public’s 
belief that institutions behave in ways that are competent, predictable, and caring. An 
organization’s lack of social trust can increase the perception of risk (McComas & Trumbo, 
2001; Metlay, 1999). For example, studies of the siting of the high-level radioactive waste 
repository at Yucca Mountain (Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992) and of Sweden’s risk 
communication to Denmark about a Swedish nuclear plant located only twenty miles from 
Copenhagen (Löfstadt, 1996) demonstrated that the absence of trust contributed to the 
amplification of risk. 
Some scholars praise the social amplification of risk as a comprehensive model and 
possible tool for theoretically integrating different risk communication paradigms (McComas, 
2006). However, others criticize it for treating the communication process as transmissive and 
failing to recognize the politics of risk (Murdock, Petts, & Horlick-Jones, 2003; Wardman, 
2008). The metaphor of “amplification” assumes the sender-receiver model of communication 
and with it the implication that one can improve communication by simply removing “noise.” 
Additionally, the social amplification model assumes that all institutions can equally contest 
each others’ claims in a democratic manner and this fails to account for the greater influence of 
more powerful groups. As an alternative metaphor, Bordieau’s field of play metaphor may better 
illustrate how these social institutions are situated and constrained in fields in which they can 
contest or complement each others’ meanings (Murdock, Petts, & Horlick-Jones, 2003). This 
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metaphor foregrounds assumptions about complex social and political communicative 
construction of risk.  
Even though many scholars recognize the public’s active role in construction of the 
meanings of risk (Fessendon-Raden, Fitchen, & Heath, 1987; Fischoff, 1995; Leiss, 1996; Joffe, 
2003; Scherer & Juanillo, 2003; McComas, 2006), the bulk of risk communication research 
implicitly uses a transmissive model of communication (Wardman, 2008).  Some researchers 
propose an interactive view of risk communication that integrates the multiple understandings of 
risk (Fischoff, 1995; Scherer & Juanillo, 2003; Kasperson et al., 1988; McComas, 2006). 
However, research studies treat risk communication as messages about a risk—evidenced in the 
multiple studies that examine the impact of messages or communication events on people’s risk 
perceptions (Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, Read, 1994; Kunreuther et al., 1990; Lofstedt, 1996; 
McComas, 2003; McComas & Trumbo, 2001; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Uggla, 2008; Visschers, 
Meertens, Passchier, & deVries, 2007).  Many of these scholars advocate the constitutive nature 
of risk, even if they do not study the processes by which social constructions come to exist 
(McComas, 2006; Plough & Krimsky, 1987; Renn, 1998; Slovic, 1999).  
Scholarship that emphasizes risk messages offers advice for how to adapt 
communication for audiences’ concerns and background knowledge (Bostrom et al., 1994; 
Covello, 2006) and the contextual situation (Sandman, 2003; Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & 
Littlefield, 2009). This practical approach for risk communication has roots in the expert/lay 
paradigm and the concomitant deficit model of communication. Because of this, risk 
communication efforts often have the effect of reinforcing power structures because risk 
psychology "proves" the irrationality of the public (Joffe, 2003; Wardman, 2008). Even 
approaches that seem more participatory and egalitarian may inadvertently reinforce the 
expert/lay divide (Lidskog, 2008). These paradigms of risk communication may have become 
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more acceptable in the technical sphere and organizational practice because their ontologies 
accept risks as more objective and hence the social construction of risk perspectives became 
eclipsed (Horlick-Jones, 1998). Additionally, “disciplines that offer an understanding of 
behaviour as the predictable response to incentives which are in principle manipulable by 
policy” have more relevance to policy-makers than more complex social scientific explanations 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2008, p. 866). Even though the transmissive, message-centered model of 
communication has applicability for public outreach activities, risk communication among 
experts must study communication as a constitutive process by which groups interactively 
negotiate meaning and coordinate differences.  
Research that studies the influence of messages on risk perception may seem useful for 
drawing connections between these phenomena, the creation of "best practice toolboxes” results 
in the systematic embedding of risk communication in regulations and corporate governance and 
invites users to engage in activity without awareness of imprints the theoretical underpinnings of 
these approaches (Wardman, 2008). This results in applications of risk communication that mask 
power, distort risk management, and detract from considering whether risk communication really 
translates into socially valued communicative action. Such a critique helps us see that 
communication not only contains messages about risk but that the social construction of risk 
occurs in communicative processes. To address these concerns Wardman (2008) proposes a 
framework to examine the theoretical underpinnings of major bodies of risk communication 
research. Additionally, a consideration of how risk communication theories explain and address 





Interaction among Technical and Scientific Experts 
While little empirical research exists about risk communication among technical and 
scientific experts, we can lay a foundation by examining practices of expert elicitation in risk 
analysis, research in multi-disciplinary research teams, and the negotiation of credibility.  
Expert judgment in risk analysis. In contrast to sociology and rhetoric of science 
perspectives that foreground social and discursive practices of producing knowledge, the risk 
assessment community develops quantitative tools to capture experts’ knowledge and control for 
the influence of bias in expert judgments. In the absence of empirical data about the mechanisms 
of a risk situation, risk analysts rely on a technique called “expert elicitation” for input into the 
risk assessment (Chhibber, Apostolakis, & Okrent, 1992). For example, accidents at nuclear 
power plants rarely occur, and this creates a void of “hard” data about causes of accidents and 
systems’ performance under accident conditions. Thus, disciplinary experts provide professional 
judgments about the degree of belief an event will happen based on their knowledge and 
experience—these become computational inputs about system component success and failure 
rates (Ortiz, Wheeler et al., 1991). Expert elicitation panels usually include disciplinary experts, 
professionals in decision sciences, and risk managers from different cultural and ethical 
backgrounds (Zio & Apostolakis, 1997). These “subjective probabilities” become aggregated 
through either a behavioral, consensus-based technique or a mathematical process (Zio & 
Apostolakis, 1997). Expert elicitation is a widely accepted practice in probabilistic risk 
assessment. Due to their commitment to objectivity, these practitioners create techniques to 
measure and control for the potential bias in their judgments (for one example see Zio & 
Apostolakis, 1997).  
Without going into much detail, for the purposes of this study, it is enough to know that 
the field of risk analysis rigorously studies and conducts the expert elicitation process to achieve 
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objectivity. The absence of data, that provokes the need for expert elicitation, illustrates the great 
uncertainties that risk assessment faces and the degree to which expert judgment provides input. 
Despite efforts to achieve objectivity, this community of experts is subject to overconfidence, 
statistical vulnerabilities of low probability events, and institutional pressure related to costs and 
politics (Freudenberg, 1988). In the end, this process masks the social role of discourse in expert 
elicitation process. Skinner (2008) poignantly illustrates this in his comparison between the 
“dry” and ineffective technical report warning about risks of a volcano eruption and the relevant 
and humorous accounts of expert elicitation told by a technical participant after the fact. Studies 
like this begin to unmask the production of risk knowledge by attending closely to 
communication among technical experts and understanding how they legitimize their risk 
understandings.  
Multi-/Inter-/Trans-disciplinary knowledge. Since society faces complex, multifaceted, 
and multidisciplinary risks, decisions about these risks necessarily involve experts from several 
disciplines (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). This practice parallels trends in academia to promote 
interdisciplinarity (Collins, 2002). The federal government and other funding institutions 
promote interdisciplinary scholarship in efforts to gain insights and make decisions about the 
complex social problems (Collins, 2002; Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004; Thompson, 2007; 2009). 
Even though scholars readily recognize the need for interdisciplinary research to address 
complex risks, little research exists about communication in interdisciplinary research teams 
(Thompson, 2007; 2009) and risk communication among technical experts (Bier, 2001).  
When discussing interdisciplinary research, one must distinguish among terms that 
people frequently use synonymously (Collins, 2002; Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). “Discipline” 
refers to a branch of learning that shares characteristics of accepted content. “Multidisciplinary” 
refers to cooperation among disciplines yet they retain their distinctions. “Interdisciplinary” 
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refers to research that integrates the disciplines to produce a unified outcome based on a new 
way of knowing. Thompson’s (2007; 2009) research about a multidisciplinary research team 
illustrates the difficulty of transcending the disciplinary specialization to achieve 
interdisciplinary research. Barriers to interdisciplinary research include disciplinary culture, 
time, evaluation, publication, employment, funding, promotion, and recognition (Kostoff, 2002). 
The little existing research about interdisciplinary groups, demonstrates the difficulty 
that they have in coming to a shared understanding of problems and how to research them. These 
difficulties arise from different research traditions and the fact that different members of the 
team, due to assigned expertise, focus on different facets of the problem at hand. Thompson’s 
(2007; 2009) ethnographic research with a multidisciplinary research term draws out four 
processes associated with multidisciplinary collaboration: (1) debating over expertise and 
posturing for power, (2) sharing learning and language, (3) developing a shared vision, and (4) 
integrating data. Eight communicative resources contribute to the processes: trust, presence, 
humor, encounter talk, discussion about language, boredom, challenging statements, and 
reflexive communication. Of these processes and resources, shared language, trust, and reflexive 
communication contribute most to interdisciplinary collaboration. In particular, Thompson 
(2007) notes that communication to develop a shared language must move beyond equations and 
measurements and move to concepts. For example abstract diagrams helped to facilitate the 
conversation because each disciplinary participant could locate his or her position in the diagram 
and propose revisions (Milligan et al., 1999 also report a similar strategy as effective). 
Additionally, Thompson observes that participants invented terms if they could not agree on 
definitions.  
Thompson (2007; 2009) observes several hindrances that limited the team’s ability to 
accomplish interdisciplinary collaboration. Disagreements about definitions and language usage 
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challenged individuals’ disciplinary identity and often led to interpersonal conflict and team 
attrition. Research using dialectical theory in healthcare teams illustrates similar emphasis on 
identity and relationship construction (Martin, O’Brier, Heyworth, & Meyer, 2008). When a 
team has unequal understandings of each person’s role it contributes to a tension between 
autonomy and connectedness. A team’s struggle with decisions to maintain routines or develop 
new approaches to problem-solving contributes to a tension between predictability and 
uniqueness. These contextually-based tensions are inevitable; however awareness about these 
identity tensions can serve as a tool for self-reflexive talk about improving relationships and 
interdisciplinary research (Thompson, 2007; 2009; Martin et al., 2008).  
Although previous research has emphasized interpersonal characteristics of 
multidisciplinary research, Thompson’s (2007) study also highlighted institutional influences on 
the process. The research team negotiated four task-oriented dilemmas in order to collaborate: 
(1) selection of measurement sites, (2) negotiation of simple/complex descriptions of 
phenomena, (3) negotiation of tensions between social and natural sciences, and (4) the 
production of a written product. Thompson examined systemic factors and outcomes of 
interdisciplinary research by integrating these findings into a computer model. In this model, the 
level of professional facilitation, experience working on research teams, influx of new money, 
and institutional support had the most influence on interdisciplinarity in team research. 
Even though much of this section treats scientific and technical experts as monolithic in 
their construction of knowledge according to tenets of the scientific method, each discipline 
carries its’ own expectations about what counts as data and appropriate methods of data 
collection and analysis (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). For example, in the nuclear field, 
engineering risk assessment and health risk assessment provide different understandings of risk 
(Jones, 1995). Each expertise focuses on different potential consequences of nuclear 
33 
technologies (core melt vs. radiation exposure) and different phases of events leading to the 
consequences. Engineering risk assessment characterizes the risk of failure of nuclear reactor 
safety systems—usually measured as probability of core damage failure. Health risk assessment 
characterizes risk of harmful substances (such as radiation or chemicals) to human health—
usually measured in cancer fatalities. In this example, the experts agree that radiation exposure is 
a real potential hazard (even if they view it unlikely due to safety measures); however they orient 
themselves to different facets of this risk.  Such variations illustrate how differences between 
technical disciplines may lead to difficulty communicating with each other about risks.   
Ethos and expertise in interaction. The relationship between ethos and expertise 
becomes relevant for research among multidisciplinary research teams because, in order to 
construct legitimate knowledge, scientists must engage in the construction of ethos with their 
audiences (both peer experts and lay). Prelli (1997) lists several possible topoi that scientists may 
draw upon to critique or defend a research project: impartiality, objectivity, commitment, 
novelty, humility, and communality. Individuals draw on these topoi differently based on the 
context of the situation. Furthermore, Prelli (1997) claims that the question of experts’ ethos may 
become more important in “boundary” work in which experts’ knowledge becomes used in 
policy situations or popular science (as in the case of risk communication and risk management). 
Additionally, the relationship between ethos and expertise helps explain how attacks to 
credibility impede multidisciplinary research teams’ knowledge production process (Thompson, 
2007; 2009). Myers (2006) observes that individuals perceive attacks to credibility as face 
threats. Risk talk tends to contain several credibility attacks because it inherently involves values 
associated with choices about a risk. Myers documents five categories of commonplaces that 
people draw on during facework in risk conversations: (1) possibility, a concept to deal with 
uncertainty, (2) scale, a concept to deal with calculation, (3) proximity, a concept deal with 
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agency, (4) time, a concept to deal with cause and effect and morality, and (5) self and others, a 
concept to deal with responsibility. Myers’ categories arise from risk conversations among non-
technical people and it remains to be seen whether technical experts use these commonplaces in 
conversations with peers. They may use these commonplaces because, as social humans, they 
attend to conversational norms. However, if nature of scientific rhetoric deprives it of flexibility 
and rhetorical sources of invention, experts may not use these commonplaces in technical 
conversations.  
In summary, this section discussed interaction among experts in risk analysis, multi-
disciplinary research, and the negotiation of ethos. Many of these processes may also appear in 
risk communication among technical experts. Risk assessments systematically incorporate 
expertise using mathematical techniques to produce subjective probabilities. Despite awareness 
and attempts to control for bias, these practices aspire to achieve objectivity and mask the 
discursive construction of expertise. Finally, this section reviewed interpersonal and institutional 
difficulties in multi-disciplinary communication. These concepts may transfer to multi-
disciplinary conversations and decisions about risks. However, we must exercise caution in their 
application due to differences in context. Multidisciplinary research teams (such as the one 
studied by Thompson, 2007; 2009) tend to work together for long periods of time and meet with 
a regular frequency and have more characteristics of groups and teams. Situations of 
multidisciplinary risk communication may occur less frequently, in special meeting situations 
such as public workshops. Additionally, organizations with functional barriers along disciplinary 
lines may limit internal cross-disciplinary exchanges about risk. 
Interaction with Risk Managers 
 The published scholarship about risk communication among technical experts and 
managers reflects a bias toward the rational-actor model and transmissive model of 
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communication. Bier (2001) summarizes government surveys about risk managers’ preferences 
for the content and characteristics of risk messages. Managers prefer risk communication to 
contain these characteristics: (1) comprehensive and understandable, (2) applicable and useful 
for decision at hand, (3) credible and defensible, (4) clear and brief with balanced treatment of 
contentious issues, (5) clear about basis for choosing key assumptions, and (6) relevant to a 
policy framework. In order to improve decision making about risk, managers desire content that 
includes the legal requirements, possible adverse effects of regulating hazard, available options 
to reduce risk, extent of public concern, and reliability of information. The bulk of Bier’s review 
discusses the four types of uncertainty associated with risk assessment (outcome uncertainty, 
assessment uncertainty, state of knowledge, and population variability) and emphasizes that risk 
communication should distinguish among the types of uncertainty when comparing risks, 
uncertainty of effectiveness, and uncertainty about magnitude. Even though Bier’s review 
provides a thought-provoking view of managers’ preferences for legitimate risk communication 
from analysts, it assumes a transmissive model. Further research should examine communication 
among risk experts (managers and analysts) and systematically explore the processes and 
interactions by which disciplinary groups construct and coordinate this desirable content. 
A large body of research in public participation collectively provides a critique of the 
rational-actor model in the risk management context. This research challenges how the 
assumptions of the rational actor model and one-way communication from the policy-makers to 
the public limit permissible types of knowledge and quality of interaction (Fiorino, 1990; 
Peterson & Franks, 2006; Tuler, 2000). Public participation research privileges the democratic 
and dialogic processes of the discourse-based risk management strategies (Barge, 2006; Fiorino, 
1990; Hamilton, 2003; 2007; Hamilton & Wills-Toker, 2006; Klinke & Renn, 2002; McComas, 
2003). Public participation for purposes of risk management tends to emphasize decision-making 
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processes and ignore an important function of risk communication, the meaning making process 
(Hamilton & Wills-Toker, 2006). Challenging the rational-actor paradigm proves to be difficult 
because policy makers and bureaucratic agencies control the power and discursive structures to 
inform, persuade, and create meaning (Ratliff, 1997). The public participation research sets a 
backdrop of risk management interaction that foregrounds issues of content and processes that 
make risk understandings more or less legitimate to risk managers and the public. When experts 
interact among themselves they demonstrate awareness of public participation which may serve 
as a resource for legitimation.  
In summary, this section has discussed the transmissive model of risk communication, 
research about interaction among multi-disciplinary experts, and interaction with risk managers. 
Even though the transmissive model of risk communication has utility for public outreach, a 
constitutive approach can examine the construction and legitimation of risk among experts. The 
research about interactions among technical experts and risk managers lays a foundation for 
what strategies and content may legitimatize risk understandings and a closer examination of the 
processes can demonstrate how experts construct and legitimize meanings of risk, and how they 
coordinate the inevitable differences.  
Legitimation and Construction of Risk 
For purposes of this study, legitimation simply refers to the ways that a risk 
understanding fits with social norms and expectations and becomes a more acceptable 
perspective. The use of a risk understanding to inform a risk decision acts as a litmus test of 
legitimation; however it is also important to examine the processes of how experts construct and 
coordinate legitimate risk understandings among themselves. The process of legitimizing a risk 
relies on actors’ abilities to use social norms and values acceptably in conjunction with scientific 
facts. A critical body of research considers the role of power and ideology in the constitution and 
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legitimacy of risk understandings. This section discusses cultural and institutional sources of 
legitimizing risk and the social learning perspectives that emphasize the transparency of norms 
and values in public discourse. Each of these perspectives treats risk as a social construction in 
order to demonstrate how dominant paradigms distort or mask power and sources of legitimacy. 
However, despite these theoretical contributions, these perspectives provide insufficient levels of 
detail about constructive processes from a discursive point of view and focus on differences 
between expert and lay groups rather than differences among expert groups. 
Social Learning Perspective 
 The social learning perspective explicitly argues that different groups must recognize the 
conditional nature of knowledge and that “the main challenge to risk assessment and technology 
assessment is to unearth and debate conditions of legitimate authority for different risk 
knowledges in a social learning process" (Wynne, 1992, p. 276). This approach to understand 
risk recognizes that "different social values and interests seem to be embedded within the 
competing technical knowledges, structuring them in ways that reflect covert social interests, 
although they appear natural and objectively given" (Wynne, 1992, p. 278). For example, 
following the Chernobyl nuclear accident, sheep farmers used their local knowledge about 
typical sheep behavior to correct expert assumptions about the presence of radioactive material 
in the environment (Wynne, 1992). This emphasis on conditional knowledge helps explain 
foundations of the social groups who act on a “field of play” (Murdock, Petts, & Horlick-Jones, 
2003). Additionally, the notion of “covert social interests” embedded in “competing technical 
knowledges” explains the implicit role of values in experts’ policy preferences (Silva, Jenkins-
Smith, & Barke, 2007) and explains organizations’ efforts to appear legitimate despite the social 
interests. Additionally, institutions (policy setting organizations or scientific disciplines) tend to 
simplify complex social risks and make sense of complexities and ambiguities (Wynne, 1992).  
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The social learning approach acknowledges power differences between types of 
knowledge. Instead of the traditional approach of debating technical differences, the social 
learning approach suggests that the best way to address the differences begins with explicit 
articulation of the taken-for-granted values that underlie their epistemologies. Three categories 
of taken-for-granted values include (1) the pursuit of truth which society often associates with 
scientists, (2) the common good which society often associates with policy-makers, and (3) 
moral concerns which society often associates with advocacy groups and citizens (Strydom, 
2008). As the social actors interact with each about risk they inevitably learn about each others’ 
values. Risk understandings become legitimate under the purview of public interest without 
which “a critical discourse in which the participants collectively learn through the mutual 
exposure of biases, distortions, half-truths, illusions, and rationalizations cannot come about” 
(Strydom, 2008, p. 15). Wynne (1992) maintains that “nothing in this interpretive perspective 
denies the importance and value of science; it allows the opportunity to place scientific 
knowledge on a more legitimate, properly conditional, and ultimately more effective footing" (p. 
279).   
 Not surprisingly, few examples exist of groups who use risk communication as an 
opportunity to make the underlying assumptions of their risk understandings transparent. Taylor 
(1996) accomplishes this by artificially juxtaposing personal and embodied experiences with 
nuclear weapons with the scientific messages disseminated for political and military purposes. In 
one example, Taylor (1997) explores the underlying assumptions of photographs and narratives 
of victims of nuclear weapons. He compares the underlying assumptions of these embodied and 
contextualized representations with the underlying values and assumption of the objective and 
isolated risk messages of the technical discourse of the epidemiology studies. The juxtaposition 
of these different types of knowing makes the social interests apparent, however Taylor’s effects 
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to construct this type of interaction highlights the effect of the more powerful, epidemiological 
discourse that often silences the voices of the victims.   
 Even though social learning perspectives (Wynne, 1992; Strydom, 2008) help articulate 
questions about the legitimacy of knowledge and their relationship to power, these perspectives 
have cognitivist orientations that locates the sources of underlying values in collective human 
cognition. Therefore, these perspectives do not help address the communicative process of the 
legitimation of risk. Additionally, these perspectives focus on differences among technical and 
lay groups and do not explicitly theorize about underlying values as sources of legitimation in 
risk communication among expert groups. 
Cultural Risk Perspective 
 According to cultural theory, risks become politicized by processes that link hazardous 
events with blame and these become accounts about who should take responsibility for the 
hazards (Dake, 1992).  This theory of risk has its roots in Mary Douglas’ book, Purity and 
Danger, and became fully explicit in Douglas and Wildavsky’s book, Risk and Culture (Tansey 
& O’Riordan, 1999). This perspective sorts individual cultural risk tendencies—their 
understanding and trust of technology and institutions—into four cultural groupings using two 
dimensions: (a) group, and (b) grid. The group dimension describes the extent to which an 
individual identifies with a particular collectivity. The grid dimension describes the symbolic 
action of these groups along a continuum of routine and personalized. The four cultural groups 
include: (1) individualist, (2) hierarchist, (3) egalitarian, and (4) isolates (Tansey & O-Riordan, 
1999; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). Individualist cultures value technology for economic purposes, 
hierarchical cultures value technology for control and trust institutions to control risks, 
egalitarian cultures tend to fear technology as an inequalizer and lack trust in institutions, and 
isolates distrust knowledge from science and avoid solving social problems.  From this 
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perspective risk communication consists of the different cultural groups’ accounts that establish 
responsibilities for certain hazards. This perspective enables consideration of how “questions 
over the acceptability of potentially dangerous technologies are actually questions about the 
distribution of power, the credibility of authority, and the legitimacy of decision-making 
practices and procedures” (Mirel, 1994, p. 47). For example, Peterson (2003) explains how the 
different cultures act as social frames that accord legitimacy (or illegitimacy) to decisions made 
in three examples of intractable conflicts. 
Cultural risk theory foregrounds the role of individual risk perceptions as devices by 
which people seek to maintain a particular way of life (Dake, 1992). This risk paradigm provides 
a holistic picture of how society constitutes risk through the role of social knowledge, trust, 
politics, and morality. Furthermore, Douglas (1990) describes a rhetorical view of risk as a 
“bridge between the known facts of existence and the construction of a moral community" (p. 5) 
which encompasses notions of danger and justice. The more a community can draw strong 
connections between cause and effect of a danger, the more they can use risk as a rhetorical 
device to uphold a particular moral code. Proponents of the cultural view of risk question the 
value of improved communication techniques for reconciling different risk opinions because 
even the techniques are grounded in power and moral points of view (Douglas, 1990). This view 
of risk usefully emphasizes the social construction of risk and its rhetorical function to legitimize 
existing power structures and moral codes. However, this theory has a macro level of analysis 
and does not provide details about the processes of how social actors use the rhetorical resources 
of the discourse (more or less successfully) to legitimize their risk understandings.    
Two ethnographic examples illustrate how dominant cultural discourses function to 
legitimize risks by making them seem invisible. The discourse communities surrounding the La 
Hague peninsula in France (the location of nuclear reactors and a nuclear reprocessing facility) 
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restricted the residents from explicitly articulating their concerns to the point that they claimed 
they could not see the plant from their property—but only because they were facing away it 
(Zonabend, 1993). The communities around Carlsbad, New Mexico combined the cultural code 
of economy with the code of “isolation” to create a premise that the “nothingness” attribute of 
the land was economically suitable for siting the Waste Isolation Plant (WIPP) for low-level 
radioactive waste (Morgan, 2007). This economic and cultural discourse held up against 
arguments from other critics and minimized health concerns so much that they did not manifest 
in the discourse.   
Each of these case studies raise questions about how cultural discourse can marginalize 
health concerns and make risk seem acceptable to the communities who rationalize their duty to 
bear the risks of a hazardous technology. They demonstrate how cultural discourse distorts 
power during the process of legitimizing a risk and provides rhetorical resources for social actors 
to legitimize a risk (Douglas, 1990).  However, these examples, and cultural theory overall, 
primarily focus on non-technical social actors. Ultimately, cultural theory helps articulate 
questions about morality and legitimation of risk in society and these arguments can reasonably 
transferred to an examination of technical expert groups. However, it is also important to focus 
on micro levels of discourse in order to understand the processes by which people construct 
legitimate and non-legitimate understandings of risk. 
Institutional Theory 
While cultural theory provides a societal view of the construction of risk, institutional 
theory explains how organizations gain credibility from their environments by legitimizing 
inconsistencies between organizational structures and organizational practices, such as the 
differences between technical and managerial practices (Scott, 1987). Organizations use symbols 
such as ceremony and rituals to legitimize their structures. This ceremonial activity becomes 
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significant by following the categorical rules of myths, rather than the organization’s actual 
concrete managerial and technical practices. These categorical rules of myths may actually 
appear inconsistent with the organizations’ practices and outputs. Therefore, organizations tend 
to decouple managerial and technical practices in order to buffer their inconsistencies from the 
external environment. For example, the case of Sybron Chemical constitutes effective risk 
communication, in part, because the organization closely coupled risk managers with external 
risk communication activity by requiring managers to respond to public input and inquiry 
(Chess, Saville, Tamuz, & Greenberg, 1992). However, most organizations decouple risk 
decision-making, risk assessment, and risk communication activity. In order to build legitimacy 
with an environment, organizations try to make processes appear rational by drawing 
“ceremonial” connections between decision-making, assessment, and public participation. Since 
experts’ values may have more influence on their policy preferences than normally recognized in 
the desirable rational actor model (Barke & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Silva, Jenkins-Smith, & Barke, 
2007), organizations may feel the need to deemphasize this phenomenon to appear legitimate. 
For example, the Hanford Plutonium Works museum illustrates how an institution used 
decoupling to appear legitimate (Taylor & Freer, 2002). The discourse of the scientific, military 
institution used several strategies to decouple the weapons from the victims. The museum 
represented the victims through epidemiological studies that objectify and isolated human bodies 
in overly scientific and “cold” museum displays and represents the weapons through mystifying 
and secretive discourse of the weapons productions organizations. Additionally, the museum 
drew upon discourse from Cold War military and political rhetoric that makes the dangers of 
nuclear weapons seem acceptable because of their role in protecting the nation. This example 
illustrates how an institution decouples its practices while ceremonially representing itself in a 
manner that makes itself more legitimate to the public.  
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In summary, the social learning perspectives emphasize the importance of foregrounding 
the values and assumptions that underlie experts’ understandings of risk. Cultural and 
institutional theories demonstrate processes by which society and organizations construct 
legitimate and non-legitimate understandings of risk. Cultural theory highlights the relationship 
between social values and rhetorical constructions of risk. Institutional theory highlights how 
organizational practices that hide decoupled activities act as legitimation devices, such as 
meeting social expectations and ceremonial activities. The review of this section creates a 
foundation for examining processes by which experts legitimize risk understandings and 
resources that they may draw upon. 
Statement of Research Questions 
As noted in Chapter I, the complexity of contemporary risks increasingly forces policy 
makers to attend to understandings of risk from multiple disciplinary experts (Horlick-Jones & 
Sime, 2004). These experts may discuss results from risk analyses or simply share scientific 
knowledge about the risk of concern. In either case, the experts draw upon different disciplinary 
assumptions and methodologies to explain the hazard’s causal mechanisms and the degree of 
severity of the risks. These differences often produce divergent conclusions and 
recommendations which makes multi-disciplinary expert perspectives difficult to reconcile. 
However, the high stakes and contentious nature of risk decisions warrants a close examination 
of the processes by which experts from multiple disciplines communicate with each other about 
risk. For this reason, the overarching research question for this study is as follows: How do 
experts from different disciplines communicate with each other about risk?   
In pursing this broad question, this study takes into account two main aspects of the 
inherent nature of risk. First, as a future-oriented concept, risk struggles with a dialectic tension 
between realist and constructivist ontologies: the source and effects of the hazard are based on 
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material phenomenon; however, until it manifests, the meaning of the risk is constructed in 
social processes. Second, as a result of this tension, communication about risk finds itself in the 
overlap between technical and public spheres, drawing on both scientific and social knowledges, 
arguments, and evidence.  Building on these fundamental tensions, which become recurring 
themes, the review of literature focuses the general question of expert risk communication into 
four specific areas of inquiry: the societal resources and types of evidence and appeals technical 
experts use to characterize a risk, the strategies they use to legitimize particular risk 
understandings, and the negotiation and coordination of their different perspectives. 
Historically, risk communication research treats expert groups as unitary and does not 
consider the processes by which they construct and legitimize risk understandings. Much of the 
risk communication field explores conflicting risk perceptions between technical and lay frames 
with an emphasis on the psychological and social aspects of lay risk perception. The failure to 
problematize how experts construct risk understandings contributes to the systematic masking of 
production of expert knowledge (Beck, 1992). By treating experts’ risk characterizations as more 
rational, this body of research inadvertently reinforces the differences between these groups. In 
order to unmask these processes, the first two research questions for this study asks the following 
research questions:  
RQ1:  What are the societal resources that enable and constrain expert's talk about risk? 
RQ2: What types of evidence and appeals do experts rely on to articulate their 
characterizations of risk? 
In addition to the overly simple treatment of experts, risk communication research tends 
to privilege transmissive and message-centered approaches to communication rather than 
discursively examining how individuals manage and coordinate different risk understandings. 
Rather than assuming a transmissive flow of messages and information, this study takes a 
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constitutive approach to communication. A constitutive approach avoids treating communication 
as a secondary phenomenon resulting from psychological, sociological, cultural, or economic 
factors but rather “itself is the primary, constitutive social process that explains all these other 
factors” (Craig, 1999, p. 126). Craig (1999) finds it useful to maintain both transmissive and 
constitutive models as a useful dialectic in communication theory. However, this study takes a 
constitutive approach because it enables consideration of the processes behind the construction 
of meaning about risks (Wardman, 2008). This allows for more specific inquiry about the 
following question: 
RQ3: How do experts from multiple disciplines negotiate and coordinate their different 
perspectives? 
In addition to considering the resources and coordination used in the characterization of 
risk, this study examines which of the expert understandings become constructed as more or less 
legitimate. Decision-makers use more legitimate understandings in risk decisions and experts’ 
awareness of risk management procedures impacts their choice of legitimation strategies. Some 
risk communication theories address questions of legitimacy at a macro, social scale but inquiry 
must also focus on micro discursive processes within expert groups. For this reason, the final 
question for this study asks: 
RQ4: What strategies do experts use to legitimize their particular risk understandings 
and justify choices that result from the risk understandings? 
The dialectical nature of risk requires the groups to negotiate both technical and social 
knowledges, regardless of their assigned role as expert or lay. Given the abundance of research 
about lay risk perspectives, this study addresses the less studied processes by which experts 
characterize, coordinate, and legitimate their risk understandings. The next chapter justifies a 
discursive approach to pursuing these research questions and creates a dialogic, multi-
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perspectival framework that helps gain insight into the specific discursive actions of experts’ risk 
communication in multi-disciplinary situations.
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CHAPTER III 
A DIALOGIC APPROACH TO RISK COMMUNICATION 
The previous chapter addressed the issues of how risk communication research treats 
expert groups as unitary and privileges transmissive and message-centered approaches to 
communication rather than discursively examining the construction of different risk 
understandings. This chapter builds a framework to address these issues by using a discourse 
analytic approach to examine the process by which experts characterize, coordinate, and 
legitimize their meanings of risk. In particular, it will examine interactions of experts across 
different technical disciplines.  
Discourse theories are well suited to study this type of question because discourse 
considers how the active language use constitutes social reality with a special emphasis on 
meaning (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). Individuals naturally and unselfconsciously use 
language in contextually appropriate way to do things—order, request, persuade, accuse—that 
construct their social worlds. This activity often results in much variation in talk and discursive 
analysis provides the contextual reasons to explain the differences (Potter & Wetherall, 2001). A 
discursive approach to risk communication takes the constitutive nature of risk seriously and 
provides insight into the characterization, coordination, and legitimation of risk through active, 
contextual use of language (Joffe, 2003; Sarangi & Candlin, 2003). 
This chapter creates a dialogic, multi-perspectival framework that is suitable for 
analyzing the complex variations in interactions. First, the chapter describes Bakhtin’s (1981a; 
1981b) dialogism as the organizing theory for the framework. Then, it integrates Potter and 
Wetherall’s (1987) discursive psychology, Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) discourse theory, and 
Gidden’s (1984) structuration theory. The last section discusses how a Bakhtinian dialogic 
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framework opens up discourse to demonstrate that experts’ characterization of risk inherently 
involves coordination and legitimation processes.   
Creating a Discursive Multi-Perspectival Framework 
This study aims to avoid treating discourse as an entity that simply exists “out there” 
and, instead, treats it as a “product of self-interested rhetoric” (C. Conrad, personal 
communication, February 2009) that focuses “on the symbolic processes through which social 
and organizational actors draw upon existing social-linguistic structures to produce, reproduce, 
and legitimize systems of privilege and domination” (Conrad, 2004, p. 429). The field of 
discourse analysis has several theoretical perspectives about the scale of discourse and individual 
relationships to discourse (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). Creation of a multi-perspectival 
framework takes advantage of multiple treatments of discourse to unpack its constructive 
processes (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). When a coherent framework integrates different 
theories, their unique perspectives enable the examination of expert risk communication from 
different vantage points (Phillips, 2000; Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). By taking care to create a 
consistent framework under Bakhtin’s dialogism, this study offers a useful explanation of the 
nuances and variations of expert risk communication phenomena that people often take for 
granted, treat as uniform, and make inaccessible to outside groups. 
I chose Bakhtin’s dialogism as an organizing theoretical framework because it enables 
the articulation of questions about how experts’ communication about risk has multiple layers of 
meaning. As the Chapter II highlights, these layers may incorporate morals, values, scientific 
information, political views, and other disciplinary points of view. Bakhtin (1981a) writes that 
discourse is “a struggle among socio-linguistic points of view” (p. 273) and that it is “oriented 
toward an understanding that is responsive” (p. 280). These descriptions capture the dialogic 
aspect of discourse with its notions of struggle and anticipation of response. Concepts from other 
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theories—Potter and Wetherall’s discursive psychology, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, 
and Gidden’s structuration theory—extend the dialogic framework. Subsequent sections describe 
what these additional theories contribute to the study, distinguish the similarities and differences 
with Bakhtin, and “translate” the theoretical concepts into dialogic terms (Phillips & Jørgensen, 
2002).  
Bakhtin’s Theory of Dialogue 
Clark and Holquist summarize Bakhtin’s ideas about dialogue “as the extensive set of 
conditions that are imminently modeled in any actual exchange between two persons but are not 
exhausted in such an exchange…ultimately dialogue means communication between 
simultaneous differences” (as quoted in Stewart, Zediker, & Black, 2004, p. 36). These 
quotations emphasize the “set of conditions” available in discourse and the interaction “between 
simultaneous differences”—two concepts that are at the core of Bakhtin’s dialogic theory. As 
Wertsch (2001) notes, the main question for Bakhtin, “who does the talking,” is really a question 
about “who owns the meaning” (p.222). Bakhtin’s dialogic view of discourse unpacks 
“polyvocality” and “language as a site of struggle” in ways that help unravel the layers of 
meaning in expert risk communication and the legitimation of these practices—regardless of, or 
in conjunction with, the expectations of the rational actor model and scientific method. 
Polyvocality. The concept of polyvocality considers the “many-voiced” nature of 
language and how these voices interanimate each other. Polyvocality conceptually emphasizes 
that the meanings of utterances are located both in the historical layered ideologies and the 
anticipated rejoinders. This makes utterances forms that “reflect the specific conditions and 
goals” of human activity (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 60). Bakhtin writes that: 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment 
in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living 
dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of 
an utterance. (Bakhtin, 1981a, p. 276) 
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By describing the utterance as “living,” Bakhtin invokes the dynamic nature of meaning 
construction within language. The weaving metaphor of this quotation foregrounds the layers of 
ideological consciousness that the construction of meaning in social contexts incorporates. 
Volosinov (considered to be Bakhtin’s pen name early in his career) believed that language 
always has an “evaluative accent” that reveals complex and sometimes subtle ideological 
positions (Wertsch, 2001). Later in life Bakhtin wrote that: 
Thus at any given moment of its historical existence, language is heterglot from top to 
bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the 
present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-
ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all 
given in a bodily form. (Bakhtin, 1981a, p. 291) 
 
This quotation illustrates how ideology becomes dialogically woven into language and 
incorporates contradictions of the social conditions that gave rise to the meaning of the 
communication.  
Bakhtin’s concept of utterance helps us further understand polyvocality. He describes 
utterances as individual forms through which “language is realized [and] reflect the specific 
conditions and goals…not only through their content (thematic) and linguistic style…but above 
all through their compositional structure…inseparably linked to the whole of the utterance” 
(Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 60). Another parties’ rejoinder, or response, is what the utterance is 
“inseparably linked to” because “understanding comes to fruition only in the …responses, as the 
activating principles [that] presuppose the ground for active and engaged understanding” 
(Bakhtin, 1981a, p. 282). Rejoinders are “relations between question and answer, assertion and 
objection, assertion and agreement, suggestion and acceptance, order and execution, and so 
forth” (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 72). The relationships between rejoinders and utterances illustrate the 
polyvocality of discourse because they “presuppose other (with respect to the speaker) 
participants in speech communication” (Bakhtin, 1981b, p.72). Rather than considering objective 
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and stable meaning that is arbitrarily link to symbols, Bakhtin uses the utterance as a unit of 
analysis that draws attention to the active processes of understanding. 
In the actual life of speech, every concrete act of understanding is active: it assimilates 
the word to be understood into its own conceptual system filled with specific objects and 
emotional expressions, and it is indissolubly merged with the response, with a motivated 
agreement or disagreement…understanding and response are dialectically merged and 
mutually condition each other; one is impossible without the other. (Bakhtin, 1981a, p. 
282) 
  
Language as a site of struggle. The previous section about polyvocality foregrounds 
how language is a site of struggle about ideology. Bakhtin also describes a related struggle that 
takes place within discourse: whether or not meaning will become centralized or decentralized. 
Bakhtin (1981a) observes that “the processes of centralization and decentralization, of 
unification and disunification, intersect at the utterance” (p. 272). The weaving metaphor quoted 
above creates a picture of how threads of meaning touch and overlap. Bakhtin calls this 
discursive space the dialogic zone of contact. To the degree that discourse permits other voices 
to interact, Bakhtin writes that 
language is transformed from the absolute dogma it had been within the narrow 
framework of a sealed-off and impermeable monoglossia into a working hypothesis for 
comprehending and expressing reality…only polyglossia fully frees consciousness from 
the tyranny of its own language and is shown the myth of language. (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 
61) 
 
This quotation describes how discourse can artificially seal itself off from other voices to attain 
dogmatic qualities and appear monologic—a description of centralizing, or centripetal, forces. 
However, decentralizing, or centrifugal forces, promote the expansion of the dialogic zone of 
contact and transform discourse. The degree to which discourse creates boundaries to isolate 
meaning or expands connections among meanings, largely determines the outcomes of 
centripetal or centrifugal forces. 
Bakhtin labels language with centripetal forces as authoritative discourse that constructs 
artificial boundaries and centralizes meaning in the discourse. Bakhtin (1981a) describes 
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“authoritarian discourse” as language conditions in which “a word may be conjoined with 
authority…it demands our unconditional allegiance…permits no play with the context framing 
it…one must totally affirm it or totally reject it” (p. 344). In other words, authoritarian discourse 
sets boundaries, distances itself from other possible voices, ignores nuances of meaning, and 
“leads to a reification of the word” (p. 346). Examples of risk communication between experts 
and lay groups demonstrate how technical risk communication operates as authoritative 
discourse that only permits risk to be narrowly understood in scientific terms (Kinsella & 
Mullen, 2007) and spoken about within the proper scope of an institution’s statutory authority 
(Ratliff, 1997).  
Bakhtin labels language with centrifugal forces as internally persuasive discourse that 
seeks out available multiple meanings, hence moving the discourse to decentralization. Internally 
persuasive discourse is open discourse that “awakens new and independent words” and “is able 
to reveal even newer ways to mean” (Bakhtin, 1981a, p. 346). Internally persuasive discourse 
removes boundaries and increases the dialogic zone of contact. By freely permitting interaction 
and overlap, this type of discourse frees “consciousness from the tyranny of its own language” 
and shows “the myth of language” (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 61) For example, sheep farmers in 
Belarus, following the nuclear power plant accident at Chernobyl, used their experiential 
knowledge of sheep behavior to challenge government claims about low levels of radiation in the 
environment (Wynne, 1992).  
In summary, Bakhtin’s dialogism creates an overarching framework that consists of two 
core concepts used in this study: “polyvocality” and “language as a site of struggle.” A weaving 
metaphor foregrounds the layers of meaning that make up the polyvocal nature of language. The 
layers may include ideologies, morals, history, economics, politics, and science. By locating the 
meaning of the utterance in the rejoinder, Bakhtin emphasizes how multiple voices and points of 
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view become layered in language. The discussion of language as a site of struggle highlights 
discursive processes that centralize or decentralize meaning. Overall, dialogism enables this 
study to consider questions about how multiple layers of meaning may (or may not) incorporate 
other points of view. 
Extending Bakhtin with Other Theories 
 Bakhtin provides a rich, holistic framework for examining the struggle among several 
potential meanings in expert risk communication. Additionally, discursive psychology, Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory, and structuration theory extend and elaborate his concepts.  
When creating a multi-perspectival framework, Phillips and Jørgensen (2002) instruct the 
researcher to elaborate on ontological and epistemological similarities that make it appropriate to 
connect theories while also drawing useful distinctions. This section discusses the benefits of 
connecting these theories with Bakhtin’s dialogism, highlights similarities, and draws 
distinctions among the theories.  
Dialogism and the three supplemental theories share consistent (although not identical) 
treatments of the constitutive nature of language, ideology, power, and the role of humans. These 
consistencies make it appropriate to integrate them, despite differences that will be pointed out 
later. Phillips and Jørgensen (2002) draw these distinctions for discursive psychology, Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory, and structuration theory and I extended them for Bakhtin’s 
dialogism based on my readings of his material and discussions in Wertsch (2001) and Billig 
(2001). First, the theories share a fundamental assumption that language contributes to the social 
construction of the world, although unlike the other three, Giddens’ structuration theory has an 
underdeveloped, or more linguistic, treatment of language (Conrad, 1993; Heracleaous, 2006). 
Each of the theories views meaning as dependent on the social context and provides a critique of 
the stable, unchangeable view of the structure of language (i.e. the view of Saussure’s 
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structuralism). In different ways, each theory connects ideological struggle with the struggle over 
meaning and treats power as produced in discourse or social action, rather than simply 
compulsion or dominance. All of the theories seek to understand change and recognize that 
change occurs in creation and reproduction of situated language use and action. Even though all 
of the theories ascribe some level of knowledgeable human action to explain change, they vary 
in the degree to which they recognize the situational constraints on agency. Most importantly for 
the main topic of this study, each of these theories reject the pursuit of a totalizing ideology but 
rather seek ways to explain how several discourses (or resources in the case of structuration 
theory) provide different, and possibly contradictory, ways to speak in social situations.  
 The following sections describe the three supplemental theories and acknowledge 
important distinctions—some of which helpfully extend Bakhtinian concepts to enrich the study 
of expert risk communication. Other distinctions are noted but not included in the multi-
perspectival framework. The end of each section translates the concepts into Bakhtinian terms to 
improve the coherence of the framework for this study. 
Discursive psychology. Potter and Wetherall (1987) developed discursive psychology to 
address what they considered to be inadequacies of the cognitivist paradigm. Cognitivist theories 
treat language as reflections of underlying mental representations. Alternately, discursive 
psychology “treats written and spoken language as constructions of the world oriented towards 
social action” (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 96). Furthermore, rather than viewing the meaning 
of any given word as universal, this theory emphasizes the contextual nature of language, which 
makes meanings dependent on individuals’ language use. People assign meaning to experiences 
“by virtue of the words which are available, and the resulting meanings contribute to producing 
the experience rather than being merely a description of the experience” (Phillips & Jørgensen, 
p. 103). As a theory, discursive psychology explains how accounts become established as stable 
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constructions of the world and the design of certain constructions to appear as facts that can 
undermine alternate constructions. 
The concept of “interpretive repertoires” helps articulate how individuals use and 
produce language in contextually appropriate ways and highlights the dynamic and multi-voiced 
nature of language (Wetherall & Potter, 1988).  An interpretive repertoire consists of a “limited 
number of terms that are used in a particular stylistic and grammatical way” (Phillips & 
Jørgensen, 2002, p. 107). The contextually appropriate terms are the resources that people use to 
construct reality. People use interpretive repertoires flexibly which means that they can be both 
“identifiable entities that represent distinct ways to give the world meaning and malleable forms 
that undergo transformation in rhetorical use” (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 107).  
The creation and use of interpretive repertoires extends dialogism by foregrounding the 
processes behind the polyvocal nature of language. Discursive psychology describes meaning 
construction as an iterative process that is consistent with Bakhtin’s threads of meaning 
metaphors while providing additional insight about how individuals strategically draw on 
resources in ways that contribute to authoritarian discourse or internally persuasive discourse. 
Similar to Bakhtin’s dialogism, discursive psychology believes that utterances provide insight 
into individuals’ goals and activity in specific historical and social contexts (Wetherall & Potter, 
1988). Bakhtin’s concept of utterance foregrounds polyvocality because the anticipated rejoinder 
is as much part of the meaning as the speaker’s text. Even though discursive psychology is less 
specific about this aspect of utterances, the contextually appropriate use of interpretive 
repertoires necessitates that individuals be sensitive to responses. 
Both Bahktin’s dialogism and discursive psychology recognize discourse as the site of 
ideological struggle, but discursive psychology foregrounds the role of the individual. Discursive 
psychology emphasizes the strategic actions of individuals more than dialogism but is consistent 
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with Bakhtin’s views of speakers as knowledgeable. Discursive psychology explains that 
discourses “categorize the world in ways that legitimate and maintain social patterns” (Phillips & 
Jørgensen, 2002, p. 108). People have a reciprocal relationship with the discourse by actively 
taking up positions while also becoming products. This reciprocal relationship creates “dilemmas 
of stake” which are individuals’ attempts “to establish accounts as factual and stable and 
deconstruct other accounts as the product of personal or group interests” (Phillips & Jørgensen, 
2002, p. 113). Ultimately, this theoretical view demonstrates how individuals’ positioning in 
particular discursive categories creates power differences among groups. Hence, discursive 
psychology provides more theoretical description to the relationship between individuals and 
discourse in the ideological struggle. This level of theoretical description invites closer analysis 
of the text, which helpfully provides methodological tools to examine language choices. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) developed this 
discursive theory as part of their political theory to describe how discursive conditions create 
hegemony. Their concepts have been applied to discourse analysis (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002) 
and help provide theoretical nuance behind the layering of ideology in language and how 
struggles result in authoritative discourse. Laclau (1993) views discourse as “addressed not to 
facts but to their conditions of possibility” (p. 431) and views the task of the analyst to examine 
how groups struggle to assign meaning within the conditions. This theoretical approach helps to 
identify how key signifiers in a discourse become imbued with meaning and how different 
understandings of reality stand in relation to each other. The notion of “articulation” foregrounds 
the relationships among “elements,” which are polysemic signs whose meanings are not yet 
fixed within the discourse (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). Floating signifiers are signs to which 
different discourses struggle to assign meaning. At times signs reach closure, a temporary stop in 
meaning fluctuation. Similar to authoritarian discourse, closure is accomplished by excluding 
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other possibilities for meanings which exist in an entity called the field of discursivity. Nodal 
points receive much attention in discourse theory because these signs attain fixed meaning and 
become the organizing principle for other signs.   
The description of discursive conditions for several possibilities of meaning and 
Bakhtin’s threads metaphor consistently describe the polyvocality of language. Furthermore, the 
struggle to assign meaning to floating signifiers aligns with Bakhtin’s concepts of language as a 
site of ideological struggle. Laclau and Mouffe believe that the struggles between potential 
meanings for key signifiers have political significance because groups that establish the 
meanings gain power. This process creates what they call objectivity—a “sedimented discourse” 
that “appears given and unchangeable” and “seemingly does not derive its meaning from its 
difference from something else” (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 36-37). Laclau and Mouffe 
equate objectivity with ideology because it masks the contingencies of knowledge and hides 
alternative possibilities of meaning. Ultimately, Laclau and Mouffe believe that individuals 
cannot escape this ideological function of discourse. If an alternate meaning does gain discursive 
closure, then that simply represents a change to a different ideology.  
With its emphasis on the struggle over floating signifiers for political significance, 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory provides a useful analytic tool to examine how experts 
assign meaning to key risk terms. Such analysis would examine specific terms that the discourse 
seems to be organized around. Then it would consider whether the terms have fixed, taken-for-
granted meanings or whether the experts disagree and assign different meanings to the terms. If 
the terms have fixed, taken-for-granted meanings, this could provide clues to shared ideologies 
and assumptions that are implicit in the experts’ risk talk. Furthermore, the analysis would 
explore the field of discursivity, the alternate possibilities of meaning. If the terms are floating 
signifiers, then the analysis would examine the strategies and interactions by which experts try to 
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assign meaning and coordinate their understandings. In this way, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory usefully extends dialogism by providing specific concepts to explain how, in the struggle 
for power, different discourses try to fix meaning to floating signifiers and the ideological 
implications for instances when signs reach closure.  
Structuration theory. The sociologist Anthony Giddens (1984) developed structuration 
theory to explain the reciprocal relationships between social systems and human practice.  Rather 
than privileging either the structures of social systems or the actions of human agents to explain 
social phenomena, structuration theory captures the explanatory power of both social systems 
and human practice by describing their reciprocal relationship through the production and 
reproduction of structures (Banks & Riley, 1993; Conrad, 1993; Heracleous, 2006; Poole & 
McPhee, 2005). The system consists of relatively stable (although not static) and observable 
patterns of interactions across time and space. Examples of systems include organizations, 
cultures, classes, political systems, and economic systems. Human practice consists of the 
patterns of particular activities that are meaningful for the actors who participate in them. 
Examples of human practice include daily activities and discursive practices of organizational 
members. Structures are the rules and resources that people draw on when interacting with each 
other. Through the enactment of structures, human practices form the observable patterns that 
constitute the system. Yet, in a reciprocal relationship, the system enables and constrains the 
human practices through the rules and resources (structures) that are available to its members.  
Throughout the process of producing and reproducing the system, structures are both the 
medium and the outcome of human practices. Agents are the individuals who all have some 
knowledge of the structures in the system, although they may have different levels of 
consciousness about this knowledge (Poole & McPhee, 2005).  Agents may faithfully 
appropriate the structures in line with the spirit of the system or they may appropriate the rules 
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and resources in an ironic manner that benefits the agent but violates the spirit of the system 
(Poole & DeSanctis, 1992; Poole & McPhee, 2005). Over time, these patterns of reinforcement 
or transformation either help maintain the stability of the system or contribute to its changes. 
Even though structuration theory has a less developed concept of language and 
discourse, the notion of knowledgeable actors who act appropriately in a context is consistent 
with the emphasis that Bakhtin puts on situational context for meaning of an utterance. 
Furthermore, the possibility of agents to use structures faithfully or ironically is consistent with 
the multiple possibilities for meaning that is the heart of dialogism. Structuration theory extends 
the concept of language as a site of struggle by describing legitimation processes. It provides 
analytic tools to explain why society recognizes some actions as more legitimate because 
individuals tend to draw on resources (from science, policy, regulation, economics, etc.) that add 
legitimacy to their actions. Admittedly, Giddens did not write his theory to deal with physical 
systems such as natural laws, however his theory does provide a tool to examine how expert 
draw upon these types of systems as resources in their discourse. This sets a stage for more 
clearly seeing the reinforcement of authoritarian discourse or possible changes from the 
centrifugal forces of internally persuasive discourse. Furthermore, dialogism, like other 
discourse theories, focuses on text and language but the incorporation of structuration theory 
allows this multi-perspectival framework to connect communication events with the larger 
political and economic environment.   
A Dialogic Response to Risk Communication 
Bakhtin’s weaving metaphor provides a suitably complex and active view of how 
multiple voices and meanings become layered together in discourse—including expert risk 
communication. He writes:  
The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension filled 
environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, weaves in and out of 
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complete interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a 
third group and all of this may crucially shape discourse, may leave its trace in all its 
semantic layers (Bakhtin, 1981a, p. 276).  
 
This excerpt aptly describes the dynamic environment of communication that can be 
applied to cross-disciplinary expert risk communication among technical experts. Historically, 
risk communication research treats expert groups as uniform and does not consider the processes 
by which they construct, coordinate and legitimize risk understandings. Bakthin’s theories 
provide analytic tools to articulate and examine questions that demystify expert risk discourses. 
As noted in Chapter I, experts’ discourse about risk exists in a liminal space between the 
tensions of material and constructivist ontologies. One way to address this is how Bakhtin 
describes his study as moving “in spheres that are liminal, i.e. on the borders of all the 
aforementioned disciplines, at their junctions and points of intersection” (as quoted in Stewart, 
Zediker, & Black, 2003, p. 27). From this point of view, Bakhtin’s conceptualizations of 
polyvocality and language as a site of struggle help us move beyond a transmissive model of 
communication and discursively examine how different risk understandings are managed and 
coordinated.   
Bakhtin’s dialogic theory does not presume that the layering of voices is or should be 
egalitarian. In the way, his ideas are distinguished from other dialogue perspective that presume 
or prescribe democratic conditions for dialogue (Fiorino, 1990). As an alternative to using 
dialogue theories to promote idealized conditions, Barge and Little (2002) use Bakhtin’s theories 
to illustrate how “dialogic wisdom” can be enacted in daily practice of organization life. This 
dialogic wisdom is “a form of situated judgment” by which individuals can create coordination 
by “inviting others to participate in particular conversation positions” and use sensibilities of 
wholeness, uniqueness, and emergence to “engage others within the flow of experience” (p. 
395). This application of dialogism highlights the sense-making aspect of communication amidst 
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several possible meanings. Often research on risk communication at public meetings emphasizes 
the use of dialogue to promote democratic decision-making at these forums (Fiorino, 1990; 
Tuler, 2000), but a Bakhtinian approach highlights rich and complex opportunities for these 
forums to serve sense-making functions (Hamilton & Wills-Toker, 2006).  
Even though Bakhtin’s writing does not specifically address issues of risk, he does make 
distinctions between the objects of study in social issues and in the sciences and mathematics. 
For example, in legal/ethical discourse an individual’s position and use of discourse can 
influence the substantive content of the law. Alternately, even though scientists deal with 
polyvocality, Bakhtin draws a distinction with scientific discourse because scientists’ use of 
discourse does not change the substance of the content they study (Bakhtin, 1981a, p. 349-351).  
This would seem to indicate a realist ontology because scientists’ discourse cannot change the 
essence of the material phenomenon. However, Bakhtin did not witness the study of risk, in 
which scientific and mathematical risk assessments are given primacy for identifying and 
prioritizing risks for purposes of setting policy. These recent developments make risk as much a 
social issue as it is a topic of scientific and mathematical study. Despite Bakhtin’s useful 
distinctions between social and scientific issues, given the current context of risk studies, one can 
appropriately use Bakhtin’s dialogism to examine the dialectical ontology through multiple 
layers of meaning in experts’ risk communication. 
The following discussion uses a dialogic framework to demonstrate that, at a theoretical 
level, risk characterization necessarily involves processes of coordination and legitimation. The 
first section discusses coordination between (1) dialectical tension of the materialist and 
constructivist ontologies, (2) social and technical information, and (3) experts’ perspectives from 
different scientific disciplines. The next section uses the dialogic zone of contact and utterances 
to explain processes of legitimation. Finally, the last section uses examples from risk 
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communication research to bring the dialogic concepts together with the other theories in the 
framework.  
Characterization of Risk Involves Coordination 
Coordination between materialist and constructivist ontologies. A dialogical analysis of 
expert risk communication demonstrates how the discourse provides resources for the experts to 
handle the ontological dialectic and how the experts draw on the resources to coordinate their 
risk understandings. Chapter I raised the point that risk has a dialectical tension between 
materialist and constructivist ontologies because it is a conception of the possibility of an 
undesirable event. If the risk does manifest then the negative consequences to human life and 
costs to society are painfully real. Most of expert risk talk consists of physical cause and effect 
relationships about hazards—scientific and technical discourse underscored by the realist 
ontology. However, if the hazards have not yet manifest then the experts’ talk also contributes to 
the social construction of the risk’s meaning by making claims about priorities that are 
underscored by political, economic, or moral values. In this way, expert risk talk imbues the 
possibility of risk and its perceived causal agents with values and expectations (Douglas, 1990; 
Taylor & Kinsella, 2007). The identification and management of risk becomes a contested topic 
in this socially constructed space.  
Few researchers question whether lay people constitute their risk understandings through 
social processes. On the other hand, scholarship tends to treat expert risk understandings as 
realist and do not consider how experts’ communication negotiates the dialectical tension with 
constructivism. The emphasis on the dialectical tension does not minimize the importance of a 
scientific or engineering study of a risk, but rather, creates an “opportunity to place scientific 
knowledge on a more legitimate, properly conditional, and ultimately more effective footing" 
(Wynne, 1992, p. 279). Bakhtin’s dialogical emphasis on the polyvocal nature of language 
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addresses the processes of how experts coordinate the dialectic between realism and 
constructivism when talking about risk. 
Coordination between technical and social information. Bakhtin’s dialogism explains 
why we can expect to find social and moral information layered in risk communication among 
technical experts. The notion of the evaluative accent, always present in language (Wertsch, 
2001), helps articulate the moral aspect of risk. Dialogic perspectives of intractable conflict 
explain that such conflicts are difficult to manage because moral aspects shaped the meaning of 
any technical information brought to bear (Littlejohn, 2006). This parallels Douglas’ (1990) 
argument that risk is a moral judgment about responsibility and blame. A dialogic view of 
language expects these moral “accents” of risk communication, even in technical risk talk, 
because the traces of other voices are always present (Wertsch, 2001). 
Research from the psychometric paradigm provides evidence that social norms, cultural 
values, and institutional affiliation may influence experts’ risk perceptions (Barke & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993; Silva, Jenkins-Smith, & Barke, 2007). This research raises questions about how 
and why experts’ understandings of risk are constituted in ways that incorporate these various 
types of information. The polyvocal nature of language invites exploration of traces of value 
judgments and other social issues layered in the discourse. A dialogic approach enables close 
attention to risk communication among experts, which provides detailed insight into the 
evidence and appeals they use to incorporate technical and social elements into their risk 
understandings.  
Coordination between different expert perspectives. Due to the complex social problems, 
technical experts from several disciplines must interact in risk management situations. As groups 
struggle to fix the meaning of key risk terms, each group contributes a risk understanding from a 
different angle of expertise. A dialogic framework enables analysis to examine how these 
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different expert perspectives become layered in the communication and coordination among 
participants.  
Given the struggles documented in cross-disciplinary research teams, one can reasonably 
expect that communication among risk experts involves conflict and disagreement (Horlick-
Jones & Sime, 2004). Thompson (2007; 2009) reports that disagreements about definitions and 
language use challenged individuals’ disciplinary identity and often led to interpersonal conflict 
and team attrition. When successful, the scientists developed shared language by using abstract, 
conceptual diagrams that help them move beyond talking about appropriate data, equations, and 
analysis methods. They also needed trust and reflexive communication to address the conflicts 
about disciplinary identity (Thompson, 2007; 2009)—which are aspects of construction of their 
expert ethos (Cochran, 2007; Prelli, 1997). Therefore, a close study of risk communication 
among technical experts must consider how the different groups struggle to assign meaning to 
the risks at hand.  
Risk Characterization as a Process of Legitimation 
Dialogic zone of contact. Risk communication among technical experts has been 
relatively unproblematized compared to research on lay audiences and inadvertently reinforces 
the notion that the experts’ use of technical information is more legitimate and rational (Horlick-
Jones & Sime, 2004; Joffe, 2003). Bakhtin’s dialogism provides a discursive explanation for 
power differences among scientific knowledge and social knowledge. Even in highly scientized 
discourses, the dialogic view of discourse offers a critical entry point to see that other voices are 
present. The notion of boundaries and contact become important in risk communication because 
the technical expert perspective tends to behave as an authoritarian discourse, setting up 
boundaries, insisting on singular meanings, and decreasing opportunities for dialogic contact 
with lay and social meanings. In this way, the expert discourse mobilizes centripetal forces to 
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unify and centralize meanings about a risk and decrease the dialogic zone of contact. These 
processes become apparent as technical experts try to construct risk understandings that appear 
more factual than others.  
Despite the strong tendencies toward authoritarian discourse, Bakhtin (1981a) observes 
that “alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their 
uninterrupted work; alongside the verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the 
uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward” (p. 272). In risk 
communication, this means that even though technical and scientific discourses have more 
power and legitimacy in risk decisions, the other layers of meaning (such as social norms, 
values, etc.) are still present in the discourse. When given opportunities to interact with scientific 
discourses, social and ideological meanings may decentralize the discourse to create alternative 
understandings that have the potential to be legitimate. Therefore, even in communication among 
technical experts, who are likely to maintain the authoritarian discourse, the dialogic “threads” 
are still present in the discourse and have the potential to surface. However, it is important to 
recognize that regardless of the centralized or decentralized nature of discourse, ideological 
values underscore scientific discourse and when these values align the combination further 
promotes centripetal forces. A close examination of the discourse of expert risk communication 
can identify the layers of meaning and gain insight into their role for constructing legitimate risk 
understandings. 
Utterance and rejoinder. Bakhtin’s notion of the utterance presumes interaction by 
insisting that meaning lies in the interaction between speaker and the anticipated response. 
Furthermore, when describing utterances, he writes: 
The processes of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, 
intersect at the utterance; the utterance not only answer the requirements of its own 
language as an individualized embodiment of a speech act, but it answers the 
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requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such speech 
diversity (Bakhtin, 1981a, p. 272).  
 
For risk communication, this means that utterances (and rejoinders) are the site to discover 
whether the discourse promotes unitary meanings or encourages diversity of meanings. In 
situations that have a strong tendency toward centralized meaning (such as expert risk 
communication) statements that align with the authorities are viewed as more legitimate.  
The psychometric paradigm seeks perception-based explanations for the influence of 
emotion, social norms, values, politics, etc. on legitimate risk understandings (Joffe, 2003; 
Wardman, 2008). As a dialogic alternative, Billig (2001) uses Bakhtin’s ideas to advocate that  
we should study memory, perception, or emotion by investigating relevant ‘language 
games’ or what Bakhtin called ‘genres of utterance.’ Attention should be paid to the way 
in which people talk about their memories, perception, and emotion. In doing so, we will 
discover the outward criteria for the social usage of the words (p. 211-212).  
 
The “criteria for the social usage of words” becomes apparent by connecting Bakhtin’s concept 
of utterance (and rejoinder) with viewing attitude statements as socially constructed. The attitude 
statement (or risk perception) is not simply the speaker’s position. It implies the views of other 
social actors’ positions. In this way, the communicative construction of risk understandings also 
carries meanings about responses to past positions and anticipation of future responses. When 
expressing a position about a risk, experts are knowledgeable actors who know what kind of 
responses to expect. They craft their statements in anticipation of these rejoinders. This 
naturally-occurring polyvocal aspect of discourse allows analysis to consider the ways experts 
strategically try to legitimize their understandings. 
Bringing Concepts Together in the Dialogic Framework 
Bakhtin’s dialogism provides a theoretical framework that demonstrates how, as one 
unpacks the layers of meaning, it becomes apparent that the characterization of risk always 
involves processes of coordination and legitimation. Additional theories--discursive psychology, 
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Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, and structuration theory—contribute to the dialogic 
framework by providing more theoretical nuance to the concepts of polyvocality and language as 
a site of struggle. This section illustrates how the multi-perspectival dialogic framework works 
together by performing a brief reanalysis of risk communication about options for storing radium 
at Fernald, a former Department of Energy weapons facility (Hamilton, 2003). The original 
research article provided an insightful and thorough rhetorical analysis of a public meeting 
between expert and lay groups that helped to shed “light on mechanisms by which participants 
strategically communicate with one another to create a mutual understanding of risk experiences 
and on how those mechanisms stem from larger meaning systems for risk” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 
292). The Fernald study draws a conclusion about overlaps of risk rationalities that is a starting 
premise for this dissertation: “participants demonstrated a capacity to combine elements of 
technical and cultural rationality in ways that suggest that they are not monolithic frameworks 
for understanding risk, but rather sources of rhetorical appeals” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 300). The 
Fernald study provides suitable material for reanalysis with the dialogic multi-perspectival 
framework in order to show how interpretive repertoires, struggles over key signifiers, and 
structuration processes enable explanations of polyvocality and ideological struggle within the 
construction and legitimation of risk communication.  
 Summary of Hamilton’s analysis of the Fernald case. The original analysis used Plough 
and Krimsky’s (1987) social and technical rationality “risk orientations as broad meaning 
systems that serve as sources of rhetorical invention for participants as they interpret risk 
experiences, formulate persuasive appeals, and promote mutual understanding by strategically 
combining aspects of these rationalities” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 293). Hamilton identified rhetorical 
strategies that participants used to enact their frames of acceptance drawing upon and combining 
the larger orientations to risk—technical and cultural rationalities. Using Kenneth Burke’s 
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“frames of acceptance,” she identified three rhetorical strategies: (1) defining a situation, (2) 
identification, and (3) circumference. When defining a situation, the participants highlighted 
certain meanings by selecting aspects of the situation consistent with a particular motive or 
attitude while muting other aspects of reality. Participants used identification processes to 
“develop common ground and join interests by demonstrating an understanding of their 
opponent’s circumstances or views and by highlighting similarities in their thoughts” (Hamilton, 
2003, p. 294). When participants used the circumference strategy they used certain words to 
narrow or widen the scope of the context or location.  Articulating these strategies helped 
Hamilton identify the underlying meaning systems that participants used to label their 
experiences. 
Prior to the public meeting used as a text for this case, cancer researchers approached 
Fernald site officials to request the extraction and use of radium for research and medical 
treatment. The public was concerned that this would delay clean-up on the site and that the 
researchers were trying to do this in secret. The medical researchers and local citizens each 
labeled the risk differently and in strategic ways that muted alternate concerns about the hazards 
of radium. The local citizens considered radium “a potential threat to their life span” whereas the 
researchers considered it “the key to a potential cure for cancer” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 294). The 
researcher “defined this situation as one in which a promising cancer therapy was dependent on 
Fernald’s radium and that the radium was only usable if it was extracted before it was 
vitrified”—a strategy that “attempted to narrow the range of possible reactions that Fernald 
neighbors might have to his request and to persuade them to support supplying the radium before 
it was vitrified.” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 296).  The citizens “defined the situation as one in which 
radium extraction might prolong their health and environmental risks by delaying Fernald 
cleanup and ‘post-vitrification extraction’ offered a solution that would enable cleanup to 
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continue and the cancer research team to receive a supply of radium in the future”—a strategy 
that “limited [the researchers’] rhetorical choices to solutions that would address both sets of 
concerns” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 296). Ultimately, the site officials rejected the medical researchers 
request in order to maintain the clean-up schedule. 
 Reanalysis with dialogic framework. The polyvocality of language can be seen in the 
processes by which social and technical information become layered together through the 
labeling strategies. Both the researcher and citizen groups label the risk by layering social and 
technical information which can be seen in the way that Hamilton (2003) used technical and 
cultural rationalities as “sources of invention.” This analysis parallels discursive psychology’s 
explanation of how individuals create meanings of risk by drawing on resources made available 
to them through interpretive repertoires. The researcher’s labeling choices emphasize the 
technical aspect of cancer treatment research and the social aspect of the desirability of a 
breakthrough cancer treatment. The citizens’ labeling choices emphasize the technical 
mechanisms of the radium’s hazard to their community and the social aspects of the democratic, 
participation process they had negotiated with DOE. As Hamilton points out, the participants’ 
labeling strategies narrowed the range of acceptable options. This insight is further enhanced by 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory which explains that “radium” is a floating signifier and the 
groups use labeling strategies to fix the meaning so that it gains political power to influence the 
decision. In addition to the discursive explanations, structuration theory illustrates the 
relationships between reified systems (e.g., science, policy, regulation, medicine, economics, 
etc.) and the strategic actions of the participants to legitimize some risk understandings and de-
legitimize others. The researchers drew upon the medical system and its values about the 
treatment of illness as bases to legitimate their risk understandings and desired outcome to obtain 
the radium. Alternately, the citizens drew upon the political and regulatory systems to legitimate 
70 
their risk understandings and desired outcome to maintain the reclamation schedule. Through 
these language choices, the participants layered social and technical information to characterize 
their risk understandings through processes of coordination and legitimation. 
Additionally, the Fernald case illustrates how the participants operated under the taken-
for-granted authoritarian discourse of scientific expertise. One example occurred in the 
beginning of the situation, when the researchers first approached only the site officials—a choice 
that Hamilton describes as rooted in assumptions of the technical rationality and prevented 
interaction with social information about risk. However, after a newspaper reported this issue, 
the local citizens expanded the dialogic zone of contact by moving the interaction site into the 
public sphere, and more specifically a public meeting. This increased contact provided greater 
opportunity for citizens and researchers to draw upon both technical and cultural rationality as 
interpretive resources. This increased set of options for interpretive repertoires illustrates how 
the field of discursivity operates in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. Initially, the 
researchers treated interaction with the site officials, authoritarian discourse, as the more 
objective and legitimate approach for making their request. However, the citizens used alternate 
understandings from the field of discursivity to legitimate their understandings and in this way 
expanded the dialogic zone of contact. 
The polyvocality of language also can be seen in the processes by which multiple voices 
to become layered together through the identification strategies. The labeling strategies 
illustrated how these participants strategically drew on interpretive repertoires to characterize 
their risk understandings. Additionally, their strategic choices illustrate the ways that they 
coordinated their perspectives by using knowledge of expected responses to establish more 
legitimate and factual accounts. The researcher made identification appeals by disclosing 
personal information about himself as a cancer survivor and that he lived two from miles from 
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the Hanford clean-up site (also a former DOE weapons facility). These identification appeals 
strategically anticipated that, due to similarities, the citizens would respond more favorably to 
his otherwise technical appeals. The local citizens used identification to demonstrate that they 
“understood his sense of urgency about cancer research” by describing “funerals of friends, 
neighbors, family members, and Fernald workers who died of cancer” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 297). 
Through these identification strategies the researcher and the citizens attempt to coordinate their 
voices by layering their personal experiences and sympathies into the discussion. The use of 
personal experience with the risks of radiation and consequences of cancer draws upon the 
cultural rationality as an interpretive repertoire.  
From Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory we can also consider why both groups 
appealed to personal similarities as a taken-for-granted identification strategy. It seems to 
suggest that legitimacy attributed to personal suffering has reached a taken-for-granted status 
that is sedimented in the discursive resources. However, the question of variation also comes to 
mind: Why did the citizens rely on this strategy more heavily than the researcher and what 
insight can be gained from understanding this variation? The researcher relied more heavily on 
the taken-for-granted assumptions about science and a pattern of logic that comes from the 
technical rationality: if the citizens could fully understand all of the information then they would 
agree to let us extract the radium. Meanwhile, the citizens’ identification with personal suffering 
appeared to sympathize with the researchers’ goals but ultimately legitimized their goals to 
maintain their participatory role in the clean-up process and the site’s current schedule. Hence, a 
closer analysis about taken-for-granted assumptions in sedimented discourse provides additional 
explanation about variable use of the identification strategy.   
Finally, the struggle between centripetal and centrifugal forces helps explain how the 
circumference strategies in the Fernald case functioned to influenced the dialogic zone of 
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contact. Hamilton characterizes the primary tension in this debate as between the local or global 
context for radium use. Both positions could stop cancer but in different ways: the researchers 
could use radium to treat cancer, whereas the citizens would prevent cancer by cleaning up the 
radium. The researchers used a wide, global circumference “by locating [the use of Fernald’s 
radium] within the context of the broad impact that this research could have for all cancer 
victims and the desperate need for an effective treatment” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 296). The local 
citizens characterized the scene at Fernald as one in which the “extraction of the radium might 
impact the clean-up schedule, and how delays might prolong cancer risks in their community” 
and used a cancer cluster map to “to focus on the continued threat to the life span of the Fernald 
neighbors from prolonged exposure” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 297). Hamilton points out that the 
researchers’ wide circumference failed to include the citizens’ local and narrow desires to 
prevent further suffering as a premise for making a decision whereas the citizens’ narrow 
circumference legitimized the choice to maintain the clean-up schedule.  
The researchers’ circumference draws upon the technical rationality as an interpretive 
repertoire—a rationality that emphasizes the authority of medicine to pursue scientific research. 
As an authoritarian discourse, medicine centralizes meaning around the imperative to develop 
medical treatments that are beneficial to everyone. However, the citizens’ redefinition of the 
circumference, to emphasize prevention of cancer in their local community provided an alternate 
centralization of meaning. The interaction of these two centralizing discourses had the effect of 
decentralizing the meaning about the use of radium. This created a wider dialogic zone of 
contact in which both groups had to draw upon multiple interpretive repertoires and non-
discursive resources (such as policy, regulation, medicine) to assign meaning to the floating 
signifier of radium. The researchers’ heavy reliance on technical rationality as a source of 
rhetorical invention (or interpretive repertoire) reveals an ideology rooted in scientific 
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understanding and institutional processes. This ideology has historical precedence for hegemony 
in environmental discourse (Ratliffe, 1997) and is widely criticized for masking the 
contingencies of knowledge and hiding alternate possibilities for meaning (Beck, 1992; Renn, 
1998). The citizens’ successful use of the cultural rationality as a source of rhetorical invention 
demonstrates a shift to an ideology that values democracy and participation in addition to the 
policy and regulatory preferences for maintaining the clean-up schedule. Therefore, the 
discursive closure that the citizens’ gained by fixing their meaning to “radium” represents a 
change to a different ideology—one that seems more transparent but probably also masks 
knowledge contingencies and alternate meanings.  
The labeling, identification, and circumference strategies demonstrate the ways that 
participants’ communication increased the dialogic zone of contact and changed the conditions 
about what could be said in this situation. Hamilton’s analysis provides a good explanation of 
how the participants’ strategically drew upon technical and cultural rationalities to coordinate 
their risk understandings. However, the brief reanalysis of this case demonstrates how the 
dialogic, multi-perspectival framework provides an explicit explanation of how groups’ 
characterization of risk always involve coordination and legitimization processes.  
Summary 
 This chapter has created a dialogic, multi-perspectival framework that enables discourse 
analysis to unpack the layers of meaning and demonstrate how the characterization of risk (i. e. 
risk communication) always involves processes of coordination and legitimation. In particular, 
this framework draws upon Bakhtin’s dialogism to highlight the polyvocal nature of discourse 
and language as the site of ideological struggle. Discursive psychology contributes an 
explanation of how individuals strategically draw upon interpretive repertoires as discursive 
resources. Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory helps explain the struggle to assign meaning to 
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floating signifiers so that the terms can gain political influence. Structuration theory helps 
explain how individuals are enabled and constrained by reified systems, such as science, politics, 
and economics.  
 This dialogic framework is necessary for a study of expert risk communication because 
historically this discourse is treated as unitary with taken-for-granted assumptions about the role 
of science for influencing experts’ risk understandings. Research about how scientific experts are 
influenced by social information, such as norms and values (Silva, Jenkins-Smith, & Barke, 
2007), institutional affiliation (Kinsella, 1999), and ethos (Prelli, 1997; Cochran, 2007), raises 
questions how these become layered into discourse. This multi-perspectival framework enables 
this study to enter the discourse of experts’ risk communication from different vantage points. It 
describes how the layers of meaning become coordinated between realist and materialist 
ontologies, between social and technical information, and between the voices of different groups. 
It also describes how the centripetal forces contribute to authoritarian discourse or centrifugal 
forces expand the dialogic zone of contact. However, observations about boundaries of dialogic 
contact may be more nuanced in communication among experts because technical experts may 
feel more pressure to act within the authoritarian discourse of science and maintain the firm 
boundaries. The next chapter provides methodological details about how this study uses case 




 This dissertation examined a case of risk communication among technical experts 
regarding the continued use of cesium chloride. This case provided the opportunity to generate 
rich and authentic data from public meetings, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and external 
documents. The data analysis used methodological tools from the multi-perspectival dialogic 
framework established in the previous chapter.  
For this study, I chose a discourse analytic approach. Alvesson and Karreman’s (2000) 
framework establishes a vocabulary to articulate methodological choices in relation to the scale 
of discourse and each theories’ positions on the relationship between language and meaning. 
This approach is consistent with the multi-perspectival framework set up in the previous chapter. 
Alvesson and Karreman (2000) begin with the observation that discourse analysis includes a 
wide range of perspectives that fall into two general categories: “little d” discourse is the "study 
of social text-talk and written text in its social action contexts" (p. 1126) and “big-D” Discourse 
is the study of “general and prevalent systems for the formation and articulation of ideas in a 
particular period of time" (p. 1126). They set up two axes as a framework to describe different 
types of discourse analysis. The first axis considers the connection between language and 
meaning: determinant discourse collapses the distinction and “directly implies or incorporates 
social and psychological consequences" (p.1133) and autonomous discourse maintains the 
distinction and “stands on its own or is loosely coupled to the social (individual)" (p.1133). The 
second axis considers the scale of the discourse and sorts it into four general categories: (1) 
micro-discourse consists of a detailed study of language in specific context, (2) meso-discourse 
is relatively sensitive to language use in context but generalizes to broader patterns in similar 
context, (3) Grand Discourse presents a group of discourses in an integrated framework, and (4) 
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Mega Discourse makes a more or less universal connection to the discourse material. Alvesson 
and Karreman demonstrate that a discourse theory’s position in the framework enables one to 
ask different types of questions and have different levels of interpretation. I have selected 
discourse analytic tools that cover the micro-, meso-, and Grand-discourse perspectives. 
Case Study Approach 
 The case study approach examines phenomena using data from a situational context and 
is an especially appropriate approach for research about a complex context (Titscher, Meyer, 
Wodak, & Vetter, 2002). Since the topic of risk communication among technical experts is 
relatively unexplored, I have chosen to use a case study methodology for gaining insight into this 
phenomenon. Additionally, since case studies are useful to explore the explanatory power of a 
theory (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2002), I selected this approach to help explore the 
usefulness of dialogic theory for explaining how risk characterizations are discursively 
constructed and legitimized. Cases should be selected based on how well the situation fits the 
typology of the issues under investigation. I selected a case in which experts from different 
professions and disciplines interacted with the purpose to characterize risks. The case study 
selected for this study is about the continued use of cesium chloride. Furthermore, since 
literature establishes that risk communication often occurs in risk management situations, the 
selected case occurs with the backdrop of regulatory activity. Even though this topic is of great 
interest to key stakeholders, it does not generate broad public attention and controversy and this 
allows public interactions to retain specialized, technical content.  
Before discussing the case, I wish to position myself to the research. During my doctoral 
program, I began part-time employment as a communication specialist for the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC is a Federal agency of the U.S. with the mission “to 
regulate the nation's civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure 
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adequate protection of public health and safety, to promote the common defense and security, 
and to protect the environment” (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2009a). This means that 
the NRC regulates and oversees civilian uses of nuclear technologies that include nuclear power 
plants, the nuclear fuel cycle (mining, processing, and storage), medical applications, and 
industrial applications. My assignment was to develop public communication tools about a 
research project that studied severe accidents at nuclear reactors. Even though this project is 
completely unrelated to the case that I use for the dissertation, I am acquainted with co-workers 
who worked on the project related to this case.  
The cesium chloride case came to my attention when the workshop on this topic was 
announced at the NRC. I attended the meetings out of curiosity and found out that the person 
who arranged the logistics was the same person I had worked with during the summer. Even 
though my position with the NRC does not create a legal conflict of interest for performing the 
research associated with this dissertation and I did not perform this research in my capacity as an 
NRC employee, I wish to make readers aware of my personal position in relation to the cases 
under examination. I do not expect the results of this dissertation to directly influence NRC 
policy decisions (in fact, the NRC made a decision about the continued use of cesium chloride in 
April 2009), but rather hope that the results will be used to improve risk communication among 
technical experts in general. 
Continued Use of Cesium Chloride 
Cesium-137 Chloride (CsCl) is a radiological material identified by the International 
Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) as having the possibility to “pose a significant risk to 
individuals, society and the environment if improperly handled or used in a malicious act (U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008a, p. 44781).” Recent risk and consequence studies 
performed by Federal agencies showed that it may be prudent to require additional security 
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features for facilities that use cesium chloride, such as irradiators used for the sterilization of 
blood, calibrators used in radiation instruments and dosimeters, and devices for biological and 
medical research. Furthermore, a recent National Academy of Sciences study recommended the 
replacement or elimination of cesium chloride sources (National Research Council, 2008). At 
this point the NRC staff was assigned responsibility to provide recommendations about phasing 
out cesium chloride in its current form, finding a new form a cesium chloride, or finding an 
alternative such as an x-ray irradiator or using a cobalt-64 source. In order to solicit input from 
the varied group of stakeholders, the NRC held a public workshop on September 29-30, 2008. In 
April 2009, the Commissioners of the NRC directed the staff to develop a policy statement that 
details expectations about security of cesium chloride sources and continue research to find a 
replacement and to the Commission’s expectations for security (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2009b). 
This case is relevant to the study of risk communication among multi-disciplinary 
experts because it involves a wide variety of fields to discuss and compare terrorism risks and 
health risks. These disciplines include but are not limited to nuclear physicists, health physicists, 
medical professionals, biomedical researchers, nuclear engineers, risk analysts, security analysts, 
technicians, and equipment manufacturers. From a risk communication point of view, this case is 
rich with multiple potential hazards (security threats, radiation exposure, loss of medical 
benefits) and this requires the participants to not only advocate their points of view but 
coordinate them with others in a complex environment. The regulatory backdrop of this issue 
involves technology that is already widely used and any changes to licensing and oversight will 





 Since the majority of the research questions are better answered through micro-analyses 
of discourse, the primary data collected for this study lends itself to this level of analysis. 
However, I also gathered a third group of data, not for detailed discourse analysis, but to provide 
evidence of relevant themes and issues that operate at a meso- or Grand-discourse level. 
Naturally Occurring Interaction in Public Forums 
 Naturally occurring interaction in public forums consists of transcripts of public 
meetings in which participants from different expert groups discuss their understandings of a risk 
at hand. These are authentic interactions, set in the context of regulatory decisions about socially 
and technically complex risks associated with the application of nuclear technologies. These 
texts lend themselves to both micro- and meso-level analyses. Within the transcripts, I was able 
to analyze micro-level actions and interactions among the participants. Additionally, since these 
meetings involved technical experts from different disciplines who were set in context of 
regulatory decision-making, this data set also lent itself to meso-level analysis. As documents of 
public, Federally-sponsored meetings, these transcripts were available through the NRC website. 
 The workshop on continued use of cesium chloride was held on September 29-20, 2008 
at the Bethesda North Marriott Hotel & Convention Center in Rockville, Maryland (near NRC 
headquarters) to discuss (1) alternative forms of cesium-137 chloride, (2) alternative 
technologies, (3) phase-out and transportation issues, (4) additional enhanced security, and (5) 
potential future requirements for use of the material. Over 200 people attended from a variety of 
groups including blood bank, hospital, research, and calibration user communities, security 
analysts, manufacturers of irradiators, calibration machines, and radioactive sources, and Federal 
and State agencies with jurisdiction over the issue. The workshop used an expert panel and 
roundtable format with a professional facilitator to encourage discussion of the five main issues 
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(listed above). Designated experts sat at a table in the front of the room while the audience sat in 
rows of chairs that had an aisle in the middle with two microphones for the audience members to 
use when making comment. Most of the panel members gave about a three minute statement at 
the beginning of the session and then the floor was open for audience members and panelists to 
discuss the topic. Despite the highly structured format and contentious topic, the interactions at 
the meeting were of high quality and generally civil. Furthermore, despite the diverse issues that 
participants wanted to address, at several points in the workshop the interaction could be almost 
characterized as a conversation with panelists and audience members authentically responding to 
each others’ comments and questions. The format of the workshop partially limited the 
participants’ ability to directly express their views about disagreeing with the security 
characterization because the agenda was organized around information-gathering questions. The 
NRC agenda questions for the workshop are listed in Appendix B. Most of these questions are 
designed to gather information that the NRC can use to make a decision about whether or not to 
follow the NAS report recommendation. The workshop lasted sixteen hours (over two days) and 
the transcript is 528 pages of typed, double-spaced text. 
Interviews with Experts 
Interviews with experts in the disciplines and professional groups provided opportunity 
for the experts to provide more in-depth discussion of their positions regarding the risks under 
consideration. Interviews allowed for elicitation of experiential knowledge through stories, 
accounts, explanations, and participants’ contextual use of language forms (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2002). These accounts shed insight into the processes that participants used to construct their 
views about risks associated with cesium chloride. The participants talked about their expertise 
and how they came to be involved with the cesium chloride issue. Their comments were self-
reflexive about how they formed and changed their views through recollections about 
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interactions that they had with other professional and expert groups. The participants’ accounts 
tell about who was involved, when and where these interactions occurred, what information and 
arguments were exchanged, and why the participants chose to accept or reject certain views. 
Interview participants were recruited from the lists of attendees at the meeting. Based on 
organizational affiliation, I sorted the list of attendees into categories of professional groups: 
blood banks, hospitals, universities, manufacturers, state regulators, federal regulators, and 
security specialists. I then randomly selected individuals to contact from each these categories. I 
contacted the participants through email and phone at least three times. This resulted in 15 
interviews with participants from professional groups that included state and federal regulators, 
blood banks, hospitals, universities, and manufacturers. Even though all interview participants 
had a science or engineering background, they had varying levels of expertise about the cesium 
chloride issue (Bolger & Wright, 1994). Unfortunately, I did not interview a security specialist 
due to the extra caution they take about who they speak with regarding security-related issues. 
Since several potential participants live in the Washington D. C. area, I was able to arrange one 
trip to conduct 8 interviews in person. Additionally, I conducted 7 interviews over the telephone.  
Given constraints on the participants’ schedules, interviews averaged 38 minutes. The 
shortest interview was 13 and a half minutes and the longest interview was about 90 minutes. 
Total interview time was 9 hours and 27 minutes. In order to allow me to listen and 
conversationally participate in the interviews, I recorded the interviews (with permission) and 
transcribed them verbatim for later analysis. Two participants declined to be recorded and in 
these cases I took thorough notes and immediately following the interview recorded my 
recollection of the interview. The transcription of interviews resulted in 271 total pages of 
double-spaced text. 
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 During the interviews I established rapport with the participant and expressed genuine 
interest by demonstrating curiosity (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). Since I am not an expert in these 
highly technical topics with specialized jargon, some participants were reluctant to talk about 
topics that are “over my head.” I addressed this hurdle using  two strategies: (1) early in the 
interview, I explicitly asked the participant to speak to me as an expert and promised to ask 
questions about unfamiliar terms and concepts, and (2) throughout the interview, I demonstrated 
my knowledge of the issue by using technical vocabulary and asking detailed questions. The 
overall strategy for the interview questions was to ask the participant to address the same issue 
more than once in the interview and then ask follow-up questions that posed alternative or 
problematic facts for the participant. This approach provided opportunities for the participants to 
create a variety of texts that allowed the analysis to probe connections between accounting 
practices and functional variations (Potter & Wetherall, 1987). The interview guide is provided 
in Appendix A. 
External Documents 
 External documents include policy statements, press coverage, press releases, and 
position papers related to the two cases. I gathered these materials by searching the NRC 
website, websites of stakeholder groups that participated in the meetings, the internet in general, 
the LexisNexis database, and the U. S. Federal Register. The searches were limited to documents 
published since 2007, unless a participant explicitly made reference to an older document. These 
documents were not for full discourse analysis, but rather provided evidence for political, 
economic, regulatory, technical, and other potential themes and issues. Evidence of these issues 
supported claims about categories of discourse that participants may use as resources. Since this 
data is broader than the immediate context of the meetings and interviews, it supports meso- or 
Grand-level discourse analysis.  
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Analysis 
 As I argued in Chapter III, Bakhtin’s dialogism enables an analysis of the polyvocality 
and ideological struggle for meaning in the experts’ risk communication. I used the tools of 
analysis from the multi-perspectival framework (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) created in Chapter 
III in order to enter the discourse from different vantage points (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). I 
used the three theoretical perspectives—structuration theory, discursive psychology, and Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory—as analytic tools that built on each other in order to support 
conclusions emerging from my use of Bakhtin’s dialogic framework.  
 Prior to conducting the detailed analyses, I oriented myself to the data by reading 
through the transcripts to get a holistic sense of the discourse and jotted down initial thoughts 
and observations. I used Altas, a qualitative computer package, to help initially identify codes 
and themes that helped focus the more detailed analysis. In Atlas, I marked participants’ 
complete turns as the unit of analysis. Then, for each unit of analysis, I coded the topic, the form 
of reasoning, types of information, appeals to values and credibility, statements of coordination, 
and risk logics. The multiple coding within a unit of analysis enabled me to then identify patterns 
of co-occurrence that I used in the later steps of analysis.  
Analysis with Structuration Theory 
The first phase of analysis used structuration theory as a framework to establish how 
participants draw on rules and resources in ways that legitimize certain risk understandings. The 
previous two phases of analysis identified participants’ discursive strategies, interpretive 
repertoires, and patterns of imbuing key terms with meaning. These results established a set of 
discursive rules and resources available to the participants in the larger system. The structuration 
analysis provides an extension by examining how the participants use both discursive and non-
discursive resources. Structuration theory is suitable for grand-level of discourse analysis 
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because it organizes the discourses established in the previous phases into an integrated 
framework. Even though Gidden’s description of structuration theory has an underdeveloped 
concept of language, the rhetorical and communicative emphasis of the other theories improves 
its usability for discourse analysis (Conrad, 1993; Heracleous, 2006). It considers discourse to be 
autonomous because the theory maintains a distinction between language and meaning. Once 
again, this phase moved the analysis to a different area of Alvesson & Karreman’s framework in 
order to provide useful insight and interpretation from a different perspective.  
The goal of structuration theory analysis is to explain the structures present within the 
system and how participants appropriate these structures to legitimize risk understandings. The 
data analysis is inter-textual and moves reflexively between the meeting texts, interviews, and 
external documents. Barley and Tolbert (1997) list three broad steps for conducting this data 
analysis under the framework of structuration theory. The first step sets up a chronology of 
events noted in interview data and external documents. It also identifies enabling and 
constraining structures within the context. This analysis attends closely to the participants’ 
interpretations of the norms or violations of behaviors and events.  Norms (“that’s just how we 
do it”) and violations of the norms are manifestations of the rules and resources that the actors 
regularly draw on to reproduce the structures (McPhee & Iverson, 2002). This step of the 
analysis is reported in Chapter V.   
The next step identified discursive and non-discursive themes and examines them at two 
different levels: root themes and surface themes. The root themes are a manifestation of the 
deeper structures within the system and the surface themes are the participants’ appropriations of 
those structures. The analysis considers the stability or transformation of the themes. This step of 
the structuration analysis is reported in answer to RQ 4 in Chapters VI and VII. The final step 
draws connections between the system, participant behaviors, and structures.  At this step, the 
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analysis discusses how structures enable and constrain the participants and the implications for 
how risk understandings become more or less legitimized. This step of the structuration analysis 
is discussed in Chapter VIII.  
Analysis with Discursive Psychology 
 The second phase of analysis used methods associated with discursive psychology. Since 
Potter and Wetherall’s (1987) discursive psychology is a detailed study of individuals’ language 
use in a specific context, it enters discourse at micro-discourse the end of Alvesson and 
Karreman’s framework. It considers discourse to be autonomous because the theory maintains 
some distinction between language and meaning (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). 
 Discourse psychology asks the analyst to examine specific language choices that lead to 
the rhetorical organization of the talk. This is a suitable entry point because it enables an 
understanding of which strategies participants use to articulate their understandings of risk. 
According to guidance from Potter and Wetherall (1987), I used the patterns of co-occurrences 
identified in the open-coding stage to identify how participants’ strategies draw upon interpretive 
repertoires. This step represents a first move from micro- to meso-level discourse analysis. Potter 
and Wetherall (1987) define an interpretive repertoire as “a lexicon or register of terms and 
metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events” (p. 138). In order to 
establish whether participants’ were using interpretive repertoires, I moved reflexively between 
the strategies and the text with a special emphasis on the function of the strategies for the 
participants. I categorized strategies based on what seemed to be a functional rule for use of the 
strategies and placed equal importance on looking for examples of how the rules of interpretive 
repertoires operated and exceptions to those rules. If, in a given contextual use, a participant had 
good reason that justified the exception, then it supported the existence of an interpretive 
repertoire. However, I revised the rules for the interpretative repertoire when exceptions seemed 
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to be common. Through this analysis, I was able to use the interpretive repertoires “to 
distinguish contrasting sets of terms used in different ways” (Potter & Wetherall, 1987, p. 153).  
 In addition to indentifying the existence of interpretive repertoires, I explored the 
salience of these repertoires for the participants by considering whether they were “genuine 
features of interpretation” (Potter & Wetherall, 1987, p. 153). Following guidance from Potter 
and Wetherall (1987), I examined situations in which multiple interpretive repertoires were 
applied to the same case. If I captured a set of genuine interpretive repertoires, then “these cases 
should cause problems requiring discursive solutions” (Potter & Wetherall, 1987, p. 153). In 
these instances, I identified tropes, or rhetorical devices, that participants used in attempt to 
resolve paradoxes that arise from applying multiple repertoires to the same case. The 
participants’ use of tropes in these situations demonstrates that he or she was consciously or 
unconsciously aware that the discursive actions created a paradox that needed resolution. 
Analysis with Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory 
 The third phase of analysis used methods associated with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory. This analysis built on the structural resources and interpretive repertoires established in 
the previous phases of analysis. Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is suitable for a meso-
level of discourse analysis because, even though it is sensitive to contextual language use, it 
focuses on the abstract mapping of broader patterns in similar context (Phillips & Jörgensen, 
2002). It considers discourse to be deterministic as it collapses the distinction between language 
and meaning and views discourse as limiting possibilities for participants. Given these 
differences, this phase moves the analysis to a different area of Alvesson & Karreman’s 
framework, but this can provide useful insight and interpretation from another perspective.  
 I used the tools of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory to explicitly examine the 
coordination or conflict regarding the meaning of key terms and floating signifiers. Following 
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guidance from Phillips and Jørgensen (2002), I first identified the key signifiers in the text. Key 
signifiers are important terms with privileged status that may include “nodal points” around 
which the discourse is organized, “master signifiers” that organize identity, and “myths” which 
organize a social space. Then, I investigated how participants combined key signifiers with other 
terms with “chains of equivalence” in ways that imbued the key signifier with meaning. This 
step involved highlighting the key signifiers and identifying terms and concepts used near or in 
conjunction with the key signifiers. For the next step, I examined how the chains of equivalence 
represent different risk characterizations by comparing how participants use different sets of 
terms and concepts to imbue key signifiers with meaning and patterns of this usage. Then, I 
determined whether any of these key signifiers have achieved closure and explored reasons that 
the discourse allowed such closure. Finally, I considered the social consequences if any 
particular meaning achieves closure and gains hegemony in the discourse (Phillips & Jørgensen, 
2002).  
Summary 
 This dissertation used a case study of regulatory action about continued use of cesium 
chloride to explore the dialogic, discursive construction of risk communication among technical 
experts. The case provides a contextual situation for the collection of data of interaction among 
different technical experts regarding the risks and benefits of the issues. The data set includes 
transcripts of a public workshop that contain interactions among experts, transcripts of 
interviews with workshop participants, and external documents that provide historical record. 
The analysis of the data systematically moves through the levels of discourse to create an 
integrated picture of how the polyvocal nature of the discourse and use of non-discursive 





RESULTS: SOCIETAL AND DISCURSIVE RESOURCES 
 This chapter uses structuration analysis to address the first and second research questions 
by identifying societal and discursive resources that enable and constrain participants as they 
interact about the cesium chloride issue. These rules and resources are building blocks and 
sources of legitimation. Enabling structures include (1) the medical institution, (2) the security 
institution, (3) regulatory bodies, (4) legislation, (5) and principles of capitalism, 
industrialization, and the Enlightenment. Constraining structures include (1) secrecy about 
security information, (2) politics, (3) legality of banning sources, and (4) participants’ limited 
points of view. Norms and violations relate to rationality, information, and procedures. Since the 
format workshop partially constrained participants’ ability to directly respond to the 
Recommendation #3 of the NAS Study to eliminate cesium chloride, they strategically used 
evidence, reasoning, and appeals to take nuanced positions that implied their level of agreement 
with the recommendation. The second section of this chapter describes three taxonomies of how 
the participants used evidence, appeals, and reasoning to express their views about the (1) uses 
and alternatives for cesium chloride, (2) security issues, and (3) risk logics.  
 This chapter focuses on identifying the social context and resources for legitimation. 
Subsequent chapters attend to their functional use to coordinate and legitimize participants’ 
views. Chapter VI uses Potter and Wetherall’s discursive psychology to identify patterns of how 
participants use these structural resources as interpretative repertoires. Chapter VII then uses 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory to examine how participants used the structures and 




Societal Resources that Enable and Constrain Participants 
 In order to explain why certain discursive resources were recognized by participants as 
more legitimate, I used elements of Giddens’ structuration theory to analyze a broad view of the 
societal resources that enabled and constrained the participants’ actions at the workshop and 
interview accounts. The results of this analysis: (1) identifies categories of participants, (2) 
constructs a chronology of events from their perspectives, (3) identifies enabling and 
constraining structures, (4) identifies norms and violations, and (5) offers a description of 
connections between the societal institutions, participant behaviors, and the structures. The 
results of the fifth step are embedded in the analysis of Chapters VI and VII and described in the 
conclusion of each of those chapters. 
Categories of Participants 
 There are several professional groups and disciplines who are involved with the cesium 
chloride issue. The first category are the user communities: hospitals and blood banks who use 
cesium irradiators to irradiate blood for transfusion, researchers who use cesium irradiators for 
medical and agricultural research, and radiation protection professionals who use calibration 
equipment to maintain consistency and accuracy in dosimetry. The next category of participants 
are the source and equipment manufacturing communities—for cesium chloride there is only one 
manufacturer in Russia, one British distributor, and only a handful of companies that 
manufacture the irradiators and calibrators. A third category of participants includes regulators 
and government officials who ensure that radioactive materials are used safely, securely, and in 
accordance with state, national, and international policy. Radiation safety officers at hospitals 
and research institutions are a group of participants who act as a bridge between the user 
communities and the regulators. Another category of participants are security specialists who 
analyze the potential for terrorists to misuse otherwise beneficial technologies and develop plans 
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to prevent these scenarios from occurring. Politicians are also part of the context, but are not 
directly present in the workshop or interview accounts. Rather, they are often portrayed as 
individuals who try to control the situation from behind the scenes. Finally, the patients who 
receive medical benefits from cesium chloride technologies and members of the public who bear 
the risk of the security threat are part of the context. Like the politicians, these groups are not 
directly present in the data; however, unlike the politicians they are not afforded any 
acknowledgement of having a legitimate means to weigh in on this issue. When the public is 
explicitly mentioned, one participant treats their views as irrational and another participant 
highlights the injustice of their absence from this conversation. Patients appear contextually in 
statements and accounts as beneficiaries of medical services of cesium chloride technologies. 
 Throughout the interviews, the participants recounted interactions they had with 
members of different professional disciplines described above. An examination the sites of 
interaction (Table 5.1) makes it apparent, that in order for a person to gain access to these 
forums, they must be networked into professional organizations. Additionally, some of these 
forums, like the sub-committee meetings, conference calls, and the NRC workshop were the first 
time that some participants had meaningful interactions regarding cesium chloride across 
disciplinary lines.  
 
Table 5.1 Sites of Interaction  
Sub-committee meetings during the NAS Study 
Meetings of professional organizations 
Chat rooms, email, and listservs of professional organizations 
Conference calls and individual phone calls 
Meetings with members of an organization 
Public meetings, including the NRC-sponsored workshop  
Conversations before and after the formal sessions of the NRC-sponsored workshop 




Participants’ Perspectives of Event Chronology  
 The next step of a structuration analysis is to construct a chronology of events. The 
following chronology is created based on news reports, press releases, and the answer that 
interview participants gave to the question: “When did you form your view about the cesium 
chloride issue?” 
 Two participants attributed the timing of their views to events prior to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. The earliest event timing came from a researcher who had been 
working with cesium chloride in his research since the late 1950’s. This is the time when the 
Atomic Energy Act allowed civilian uses of radioactive materials and President Eisenhower’s 
“Atoms for Peace” speech encouraged such activity. At this time, the researcher formed his 
views about his preference for using cesium-137 in his research based on its energy properties. 
Another participant attributed the beginning of his views on radiation source use and 
replacement to the DOE offsite source recovery project (OSRP) that began in the late 1990’s 
(although Los Alamos National Laboratory has been collecting sources since 1979). The mission 
of this program is remove excess, unwanted, abandoned, or orphaned radioactive sealed sources 
that pose a potential risk to health, safety, and national security and send them to a storage 
facility at Los Alamos or return them to manufacturers for recycling. This program represents a 
conscientious effort by the U.S. government to maintain an accounting of all radiation sources 
and since 2003 has taken on the security dimension of its mission.  
 Several participants pointed to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 as helping 
them to form the view that terrorists could use any technology to cause harm to the U. S. 
Following these attacks, government agencies began increasing security around all radiation 
sources, including cesium chloride. Additionally, one participant discussed his involvement with 
the radiation of mail to the U.S. Congress to check for anthrax. During this event, he formed the 
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view that as a scientist, he needed to stay involved with these security decisions in order to 
ensure that they were not driven by fear.  
 In the years following 9/11, Congress took increasing interest in security of radioactive 
materials and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 made provisions for an interagency task force to 
examine the risk of dirty bombs and for the NRC to commission a study with the National 
Academy of Sciences to examine radioactive source use and replacement (Dolley, 2008b; 2008c; 
Markey, 2005a; 2005b). The participants who worked on this task force or sub-committees of the 
NAS study marked this time period as when they began to form their views. Participants who 
worked in these settings were aware of the Congressional interest because aides were frequently 
present at the meetings. In 2006, Congressman Edward Markey and then Senator Hilary Clinton 
sent a letter to the NRC regarding nuclear security that included, among other things, a request 
for increased oversight of radioactive materials to prevent their use in a radiological dispersal 
device (Markey, 2006). In 2008, Markey and Clinton proposed legislation in both congressional 
houses to incentivize the replacement of radioactive sources, such as cesium chloride; however 
this legislation has not been passed (Markey, 2008a).  
 In the timeframe between 2005 and 2008, several user communities described how they 
began implementing increased controls. For one participant, the interactions that he had within 
his organization at this time were critical events that shaped his views about use and security of 
cesium irradiators. Also, around the 2006 timeframe, two participants who used cesium 
irradiators in medical settings formed their views about the feasibility of x-ray irradiators as an 
alternative. One participant was moving a cesium irradiator and considered replacing it with an 
x-ray irradiator so that he could avoid compliance issues with the cesium irradiator. However, 
after research, he decided that due to cost and reliability issues, it was not in the best interest for 
his organization. The other participant did purchase an x-ray irradiator and said that he formed 
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his views about its expense and lower reliability when the x-ray irradiator began requiring more 
maintenance.   
 In February of 2008, the NAS study Radiation Source Use and Replacement was 
published. This study examined several radioactive sources and included the following 
recommendation that directly related to cesium chloride. 
Recommendation 3: In view of the overall liabilities of radioactive cesium chloride, the 
U. S. government should implement option for eliminating Category 1 and Category 2 
cesium chloride sources from use in the United Stated and, to the extent possible, 
elsewhere. The committee suggests these options as the steps for implementation: 
i. Discontinue licensing of new cesium chloride irradiator sources. 
ii. Put in place incentives for decommissioning existing sources. 
iii. Prohibit the export of cesium chloride sources to other countries, except for 
purposes of disposal in an appropriately licensed facility (National Research 
Council, 2008, p. 9). 
 
The publication of this study was announced in an NAS press release and covered with a small 
blurb in the Washington Post and more detailed articles in the Montreal Gazette (Boswell, 2008) 
and trade press Defense Daily (Lobsensz, 2008) and Inside NRC (Dolley, 2008a). Additionally, 
Congressman Markey praised the NAS study’s recommendations in a press release (Markey, 
2008a).   
 Several participants mentioned professional conferences in the spring of 2008 as the 
point in time when they learned of NAS Study’s Recommendation #3 and this is when they 
formed their views that, to some level, disagreed with the recommendation. During the summer 
of 2008, the participants from professional societies started to receive calls from their 
membership expressing concern about this recommendation. These user communities began to 
interact with each other in chat rooms and over email and expressed a lot of anger about the 
recommendation. In August 2008, the NRC announced that it would have a public workshop 
regarding this issue and invited participants to serve as panelists at roundtable sessions (U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008b; 2008c). In the time immediately preceding the 
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September 2008 workshop, the user communities held several phone conferences to gather 
information from each other. Additionally organizations gathered information from members in 
order to prepare for presentations at the workshop. Also, in the week before the NRC workshop, 
the USA Today ran an article about the Department of Homeland Security’s “red teams” that 
could extract the cesium chloride from irradiators in less than two minutes, and described the in-
device delay program (commonly called “hardening”) that re-engineers the cesium irradiators to 
make the sources more difficult to steal (Hall, 2008). For one participant, his involvement in this 
program was an important activity that shaped his view about the security concerns of cesium 
chloride. 
 In December 2008, NRC staff recommended that the NRC improve security for cesium 
chloride sources rather than prohibit the use of them and continue to research alternatives. This 
was announced in an NRC press release and an Inside NRC article (Dolley, 2008c). At this time, 
Congressman Markey ran a press release expressing his displeasure at the NRC staff 
recommendation and promised further support of programs to enhance security related to 
radioactive sources (Markey, 2008b). In April 2009, the NRC Commissioners (the 
presidentially-appointed decision makers for the NRC) voted to agree with the staff’s 
recommendation and directed them to write a policy statement that provided the details of the 
increased security and program of research for alternatives. Then Commissioner Jackzo (he is 
now the Chairman of the NRC) dissented from this vote because he would have preferred the 
NRC to begin rule-making on this issue (Dolley, 2009).  
 In recent years, fears about radiological terrorism with cesium chloride were present in 
the press and fiction. In 2006 and 2007 there were two articles appearing in the Washington 
Times and the New York Times (respectively) about the radiological terrorism—both mentioned 
cesium chloride explicitly (de Borchgrave, 2006; Zimmerman, Acton, & Rogers, 2007). 
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Additionally, in 2007, an Australian fiction book incorporated a scenario in which terrorists stole 
cesium chloride from medical providers and used it to poison water in several Australian cities 
(Porter, 2007). Most recently, in 2010 a U. S. television drama series, NCIS, featured an episode 
in which cobalt-60 (a radionuclide that is offered as an alternative to cesium chloride) was stolen 
from a dentist’s office and used on a dirty bomb.  
 This chronology provides a high level context for the issues around civilian use of 
radiation sources, with a special focus on the use of cesium chloride. Principles about uses of 
radioactive sources date back to the 1953 with Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech and the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, both of which encouraged civil use of nuclear materials and 
emphasized the importance of always maintaining control of sources. The 1950’s are when 
scientists began using cesium chloride as an irradiation source for research. The OSRP program 
demonstrates a long-term interest in securing radioactive sources. However, as it did in many 
sectors of society, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 increased the urgency for 
improving security around sources and this activity was given further legitimacy and resources 
with the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Throughout the policies and programs that shaped some 
participants’ views, several participants marked turning points of their views based on their 
experiences using irradiators. The final insight from this high-level view demonstrates that 
information spread quickly through professional communities after the publication of the NAS 
study, and that the NRC workshop was an important response to the concerns that several user 
communities had about the recommendations of that study. 
Enabling and Constraining Structures 
 An important step of structuration analysis is to identify structures present within society 
that enable and constrain the actions of individual actors. As individuals enact the structures, 
they reinforce society. Individuals can also appropriate structures an ironic manner that is not the 
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intended spirit. The following sections describe enabling and constraining structures that 
participants appear to be appropriating or feel restricted by. They are described in this section 
and the analysis of interpretative repertoires (Chapter VI) and coordination (Chapter VII) 
identifies their use by participants. For purposes of this dissertation, these descriptions are 
necessarily simplistic, however, the generalizations are not intended to imply that these 
structures are uniform and lack complexity. 
 Enabling structures. Enabling structures are the rules and resources that are available to 
the participants. These structures are both a medium and outcome of interactions about use of 
technology with radioactive sources. Enabling structures for the cesium chloride issue include 
(1) the medical institution, (2) the security institution, (3) regulatory bodies, (4) legislation, (5) 
and principles of capitalism, industrialization, and the Enlightenment. 
 In the U. S. the medical institution is a powerful entity comprised of organizations that 
provide patient care, research health issues, educate future healthcare providers, sell medical 
services and products, and a complex network of insurance companies.  The practices of the 
medical institution are regulated by the U. S. Department of Health and some agencies under the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Organizations within this institution are motivated to prevent or 
treat human illness and several organizations also have a profit motive. This structure is a 
resource that enables participants to make general claims about the value of technology for 
patient care. 
 Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the security institution is an 
increasingly powerful institution in the U. S. with the mission to protect the public by preventing 
terrorist attacks and providing resources in the case of an attack. It is primarily composed of 
agencies within the U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) who liaison with other 
federal agencies with jurisdiction over areas of concern. In the case of cesium chloride, the 
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security divisions of the NRC, the Department of Energy (DOE), National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Department of Defense (DOD), fall into the 
category of the security institution. Other organizations in the category include contractors with 
the federal agencies, especially national laboratories such as Sandia National Labs who provided 
research for the security studies related to cesium chloride and Oak Ridge National Labs that are 
experts in research about radioactive sources. This structure enables participants to express 
concerns about cesium chloride in terms of protecting the public. It also provides the “9/11 
logic” which is a reasoning that if terrorists would use airplanes as a weapon and are willing to 
commit suicide for their cause then they could use any technology to harm the citizens of the 
U.S.  
 Another set of important institutions for the cesium chloride issue are regulatory bodies 
who create policies and oversee the safe and secure use of radioactive sources. In the U. S. the 
federal agency for this is the NRC, but there are also 38 agreement states that have been 
delegated primary responsibility for regulatory oversight of radioactive sources. At the 
international level, the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) is the regulatory body 
that coordinates regulatory programs in all nations that use nuclear technologies for civil or 
military applications (or at least they try to have authority in all nations). The regulatory 
structure enables participants to believe that their use of radioactive sources can be done safely 
to minimize the risks of the hazardous material. Fundamental to regulation and policies 
regarding civil uses of radioactive material is a radiation protection logic that reasons that as 
long as users measure and minimize exposure to and dose from the sources, then the health of 
users and the public will be protected. 
 Closely related to the regulatory structure is the legislative structure. This structure 
consists of a variety of federal legislation and policies. Legislation can be as fundamental as the 
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that allowed for civil uses of nuclear technology by private 
organizations for commercial purposes. In more recent times, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
provided resources for additional study to improve security of radioactive sources, and 
periodically Congressman Markey and other elected officials will propose legislation or add 
amendments to funding bills that are related to the use of radioactive materials. Also 
fundamental to the use of radiation sources is the IAEA Safety Standards: Categorization of 
Radioactive Sources published in 2005 (International Atomic Energy Commission, 2005) sorted 
radionuclides based on the amount of dose that would be required to impact harm to human 
health. Throughout the workshop and meeting participants draw upon this policy when they refer 
to “Category 1,” Category 2,” and “Category 3” sources with Category 1 sources presenting the 
most risk. For the cesium chloride issue, Category 1 and Category 2 sources are of the most 
interest. The legislative structure enabled participants to use radioactive sources for civil 
purposes and refer to policies that helped them do so safely.  
 A final structure related to the issue of cesium chloride is a general belief, characteristic 
of late Western societies, that technology is a resource to solve social problems (Habermas, 
1984). This belief stems from the history and precedence of capitalism, industrialization, and the 
Enlightenment. This belief is fundamental to the preceding structures and enables participants to 
express their beliefs in the importance of cesium chloride technology, the importance of 
proposing solutions that are supported by the market, and the possibility of finding a 
technological alternative to the cesium irradiators that pose a security threat. 
 Constraining structures. Constraining structures are rules and resources that limit 
participants’ actions. Again, these structures are both the medium and outcome of interactions 
about the use of nuclear technologies. Constraining structures for the cesium chloride issue 
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include (1) secrecy about security information, (2) politics, (3) legality of banning sources, and 
(4) participants’ limited points of view. 
 One important constraining structure is the secrecy about security issues. Security-
related information is often considered secret or top secret which requires individuals to have a 
federal security clearance and need-to-know in order to gain access to this information. Such 
protections around this information are necessary in order to prevent U. S. enemies and terrorists 
from gaining access to information that they could use to cause harm to U. S. interests. This is a 
fundamental and well-respected aspect of dealing with security-related issues, especially among 
federal employees. However, this aspect of dealing with security-issues also poses a constraint 
on the actions of individuals who cannot share the fullness of their understanding about why 
cesium chloride is considered a security risk in an attempt to persuade others to believe them and 
take appropriate actions. For some participants, this secrecy was frustrating because they could 
not see the whole context of the problem, evaluate the quality of information or the efficacy of 
the proposed solutions. Additionally, two participants pointed out that due to secrecy, security 
reports rarely receive peer-review. This can prevent overly-conservative or underestimated 
conclusions from being corrected which leads to poor quality of information for decision-
makers. The secrecy of security information constrained security-specialists from being able to 
fully persuade some participants of the security threat and constrained some participants from 
being able to evaluate the quality of information related to changes that they were going to have 
to make. One participant, who respected the importance of secrecy, could not help but feel 
frustrated with how regulators simply said “trust us” and provided only “piecemeal” information 
to them about the security changes they were going to have to make in her organization. 
 Even though legislation is an enabling structure, participants observed that the presence 
of politics around the cesium chloride issue seemed to constrain the NRC. They recognized that 
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elected officials who sat on congressional committees that oversaw the NRC were very 
interested in the cesium chloride issue. One interview participant felt that the cesium chloride 
issue was “sadly the result of a bizarre political process where certain congressmen or senators 
felt that they would get positive press based on how tough they were on terrorists.”  Indeed, 
Congressman Markey publicly expressed his agreement with the NAS study’s recommendations 
and displeasure at the NRC’s decision to not follow them explicitly. As a result, some 
participants noted that the NRC staff had to be careful in how they responded to the 
recommendations of the NAS study, which may explain one reason that they solicited so much 
input from user communities and held the workshop. Several participants expressed views that 
Congress “could put pressure on the regulatory agencies to actually implement some of those 
recommendations.”  This congressional desire to be “tough on terrorists” constrained the NRC 
from being free to form their own professional judgment about the risks and subsequent policy 
about use of cesium chloride. Additionally, a couple of participants noted a political tendency of 
managers in federal agencies to use fear appeals in order to increase the importance and funding 
for their programs. For these participants, the element of politics created constraints on the types 
of information used in decision making.  
 The third constraining structure is the legal issues associated with banning radioactive 
sources. First, several participants pointed out that current legislation does not encourage a 
“banning” of radioactive materials. Additionally, participants frequently mentioned the legal 
constraint of not having a disposal option for cesium chloride if it was banned—they even 
alluded to the Yucca Mountain controversy and the inability of the federal government to 
provide for disposal of any radioactive materials. A unique angle on legal constraints of the 
disposal problem came from one participant who pointed out that cesium chloride does not fit 
into the current configuration of OSRP and other non-proliferation programs. Currently the 
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OSRP program is designed for other radioactive isotopes but not cesium chloride. Non-
proliferation programs are able to collect radioactive materials that could be used to build 
nuclear weapons but currently, cesium chloride is legal to use when licensed by NRC and 
agreement states and does not qualify for non-proliferation programs. This participant was 
careful to acknowledge that not all of his colleagues held this view, though. Ultimately, these 
legal issues constrained the NRC or any other entity from banning cesium chloride before 
creating a disposal pathway. 
 Finally, several interview participants believed that they or others in the situation were 
constrained by a limited point-of-view—that is, they were initially unable to understand other 
participants’ perspectives and often failed to ever really achieve full understanding. One 
participant said the communicating about the cesium chloride issue was “like the proverbial 
elephant with the three blind men.” Participants also noted that this was inevitable because any 
one person could not know everything but it was important to have individuals who represent all 
perspectives present at the interactions in order to correct false information. One participant 
explicitly connected this constraint with the political constraint when describing how “people 
contrive more vulnerability and risk so that they can build their programs” while at the same 
time other “people might also say less to make management easy.” As a result of these different 
points of view, “people who deal with risk communications should recognize both extremes and 
most likely the truth of the situation lies somewhere in the middle.”  The participants believed 
that a limited point-of-view constrained their abilities to accurately share and interpret 
information. 
Norms and Violations 
 A third step for analysis with structuration theory is to identify norms, moments in 
which participants treat particular structures and behaviors as if they are taken-for-granted. 
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Conversely, this step identified moments in which participants feel that the norms are violated. 
In the interviews and workshop, participants demonstrated that they held norms about how 
individuals should behave rationality and follow procedures. Violations of these norms occurred 
when emotion seemed to guide decisions, other parties shared or withheld too much information, 
and there was talk of elimination or “banning” cesium chloride. 
Norms 
 Typical of the rational-actor model (Garvin, 2001), participants’ interviews upheld the 
norm of rationality as important basis for decision making. This is apparent in their approval of 
the NRC decision to allow to continued use of cesium chloride with security enhancements 
based on a belief that it “is the most rational outcome.”  Participants constructed themselves as 
providing a rational voice in the interactions—sometimes they even saw themselves as more 
rational than other participants. They felt that they had high quality and relevant experiences that 
enabled them to contribute important information to the interactions. One participant who 
worked on the NAS study said “I had actually seen a lot more of these sources than some of the 
other people there and [knew] how they were used and how the radiation safety came into play 
and some of the security measures.” Some participants also felt that their rationality helped them 
to see a more complete picture of the situation of how decisions would impact users and the 
actual role of the government.  
 Closely linked with the norms about rationality, participants held expectations about 
following procedures of sharing information and creating policy or rule-making.  Again, 
participants approved of the NRC’s process of gathering information related to the cesium 
chloride issue, especially because the NRC took into account the user communities’ perspectives 
about how a decision to eliminate cesium chloride would impact the beneficial functions of 
cesium technology. Several participants have a lot of experience working with federal agencies 
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and they all praised the NRC’s information gathering approach in terms similar to the following 
excerpt: 
I think NRC did a good job in saying, ‘Okay, let's just get everybody together and 
announce this and get some feedback from the community to find out more about it. 
What are the different applications? What will be the impact, if such a ruling will be in 
place - eliminating cesium chloride?’ 
 
Additionally, participants had expectations about procedures that federal agencies should follow 
when creating policy or rule-makings. This expectation began with rational information 
gathering, as described above, but also included an expectation that the agency with legal 
jurisdiction should be the one to make the decision. Several participants expressed the view that 
it was the NRC’s decision about whether or not to phase out cesium chloride. One participant 
who participated in a working group for the NAS study identified this belief as the one thing the 
group could agree on, so they “basically punted this decision back to the NRC and said if the 
NRC wants to phase out cesium chloride they should conduct their standard rule-making 
process.” 
Violations 
 The most common violation the participants responded to was that decision-makers 
would make decisions based on politics, emotion, or both. Several interview participants felt that 
some politicians had “radiophobia” to and this led to “mind sets … to ban all radioactive 
materials--I'm sure as the sun rises that some people consider that.”  One participant noted that 
another federal agency was only “tangentially involved in regulating the radiation. And so they 
felt [that] a terrorist could use this and it needs to be eliminated--not really comprehending the 
fact that the bigger picture is what they’re used for and what the beneficial uses are.” These 
participants reacted to a violation of the rational decision-making process based on a holistic 
point-of-view. A third participant expressed his sense of this violation by contrasting ideal 
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conditions for rational decision with the real political constraints that violate what he views as a 
norm of rationality. 
One would hope that governmental bureaucracies that exist for public safety, whether 
they may be the NRC or the Environmental Protection Agency, will be encouraged to do 
their job as best as possible and is free from political constraint, and it is always 
unfortunate regardless of who’s in power when public servants need to tailor their 
communications because of who happens to be in government control at the time. 
 
 Another violation is the distortion of information. Several interview participants hinted 
at this violation, but workshop participants addressed it more specifically. This distortion is 
attributed to fear and political pressures that are disseminated in the media. The following 
excerpt expresses one participant’s concerns about distortion in contrast with the norms of 
scientific information and rational decision-making.  
As a consequence of conflicting threat assessment and media depictions of threats, we 
have become even more polarized over the nature and severity of national security 
threats to the United States and fundamentally disagree about how to frame and 
negotiate these threats. These trends can distort perceptions and … disproportionately 
shape our policy choices and specifically about the issue before us today. Therefore, 
especially in cases where alarmist predictions are not backed by good evidence, we 
should strive to ask the right questions to the extent that that is possible. We should ask 
for a comprehensive evaluation of sources and exculpatory evidence for these 
predictions, which will help us determine the appropriate variables for informed cost-
benefit analysis and sustained high-quality reasoning about the security and safety 
challenges of our time. 
 
 A third information-related violation occurred at the workshop when a security specialist 
was trying use additional information to support his concerns about cesium chloride but he was 
asked to stop speaking because he may have been crossing the line of sharing too much security-
related information.  
Security Specialist: If you do a study of the economic impact of a major dirty bomb 
using cesium chloride, as [my colleague] and I did … some years back, we found 
that an attack in lower Manhattan on the 10th of September, 2001 could have caused 
just about as much property damage and economic loss, all told, as the terrorist 
attack the following day. Again, we were exploiting the physical properties -  
DHS Official: Excuse me, if we could make sure we don't get into any specifics in the 
use, it would be very helpful.  
Security Specialist: I'm sorry?  
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DHS Official: If we could make sure - I'm … from the [DHS] Office of Nuclear Security 
and Response.  
Security Specialist: Who and what?  
DHS Official: I'm … from the Office of Nuclear Security Incidents and Response. We 
just want to make sure that this is something that's public, essentially something for 
the public.  
Security Specialist: I'm going into no specifics whatsoever. Okay?  
Facilitator: And sir, we are just trying to make sure we are covered, okay?  
Security Specialist: Thank you for that pleasant intervention. 
 
 This particular violation illustrates how the security specialist felt a constraint about 
secrecy. He was trying to use his professional knowledge to convince other groups about the 
risks of cesium chloride, but since other officials did not want to risk having security-related 
information in the public record, they asked him to stop speaking. The security-specialist clearly 
felt that his credibility was attacked, responded to this request with sarcasm, but complied with 
the request. This was a particularly memorable moment as recounted by an interview participant 
a year and half later. 
…Somebody actually had to be reprimanded at the meeting verbally … because of 
security risks of what they were saying I guess about the dispersability of cesium 
chloride… I do Federal Agency meetings almost for a living and I've never seen a 
situation like that happen even at…controversial meetings. 
 
The interview participant recognized the unusual act of meeting officials asking a participant to 
stop speaking and this cued him to the violation of the secrecy norm related to security 
information. 
 Finally, participants reacted to violations of established procedures and precedent. In 
particular, participants were very sensitive to the fact that, in their view, it is not legal to ban 
radioactive materials that are being peacefully used for the benefit of society. For example, at the 
workshop, a security specialist who used the word “eliminate” in his comments provoked a 
series of angry comments that caused the facilitator to redirect the meeting. Interview 
participants also reacted to the idea of “banning” cesium chloride by saying things like, “we 
don't have the authority to ban … if anybody has the authority to ban, it will be [the NRC].”  
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Basically, they felt that any procedure other than an NRC rule-making, would be an 
inappropriate procedure for determining whether cesium chloride should be eliminated. 
Summary 
 In summary, the history of the safe use of radioactive materials, including cesium 
chloride, dates back to the 1950’s with an important premise to keep track of the materials. This 
has not always been handled well by the federal government, but in the 1990’s, DOE’s OSRP 
program increased efforts to locate and secure sources. Since the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, Congress and the federal agencies have increased security around all radioactive 
materials. Additionally, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided resources to study this issue 
further—a study by NAS that resulted in the recommendation to eliminate cesium chloride for 
security reasons. Since the publication of this study in 2008, there have been several interactions 
about the benefits and security of cesium chloride.  
 Throughout this history, there were several enabling and constraining structures that 
participants drew upon. Enabling structures include (1) the medical institution, (2) the security 
institution, (3) regulatory bodies, (4) legislation, (5) and principles of capitalism, 
industrialization, and the Enlightenment. Constraining structures include (1) secrecy about 
security information, (2) politics, (3) legality of banning sources, and (4) participants’ limited 
points of view. By drawing on the enabling structures and reacting to the constraints, 
participants’ actions at the workshop and accounts in the interviews demonstrated norms and 
violations regarding rationality, information, and procedures. In particular, participants displayed 
a strong norm of expecting the NRC and other decision makers to make a rational decision based 
on high quality scientific information and the impact on the beneficial uses of cesium chloride. 
Ideally, this rational decision should avoid influence of politics and fear if possible; however, 
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interview participants understand the power that certain politicians have over the budgets of 
federal agencies and the power that the security institution has over nearly all sectors of the U. S.  
 This section of the structuration analysis demonstrates the resources and constraints that 
participants draw upon throughout their interactions about the cesium chloride issue. Participants 
act and react both consciously and subconsciously to the powerful institutions, norms, and 
constraints of the situation. For example, several interview participants are aware that political 
interests potentially explain why the NRC underwent a long information-gathering process 
before making their decision to allow the continued use of cesium chloride—largely based on the 
values of using technology to provide medical care and radiation protection. On the other hand, 
interview participants also understand the importance of security to ensure that terrorists cannot 
use beneficial technologies for the public harm. Both of these positions are set up in the societal 
institutions and mutually constrain each other.  
Use of Evidence, Appeals, and Reasoning 
 In addition to societal resources and constraints, structuration theory also attends to 
actions of individuals. This section provides an explanation for how participants strategically 
positioned their views in relationship to each other and Recommendation #3 of the NAS Study. 
In the NAS study, cesium chloride is characterized as a security threat and this is the basis for 
Recommendation #3. Participants from user communities wanted to characterize cesium chloride 
as a unique isotope that provides a beneficial technology. This characterization becomes a 
premise for expressing disagreement with NAS Recommendation #3—either its security basis or 
the feasibility of alternatives to replace cesium chloride technologies. However, the structure of 
the workshop partially constrained direct expression of views about disagreeing with the security 
characterization because the agenda was organized around information-gathering questions. The 
NRC agenda questions for the workshop are listed in Appendix C. Most of these questions were 
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designed to gather information that the NRC can use to make a decision about whether or not to 
follow the NAS report recommendation. In response to Question 3.1-5 about whether the NRC 
should “discontinue all new licensing and importation of these sources and devices,” several 
participants stepped to the microphone and answered, “no.” The facilitator joked that he was not 
intending to take a vote, but the reaction illustrates how participants wanted to express their 
disagreement with the recommendation to eliminate cesium chloride due to its security threat. 
An NRC manager clarified the question by saying that, “while ‘no’ is a perfectly reasonable 
answer for you to say… we need a regulatory basis to say no and yes, we disagree with you or 
we agree with you or we agree with you in part [and] so we really need your help in flushing out 
no, but why.”  
 Given this constraint, participants generally made comments that addressed the agenda 
questions using discursive strategies that layered in their views about Recommendation #3. This 
section describes three taxonomies of how the participants used evidence, appeals, and reasoning 
to express their views about the (1) uses and alternatives for cesium chloride, (2) security issues, 
and (3) risk logics.  
Talk About Alternatives 
 Most of the talk about alternatives used deductive reasoning using either scientific or 
economic principles. Talk about alternatives is full of very specific detail about operations of the 
equipment, organizational operations, specific activity and energy level of radiation sources, and 
physical and chemical properties of the isotopes and their forms. Occasionally, participants used 
inductive reasoning from a professional experience that offered a cautionary tale about the use of 
an alternative or recalled a historical experience of phasing out of another radiological 
alternative. When talking about alternatives, it was more common for participants to try to build 
their credibility by appealing to their organizational affiliation or external expertise. An appeal to 
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the organizational affiliation may try to establish their stance as neutral or substantiate their 
comment as being supported by the knowledge and expertise of the organization. Participants 
also tried to build credibility and consensus by directly appealing to the expertise other 
participants to add support to their comment or referring to the dominant view of their 
organizations’ members. These credibility appeals function to create a sense of objectivity which 
is the hallmark of rational decision making. The information about impacts of phasing out 
cesium chloride is layered in talk that appears informative. Therefore disagreement with the 
NAS recommendation is implicitly present in most participants’ comments and this may explain 
why there were shades of distinction in their views. The participants talked about whether the 
alternatives were feasible, possible, or preferable. Table 5.2 describes the shades of distinctions 
that participants took when articulating their views and how these distinctions function as 
implicit positions toward NAS Recommendation #3.  
 
Table 5.2 Distinctions Between Participants’ Positions About Alternatives 
Description of Position Function Example 
Alternatives can work 
and would be preferable 
to cesium chloride 
Demonstrates some 
level of agreement with 
NAS Recommendation 
#3 
Should we pursue safer forms of cesium-137 or 
technologies assuming they exist and are 
economically viable to the end user and I think all 
of you would agree that we should because if we 
don't the potential impact of not doing so could be 
substantial as already mentioned.  
Alternatives are not 
ready to fully replace 
cesium chloride 
technologies 
Argues for extended 
time to follow NAS 
Recommendation #3 
So I just wanted to caution people into thinking in 
terms of time to market of a viable work horse X-
ray technology to supplant the use of cesium-137. 
We're talking several years down the road, and 




there are instances when 
alternatives might be 
preferable 
Suggests that NAS 
Recommendation #3 
should not apply to all 
technologies 
So you look at each one differently and maybe you 
can come up with different solutions. Maybe for the 
blood banks for those that are not using a very high 
through-put, an x-ray machine is a good option. For 
United Blood Services or the Red Cross where they 
have a lot of through-put, maybe you consolidate 
your cesium chloride there and you increase the 
security and really beef it up at those facilities. 
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Table 5.2 continued 
Description of Position Description of Position Description of Position 
Could use an alternative 
technology but there 
large obstacles to this 
possibility such as 
expense and reliability  
Demonstrates that 
implementing NAS 
Recommendation #3 is 
extremely problematic 
It is easily demonstrable that cesium chloride 
sources utilized in blood irradiators have a much 
more reliable performance record than machine-
produced technologies. And both the cost and 
continuity of operation or failure should be 
considered financially, and then the possible impact 
on human life. 
Strong expressions of 
preference for using 





could have negative 
impacts 
Cesium-137 is the instrument of choice for much of 
the research. It is the standard. It is the standard 
because it has uniform irradiation effects. It has 
very unique cell interactions. This is one of the 
areas where I got very clear guidance from my 
faculty. 
Alternatives are not 





could have negative 
impacts 
If we had to go to another form of radiation, we'd 
have to recharacterize that, and that would take 
many years of research. 
 
 
Talk About Security  
 At the workshop, explicit talk about security is less frequent than talk about alternatives 
because the agenda questions did not ask participants to share their views about security risks. 
Never-the-less, participants did find opportunities to talk about security issues by reframing the 
agenda questions in a way that would allow them to more directly respond to the premise for 
Recommendation #3 of the NAS study. As it becomes apparent that several workshop 
participants did not believe the cesium chloride is a serious enough security threat to warrant 
elimination, a few participants felt the need to reinforce the report’s claim. Most of the talk about 
security at the workshop used inductive reasoning from professional experience and appealed to 
personal credibility. Security specialists reasoned from professional knowledge about security-
related issues, frequently using analogic reasoning to past events. Participants from user 
communities reasoned from their professional experience of implementing the increased controls 
and working with the equipment in its organization setting. One exception to the tendency to use 
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inductive reasoning about security topics is when participants talk about dispersability or 
solubility—in these cases they tend to reason deductively from the physical and chemical 
properties of cesium chloride to either explain the severity of the consequences or consider a 
technological solution of an alternative cesium-137 form. Table 5.3 describes the range of 
positions that participants took when expressing their views to reinforce the premise for NAS 
Recommendation #3 or challenge the level of security concern that is merited for cesium 
chloride.  
 
Table 5.3 Distinctions Between Participants’ Positions about Security 
Description of Position Function Example 
There is a real security 
threat associated with 
cesium chloride 
Supports the premise of 
NAS Recommendation #3 
The only radiological dispersion devices 
scenarios that I'm aware of, and I have been 
writing on this since about 2001, the only RDD 
scenarios that can kill in excess of 1,000 people 
at a crack exploit the physical properties of 
cesium chloride. 
Description of 
consequences of RDD 
Reinforces the premise of 
NAS Recommendation #3 
If you do a study of the economic impact of a 
major dirty bomb using cesium chloride… we 
found that an attack in lower Manhattan on the 
10th of September, 2001 could have caused just 
about as much property damage and economic 
loss, all told, as the terrorist attack the following 
day. 
Increased controls and 
hardening minimizes 
security concerns 
Challenges the basis for 
NAS Recommendation #3 
We agree that the hardening program … slows 
somebody who might want to acquire the 
sources down, and allows our security programs 
to kind of kick in gear and mount a response. 
Those are things that we feel are very 
appropriate and do add another layer of security 
on top of that. 
Elimination of CsCl is 




It's the elimination of the cesium chloride 
irradiation is an extreme action. And the 
comparison that I would make is if after 9/11 we 
had eliminated air travel. 
Elimination of CsCl 
creates other security 
threats 
Demonstrates that NAS 
Recommendation #3 has 
not taken full account of its 
unintended outcomes  
Most medical facilities are certainly not set up to 
store a cesium chloride irradiator if it's taken out 
of the secure area that we've gone to great 
lengths to set up now to have security pathways 
approved for. The last thing I would think we 
would want to do is move it out to what we call 
the storage area.  
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Table 5.3 continued 
Description of Position Function Example 
Real concern is a lack of 
security in other 
countries 
Supports the third aspect 
of NAS Recommendation 
#3 
And it seems to me that any solution which is 
intended to address an improvement to security 
here in the U.S. needs to take account of what 





Supports the basis for NAS 
Recommendation #3, OR 
Offer a technological 
solution to the NAS 
recommendation 
I've talked a little bit with [source distributors] 
about the dispersability issue and whether if we 
were to start with pollucite form whether we 
could design it in such a way that it minimized 
certain dispersible effects. So one good thing 
about designing it from scratch is we could try 




 Even though the workshop agenda is designed to solicit information about alternatives to 
cesium chloride and potential impacts of government decisions, assumptions about how to 
determine a risk underlie the informative and persuasive statements. I call these categories of 
assumptions “risk logics.” Each risk logic differs in the linguistic resources that it makes 
available to participants as they characterize the issue of concern (or try to demonstrate that it is 
less of a concern). Table 5.4 describes the four risk logics that participants employed to justify 
their views about whether or not to continue the use of cesium chloride given a security threat. In 
the case of the cesium chloride issue, the “focus on consequences” logic is legitimized by the 
security institution. The “probabilistic risk assessment” logic is used the least frequently, but 
when it is used, it is legitimized by the technology structure and reinforces the norm of 
rationality because of its engineering-based approach to calculating risk and balancing concerns 
of consequence with concerns of likelihood of an event occurring. The acceptable risk logic 
maintains that society can bear risks of certain technologies and is legitimized by the existence 
of regulatory agencies. The risk/benefit logic adds the reasoning that this acceptability must be in 
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proportion to the benefits the technologies provide and is further legitimized by the belief in 
beneficial uses of technology. 
 
Table 5.4 Risk Logics 
Name of Logic Description of Logic Example 
Focus on 
Consequences 
If a threat could result in a 
large societal consequence 
then it is considered a large 
risk and should be 
removed if possible. 
If you do a study of the economic impact of a major 
dirty bomb using cesium chloride… we found that an 
attack in lower Manhattan on the 10th of September, 
2001 could have caused just about as much property 
damage and economic loss, all told, as the terrorist 
attack the following day. 
Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment 
Rhetorically used to 
suggest that another view 
focuses too much on the 
consequences of a negative 
event. This should be 
balanced with estimation 
of the likelihood of the 
event’s occurrence. 
What can go wrong? How likely is it? What are the 
consequences?So those three elements in anything 
come together to really help you define the risk. It's not 
just about what are the consequences. It's about how 
likely is it and what can go wrong … But I think in the 
context of cesium chloride or irradiators or any other 
radioactive material or even reactors, which is a very 
common way we assess those, we use probabilistic risk 
assessment. 
Acceptable Risk Society cannot avoid risk 
and should set tolerable 
levels. The implication is 
that regulatory bodies will 
enforce the levels. 
Nothing that we're going to do is going to give zero 
risk except complete elimination of radionuclides. I 
think that's recognized. So the question becomes what 
is an acceptable risk and that's something we should be 
thinking about as we go through and formulate our 
comments. 
Risk/Benefit A decision about a risk 
should be based on 
whether the benefits of 
technology outweigh the 
risks. 
So before we spend millions and millions of dollars 
trying to recall all of these cesium chloride sources, we 
[should] really make sure that it's a smart decision in 
terms of our limited resources for homeland security 




 The results in this chapter partially answer the overall research question for this study 
about how experts from different disciplines communicate with each other about risk. In 
particular, the analysis with structuration theory reveals societal and discursive resources that 
participants draw upon when characterizing cesium chloride. 
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 The first research question considers the societal resources that enable and constrain 
experts’ talk about risk. Structures such as the U. S. medical institution, regulatory bodies, 
national and international legislation and policies, and belief in technology provide rules and 
resources that enable participants to perform more legitimate norms such as rationality in 
decision-making and procedures for sharing information and creating policies. Most interview 
participants recognized that they are constrained by a limited point of view but they balanced 
this constraint with their view of themselves as rational.  
 The emerging security institution enables participants to take action to protect the public 
from terrorist threats—the impetus for the concerns about cesium chloride. The structural 
constraints lead to norm violations such as decisions based on politics and emotion, distortion of 
information, sharing too much security-related information, and expressed desires to ban 
radioactive materials. However, this structure also constrains participants due to secrecy about 
security information.  
 The second research question considers the types of evidence and appeals that experts 
relied on to articulate their characterizations of cesium chloride. Since they were constrained by 
the agenda structure of the workshop, participants used their characterizations of cesium chloride 
(as a beneficial technology or as a security threat) as an implicit way to express agreement or 
disagreement with NAS study Recommendation #3. Therefore, participants used evidence, 
reasoning, and appeals to invoke their nuanced positions related to the elimination of cesium 
chloride through their talk about the feasibility of alternatives and security issues.  When 
participants talked about alternatives they tended to reason deductively from operations or 
scientific principles with the exception of using inductive reasoning from a cautionary historical 
tale about the elimination of another radionuclide. Participants from user communities were the 
most frequent contributors to talk about alternatives and they tended to build their credibility by 
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appealing to their organizational affiliation or external expertise. When participants talked about 
security they tended to reason inductively from professional experience with appeals to their 
personal credibility. Security specialists reasoned from professional knowledge about security-
related issues, frequently using analogic reasoning to past events. Participants from user 
communities reasoned from their professional experience of implementing the increased controls 
and working with the equipment in its organization setting. One exception to the tendency to use 
inductive reasoning about security topics is when participants reasoned deductively about 
dispersability and solubility to explain the severity of the consequences or consider a 
technological solution of an alternative cesium-137 form. 
 




RESULTS: INTERPRETATIVE REPERTOIRES 
 This chapter uses discursive psychology to address the second research question by 
analyzing participants’ strategic use of the societal and discursive resources identified in Chapter 
V and the third and fourth research questions by describing processes of coordination and 
legitimation. The participants enacted the enabling and constraining structures through two 
primary interpretative repertoires that provided resources for them to characterize cesium 
chloride according their view: (1) necessity of technology interpretative repertoire and (2) 
security threat interpretative repertoire. These interpretative repertoires were identified using 
methods from Potter and Wetherall’s (1987) discursive psychology. Each repertoire is 
characterized by its use of reasoning, evidence, appeals, risk logics, and the responsibility of the 
government. The elements of each repertoire are summarized in Table 6.1 Even though there 
was a tendency for security analysts to draw upon the security threat interpretative repertoire and 
user groups to draw upon the necessity of technology interpretative repertoire, these repertoires 
were linguistic resources available to all participants. Furthermore, participants could use the 
interpretative repertoires in an ironic manner and did so several times with the security threat 
repertoire.  
 
Table 6.1 Elements of Interpretative Repertoires 
 Necessity of Technology (NTIR) Security Threat (STIR) 
Function  Functions to demonstrate that the 
application of a technology (i.e., 
cesium chloride) provides necessary 
social and scientific benefits. 
Functions to demonstrate that an 
object or issue poses a security threat 
Forms of reasoning and 
types of information 
Deductive – using scientific 
principles, operational information, 
and economic principles  
Inductive - when using information 
professional knowledge, past events, 
and economic consequences 
Deductive - when using scientific 




Table 6.1 continued 
 Necessity of Technology (NTIR) Security Threat (STIR) 
Strategies to build 
credibility 
Draw upon external expertise or 
organizational affiliation 
Draw upon personal expertise by 
referring to credentials and unique 
knowledge 
Appeals to values Used values of medical need, safe 
use of equipment, and quality 
control of product or service 
Used values of public interest and 
fear appeals 
Risk Logic Risk/benefit  
Acceptable risk 
Focus on consequences  
Used PRA logic as possibility to 




Emphasized role of government to 
protect the public by regulating uses 
of technology 
Emphasized the role of government to 




Necessity of Technology Interpretative Repertoire 
 The necessity of technology interpretative repertoire (NTIR) functions to demonstrate 
that the application of a technology (i.e., cesium chloride) provides necessary social and 
scientific benefits. This repertoire uses deductive reasoning with either scientific principles that 
demonstrate the uniqueness of cesium for necessary applications or economic principles that 
demonstrate reasons to allow continued use of the technology (at least in the near-term). 
Participants using this repertoire tended to build credibility by appealing to organizational 
affiliation and external expertise—this was probably an attempt to make statements appear more 
objective. Participants using this repertoire tended to appeal to values such as the need for patient 
therapies and quality control issues. This repertoire provided resources for participants to use 
acceptable risk, risk/benefit, and PRA risk logics. The risk/benefit logic enabled the main 
function of this repertoire to demonstrate that the necessary benefits of technology outweigh the 
risk. The PRA logic supplemented the main function of this repertoire to redirect attention from 
security consequences by balancing them against the likelihood of an event that would initiate 
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the consequences. Finally, this repertoire highlights the responsibility of the government to set a 
regulatory framework of acceptable risk levels that ensure that technology is used safely.  
 In summary, the main function of the necessity of technology repertoire is to 
demonstrate the unique and useful characteristics of cesium application. The combination of the 
acceptable risk logic with the emphasis on the regulatory responsibility of government mutually 
reinforces each other and creates a source of legitimacy for arguments drawn from NTIR. 
Additionally, the risk/benefit logic draws on structural resources about beneficial technology 
with a special emphasis on the economic resources and constraints. Use of NTIR is rarely 
challenged by other participants. However, participants draw on this repertoire when they 
distinguish their nuanced views about the feasibility of alternatives and these distinctions 
become a source of disagreement that are discussed in Chapter VII. 
NTIR in Relationship to Recommendation #3  
 At the workshop participants primarily drew on NTIR to position their views in 
relationship to Recommendation #3 of the NAS Study. In the first example of NTIR a participant 
used deductive reasoning from scientific principles to emphasize how the unique characteristics 
of cesium chloride enable agricultural researchers to achieve their necessary function of insect 
sterilization. This statement counters a belief that an alternative form of cesium-137 is feasible 
because the participant’s work could not handle the estimated increase in irradiation time for a 
ceramic or glass form.  
We currently own and operate nine Huseman Category 1 irradiators that we use 
primarily for sterilizing insects. And in our line of work we simply can't tolerate too 
much of an increase in time, which you're sort of implying if you had … decreased your 
activity by about a half, because in our line of work the time is critical because we try to 
destroy the gonadotropic tissue in the insects. But if they are in those irradiators too 
long, we start getting secondary damage to the insect. 
 
 In the second example of NTIR a participant uses deductive reasoning from operational 
data that was gathered from the membership of a professional organization for blood banks. This 
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statement emphasizes (1) that there are a lot of cesium irradiator users that would be impacted by 
NAS Recommendation #3, and (2) that cesium irradiators are more reliable and cost effective 
than x-ray irradiators.  
The membership currently has 65 cesium irradiators out there that have an average 
purchased year of 1996. These irradiators have a shelf life, or a lifespan of 25 years. 
They have significant value remaining in the irradiators that are in our facilities. And we 
estimated that value to be over $3 million. When we look at decommissioning a 
comment that was made earlier has been the cost of decommissioning… This is the total 
phaseout cost…We are looking at over $21 million to decommission and switch out all 
the irradiators…The obstacles that he mentioned this morning remain the same, and 
these have been gone over repeatedly…The question is how do we overcome these 
obstacles? Unlike what I've heard in the research arena, the blood banks could convert 
over to X-ray technology to irradiate blood…So if y'all would like to help us, we will 
take those funds also. Then the biggest thing we could ask, since … our industry could 
switch over to X-ray, it has got to be done in an orderly - give us enough time to do it. 
And I would imagine that 10 years is probably required to accomplish this for our 
industry. 
 
Ultimately, based on economic principles, this statement demonstrates the expense of replacing 
cesium irradiators and argues that the implementation of NAS Recommendation #3 should take 
place over a long period of time. 
 In the third example of NTIR, a workshop participant emphasizes the government’s 
responsibility as a regulator and uses of the risk/benefit logic.  
The basic principle, one of the basic principles of radiation safety is that of justification 
and that is any use of radiation, radioactive materials should have a net benefit which is 
greater than the net risk of that use…We think that cesium chloride sources should be 
subject, through the normal licensing process both for new licenses and renewals, to 
evaluation of justification of that source, and that it be incumbent upon the licensee to 
demonstrate in the license application that the net benefit of the new or continuing use of 
a cesium source outweigh the risk in detriment. The risk equation has changed since 
2001 and that is really what justified this and that needs to be looked at, of course, but 
we would suggest that license applications investigate alternate technologies and 
determine the licensee's or I should say document the licensee's determination that no 
suitable alternative exist on whatever basis, whether economic, availability to do the 
required job or whatever. And the NRC should develop guidelines for determining that 
sort of thing as part of the licensing process...But the discussion of the regulatory basis 
does trace to the basic principle of justification. And the big question now, is who should 
conduct the risk analysis. Well, we think everybody who has a dog in the fight should be 
involved in the risk analysis which is both radiation safety professionals, users, 
manufacturers and so on and also involving people with specific expertise in the new 
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risk environment that would include Homeland Security, the FBI and the National 
Nuclear Security Administration. 
 
 Early in the statement, the participant invokes the risk/benefit logic. He then clearly 
addresses his position that the NRC should not follow NAS Recommendation #3 based on the 
responsibility of the government to set acceptable risk levels and license and regulate materials 
within these parameters—the acceptable risk logic. This statement hints at scientific and 
economic principles, but mainly primarily draws on  risk logics and government responsibility to 
express his view that technology is necessary and should not be eliminated without a risk/benefit 
analysis and following licensing procedures. Additionally, the participant draws on the structural 
resources of radiation protection logic and reinforces the norm of bureaucratic processes. 
NTIR In Relation to Societal Benefits  
 As interview participants positioned their work in relationship to society, they talked 
about how the functions of both their applications of cesium chloride technologies and 
applications for other industries are necessary for society.  
Patients who are immuno-compromised need the blood products that are irradiated. 
Then, when you get beyond -- it was fascinating at the workshop to find out all of the 
other uses for the Cesium -- the research arena -- that uses the medical research arena, 
then even the nuclear power plants that use them for calibration…But, the benefit is for 
the patients. 
 
My colleagues and I, professional society, and my people that I work with were all of the 
same view that this … would be damaging to the end user…If you took away our one 
gold standard that we do use, which we feel is being regulated and being held safe as is, 
you would really damage our capability of doing our work, and providing resources to 
the public that the public is really probably not even aware of. 
 
 Both examples illustrate how the participants draw upon resources of NTIR. In 
particular, both participants appeal to values of the benefits of their applications: medical 
benefits for patients and the protection of the public that calibration equipment makes available. 
Also, the participants build credibility external of themselves. The first participant references 
other professional groups to bolster her view and the second participant references his 
121 
professional society and colleagues. Additionally, the second participant also emphasizes the 
role of regulatory role of the government. These types of comments were typical of interview 
participants and demonstrate how they use NTIR when explaining their views in relation to 
society. 
NTIR in Relation to Other Groups 
 Interview participants also drew upon NTIR when making accounts about how they 
were related to other professional groups. A couple of participants were very clear that they 
would make different arguments to their colleagues and NRC staff than they would to the public 
or Congress. If they were discussing this issue with colleagues or NRC staff they would say 
something similar to this quotation: 
I think it’s safe. I think your controls that we have implemented make these types of 
amounts of radiation safe. And, go ahead and, if you feel it’s necessary, increase those 
types of controls but don’t take away our ability to do our work. 
 
If they were discussing this issue with a member of Congress or the public they would say 
something similar to these quotations:  
Understand my work first. Understand the controls that you already have in place. And if 
you want to increase that, that’s fine. 
 
Well, be assured that the facilities that have these sources are very highly secure and the 
risk is minimal of that event. 
 
Responses to both categories of groups use resources from NTIR. These comments foreground 
the responsibility of government to regulate technologies for the purpose of enabling them to 
continue to receive the benefits. Additionally, the accounts invoke the acceptable risk logic by 
explicitly calling the risk “minimal” or implying that, if necessary, the regulatory bodies can 




Security Threat Interpretative Repertoire 
 The security threat interpretative repertoire (STIR) functions to demonstrate that an 
object or issue poses a security threat. This repertoire uses both inductive and deductive 
reasoning. Inductive reasoning is used to reason from hypothetical scenarios, historical events, or 
professional experiences. Deductive reasoning is used when talking about the scientific 
characteristics of dispersability and solubility of cesium chloride that make the potential for its 
consequences so great. Participants are more likely to build credibility based on personal 
expertise and make appeals to public interest of protecting security; however, this does not 
preclude them from building credibility through organizational affiliation, external expertise, or 
appealing to other values. This repertoire enables participants to use two risk logics. Participants 
draw attention to consequences as a fear appeal that functions to highlight the severity of the 
risk. Additionally, some participants appeal to the PRA risk logic as a tool that could help bolster 
their claims. Finally, this repertoire highlights the responsibility of government to protect the 
public from terrorist threats.  
 The following example illustrates how a security analyst uses STIR to respond to several 
comments at the workshop.  
I was very disappointed with the attitude that I heard on a couple of people's 
part…Nobody is actually talking necessarily about taking away your cesium gamma 
spectrum. We're talking about taking away cesium chloride, and let me point out that the 
only … radiological terrorist scenarios you can dream up that kill a lot of people use and 
exploit cesium chloride. I'm not at liberty to discuss what those are, but they're pretty 
bad. You've talked about security. Well, security is not just in the fingerprinting or even 
in the locks and keys. It's in an ongoing security check that prevents good employees 
from going bad. I could mention the name of Aldrich Ames and Hansen, just to name a 
couple of good employees who went real bad. So to say that you've implemented the 
security measures is not to say that those security measures can ever be considered 
adequate unless you have really intrusive, ongoing personnel monitoring. I think we are 
going to have to face the fact that cesium chloride in a water soluble form is going to 
have to come out of circulation.  
 
123 
He reasons inductively from professional knowledge (that he cannot share because it is 
considered sensitive) and also from historical examples of unreliable employees. This statement 
focuses on the consequences of a terrorist attack and clearly highlights the responsibility of 
government to prevent such an attack. At the beginning of the statement he briefly alludes to the 
dispersability of cesium chloride and he concludes his statement with an expression of 
agreement with NAS Recommendation #3.  
 Participants may use STIR when making an explicit point about security, but since most 
of the workshop focused on the feasibility and impacts of alternatives, this talk was discouraged. 
The following example occurs very early in the workshop when a participant is not allowed to 
complete his thought because the facilitator moves on to the next question. 
Participant: To address that question, I guess, is -- the concern is the solubility of the 
cesium-137 chloride. Just I'm also on the emergency preparedness side, and 
dispersability, and the ability to leach into concrete, and so forth. So if it gets 
released, for example, in the City of New York, let's say, while you're talking about 
economic impact, that could be billions of dollars. That could be underestimating it. 
So, I mean, it is a real potential, and that's why there is concern…So --  
Facilitator: Okay. Any further discussion before we move on to the next question? Okay. 
 
The facilitator may not have realized that the oncologist wanted to continue, but it is also 
possible that the facilitator was trying to minimize comments based on STIR due to concerns 
about its sensitive nature or controversial nature.  
Ironic Use of STIR 
 Some participants used STIR in an ironic manner with an extreme case to demonstrate 
that concern about the cesium chloride security risks is overstated.  
When you compare that with the proliferation of X-ray technology, for instance, you 
have to consider that there will be terrorism uses of X-ray technology as well. I mean, 
one can envision a portable generator being put into a truck or on a float and driven 
through crowds, maybe this happening 100 cities at a time. You know, how are you 
going to stop that?  
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In this example an equipment manufacturer used inductive reasoning from a hypothetical 
scenario to emphasize possible security-related consequences from one of the alternative 
technologies. Admittedly, his scenario is far-fetched, but that characteristic highlights his view 
that the characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat is hard to believe. This example 
is not a perfect use of STIR because it emphasizes the responsibility of government to regulate 
nuclear materials and challenges the efficacy of the government to prevent all imaginable 
terrorist scenarios. 
 In another session of the workshop, participants were upset by the expressed suggestion 
to eliminate cesium chloride as the best solution to remove the security threat, several 
participants used STIR in an ironic manner. For example, a calibration physicist draws attention 
to a potential unintended consequence of increased controls around cesium chloride. 
If we would increase the security in the facilities that have cesium chloride, then as you 
say there would be a terrorist which would like to get a hold of cesium. Now if he has 
increased security, would he prefer to get something else, cobalt for example? I 
understand that because the cost to clean up cobalt would be much less, but still do you 
have still the psychological or social impact? 
 
A security analyst does not seem bothered by this ironic use of the STIR and counters by 
focusing on the greater vulnerability of cesium chloride by deductively reasoning from 
operations information—a noted deviation from the typical strategy of using inductive reasoning 
about consequences.  
Well, that's a concern that you want to have a risk balanced across the spectrum. But 
again from my perspective, I'm looking at where the long pole is in the tent right now. 
Where are the high risk factors right now? What do we need to do in the near term to try 
to reduce that? … If that [hardening program and increased controls] forces the terrorists 
to move to cobalt, well, we already have the increased controls with cobalt and, as I 
mentioned, cobalt, anything can be made dispersible, but it takes more skill. It takes a 
larger team, more equipment, more money and more time and the time is of the essence. 
That's the critical factor here. If you steal it and then you have to use it, that takes time. 
That's why cobalt is less risk. 
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 After this exchange, several participants used STIR in an ironic manner to redirect 
attention on to other security risks than cesium chloride. For example, “In a comparison between 
cesium and … biological terrorism…what would be worse?”  This repeated ironic use of the 
STIR is a strategy by which user groups were trying to overtly resist the characterization of 
cesium chloride as a security risk. This strategy differs from the usual strategy embedded in the 
NTIR to characterize cesium chloride as unique and useful. The facilitator, who sensed the 
building tension and distraction from the agenda question, redirected the conversation by saying, 
“remember we're here to talk about the feasibility of the isotopes other than cesium-137.” 
Management of Tension Between NTIR and STIR 
 Potter and Wetherall (1987) encourage analysts to consider whether interpretative are 
“genuine features of interpretation” (p. 153) by examing situations in which multiple interpretive 
repertoires are applied to the same case. If the analysis has captured a set of genuine interpretive 
repertoires then “these cases should cause problems requiring discursive solutions” (p. 153). In 
the cesium chloride discourse, participants draw on both NTIR and STIR and consciously or 
unconsciously use rhetorical devices to resolve paradoxes that arise from applying multiple 
repertoires to the same case.  
 By the end of the workshop, some participants indicated that they had adjusted their 
views and recognized security threat as more legitimate than before. This did not cause them to 
fully support NAS Recommendation #3, but at least they understood why they were looking at 
this issue.  
I learned yesterday and had my eyes opened when we had the discussion from Sandia… 
That will also influence some of my comments a little bit later (W8:86). 
But, again, the discussions that we have had just over the last two days, quite frankly, I 
have changed two or three of my positions in terms of what I perceive as risks to be less 
laissez-faire and more restricted on access to and use of some of the source materials 
that might actually be used in a non-conventional manner is the best way to say it. 
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 A year and a half later, during the interviews the participants began by recounting their 
understanding of the cesium chloride issue. Most participants recounted their understanding of 
the cesium chloride issue by discussing both the security concerns and the benefits of cesium 
chloride applications. The following examples illustrate typical patterns by which participants 
would answer the first question.  
…Essentially there was a plan to consider eliminating the use of cesium chloride in the 
US and the reason for this is because of risks involved for malicious use of cesium 
chloride, that it could be used in some sort of weapon developed by terrorists such as a 
dirty bomb or a similar thing. And, well, having all these facilities that use cesium 
chloride around increases that risk. So, that was the motivation for, I guess, the National 
Academy of Sciences as a result of this, NRC I think sponsored the National Academy 
of Sciences to investigate further into what are the different uses of cesium and see if 
there was a possibility of finding a replacement to minimize this risk or to fix that 
problem. I think, they did a thorough job, they wrote a nice report on that…What came 
later after that report was published, the NRC, I guess, took that into consideration 
together with other things and decided, well, they were going to, they have to, make a 
decision or recommendation to see if this should be banned or not; the use of cesium 
chloride. So, I think at that point in time the user community started to find out about 
this and of course everybody had different reactions. Some because they just don't want 
to change, others because, like in my case particularly, I know that there are no 
replacements for the type of applications I use for my work…I think NRC did a good job 
in saying – “Okay, let's just get everybody together and announce this and get some 
feedback from the community to find out more about it. What are the different 
applications? What will be the impact, if such a ruling will be in place - eliminating 
cesium chloride?” 
 
Cesium, as it is found in many blood bank irradiators and some other types of 
freestanding irradiators, is a radioactive source used to irradiate blood products to 
prevent all sorts of mayhem and havoc as a result of a certain small subset on our patient 
population. And that radioactive source is a highly dispersible salt and once it’s spread is 
really hard to pick up since it’s both water soluble and chemically reactive, as opposed 
to other sort of sources. And so, while it is extremely, extremely unlikely that someone 
could actually successfully break into a radioactive source and spread it around, we can 
turn this -- it is so hard and so impossible to contain, after the fact that there were well 
meaning individuals thinking that maybe we should not have this around, and that way, 
it can’t be spread around. 
 
 In these accounts participants use resources from STIR to acknowledge the 
characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat. The first participant seems to lend more 
credence to the security threat, whereas the second participant’s sarcastic tone indicated that he 
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was less convinced about the security threat. This variability of responses was typical among the 
participants; however, regardless of this variability, both participants balanced the security 
characterization by using resources of NTIR to discuss benefits of their technologies. They 
invoked NTIR to address the “elimination” element of Recommendation #3 from the NAS 
report. From a purely logical point of view, the use of both repertoires seems to create a paradox. 
However, this is a typical feature of discourse and analysts should look for how participants use 
rhetorical devices to manage the paradox (Potter & Wetherall, 1987). Interview participants used 
four categories of rhetorical devices that ultimately re-established the importance of NTIR: (1) 
colloquialisms, (2) risk logics, (3) timing and research, and (4) increased controls.   
Colloquialisms 
 Some participants used colloquialisms when they were discursively managing the felt 
inconsistency between acknowledging security risks while also wanting to maintain continued 
use of cesium chloride technologies. For example, they used phrases like “on the other hand,” 
and “I understand both sides of the story” to bridge the two characterizations of cesium chloride. 
The following quotation shows how one participant used the “baby and bathwater” expression to 
connect the two characterizations. 
Everybody agreed that these were very important implications and that we shouldn’t 
throw the baby out with a bath water, that it was important to continue to be able to use 
devices and equipment that contains cesium chloride. But that, you know, that we all 
acknowledge the risks around it but you really had to balance the risks and the benefits 
and that a lot folks, you know, were supporting increased security and that’s fine but not, 
you know, it’s not throw, throw this all out. 
 
The colloquialism device does not necessarily resolve the tension between security threats and 
technological benefits, but it discursively allows the participants to include both concerns in their 




Risk Logics  
 Participants also used the risk/benefit logic to manage the paradox between the security 
concern and desire to retain use of cesium chloride technology. The following example 
illustrates how one participant explicitly labels risk as “comparative.”  
Risk is a relative term, a comparative term. It's obviously -- cesium 137 in current form 
is, you know, dispersible. There is obviously security risks that are present in that 
particular isotope in that particular chemical form than many of the other materials that 
are used by hospitals. But that’s not really, that’s not really our focus area per se; it’s the 
security aspects of it. We're more interested in, you know, comparing cesium chloride 
use on blood irradiators in research versus the alternatives and what are the, you know, 
benefits and cons of that and I think if I remember it correctly we commented that we 
weren’t really comfortable with the research of those out there right now about the 
alternatives to cesium chloride particularly in blood irradiation. 
 
This participant acknowledges the security risk but then foregrounds the benefit of continuing 
use of cesium irradiators and the lack of viable alternatives.  
 In the second example, an interview participant acknowledges the risk of consequences, 
but then explicitly invokes a cost/benefit logic to weigh the cost of mitigating against the 
security threat at the expense of institutions that provide important benefits and, by implication, 
may not be able to afford the technology to provide these benefits if cesium irradiators are 
eliminated. 
Yet one cannot gainsay the seriousness of an event should the source material be widely 
disseminated if you clearly put pulse on this problem. But in public planning, like in 
medicine, one increasingly needs to be aware of the cost and benefit of the intervention 
on -- that there might be a considerable benefit, one does not deny. But at what expense 
should we not be allocating our limited resources in a way that would do the most good 
for the most people. And so, to be spending a gazillion dollars on something that may 
never, in our lifetime, happen -- doesn’t seem particularly wise at a time when we’re 
creating new record deficits. 
 
 These examples illustrate a common approach to managing the tension between the 
security concern and desire to continue to get benefits from cesium chloride technologies. This 
strategy uses a risk/benefit logic to demonstrate that benefits of cesium chloride technologies 
outweigh security risks or the costs of decisions based on consequences of unlikely security 
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events. Additionally, the participants are careful to hedge these kinds of statements with phrases 
such as “that’s not really our area of focus” or “one cannot gainsay the seriousness of an event.”  
Timing and Research 
 Similar to the “truth will out” device identified by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984; Potter & 
Wetherall, 1987), participants relied on a belief that given enough time and research, there could 
eventually be a solution that would enable them to continue their important functions. This could 
involve research to develop a less dispersible and soluble form of cesium-137, improved x-ray 
technology, or a new pathogen technology that would replace blood irradiation technology. The 
following quotations illustrate how participants invoked their beliefs in research given enough 
time.  
I think it all hinges on research and the other really need to somehow work together to 
get an alternate source of cesium, that is, in its ceramic or other form that’s not soluble. I 
think that everybody has to, kind of, focus from the research aspect, really come 
forward, you know, and push what you really need to do.  
 
…Five years from now, there’ll probably be some better x-ray alternatives. And 20 years 
from now, there’ll probably be no need for x-rays at all because we’ll probably be 
tickling our blood and don’t need to worry about this since virtually all of the pathogen 
reduction technology would make blood irradiation completely unnecessary. 
 
Even though participants use this strategy of time and research to manage the tension between 
security concerns and technological benefits, ultimately they are drawing on resources from 
NTIR and re-establishing this as an important interpretative repertoire.  
Increased Controls 
 The most common strategy for managing the tension between security concerns and 
need to continue using cesium chloride technologies was to reference the increased controls and 
hardening programs that make cesium irradiators less vulnerable to theft. Participants noted that 
“there has been a lot of progress already in terms of securing radioactive cesium chloride 
sources” and expressed a view that “the NRC has done an adequate job of upgrading security 
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requirements and this is demonstrated by performance.” Additionally, some participants 
referenced increased controls with the risk/benefit logic to show how it balanced the security 
risk. The following example also invokes the acceptable risk logic when she included the 
disclaimer that “there’s no perfect solution.” 
Well, here you have two things, you have the benefits of cesium and then you have a 
risk. But, what you want to do is, there's no perfect solution to anything, but you can 
make it as perfect as possible. So, it's a matter of, can you decrease the risk and make 
that balance change? And I think, in this case, you can. In the federal government 
agencies that have cesium sources are very secure and the risk is minimum. So, 
basically, you just have to identify where these sources are and make sure that you have 
enough security in those places that you make the risk small as in other places and if you 
can't do that then those places probably should not be allowed to have cesium sources.  
 
 The most common response was that the participants were willing to do whatever it 
takes to retain use of the cesium chloride technologies. This strategy is similar to the “that’s how 
it is” strategy identified by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984; Potter & Wetherall, 1987) by which 
participants simply accepted the state of affairs and would continue their work within that 
context. The following examples illustrate how participants expressed these ideas. 
Not just irradiation, but in nuclear medicine, we use hundreds of isotopes every day. We 
just can't stop using these isotopes. I'm totally in support of using precautionary 
measures. I don’t mind, to whatever extent, if the NRC asks us to do anything else, I'm 
willing. That’s what I told [the NRC], and that’s what I'm telling you now. 
 
You have concerns about access and control of the sources, presuming that we’re talking 
about large sources which is what they need to do these experiments…But given the 
option of no access to the source versus access to the source, the scientists are willing to 
go through that. 
 
In these examples, the participants set up a contrast between being able to use their technologies 
and not being able to use their technologies. Given this simple choice, they chose to use the 
technologies and follow the regulatory guidance to ensure security. 
 The strategy of referencing increased controls allows participants to acknowledge the 
security concern, but point to specific guidance and policies (that they cannot describe in detail 
due to the secrecy of security information) that they follow in order to lessen the vulnerability of 
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cesium chloride sources to theft. This strategy draws upon the regulatory aspect of government 
responsibility, acceptable risk logic, and risk/benefit logic which are resources from NTIR. The 
participants’ attempts to manage the paradox of using resources from both STIR and NTIR 
ultimately re-establish NTIR as a more important interpretative repertoire for communities who 
manufacture, use, and regulate cesium chloride technologies.  
Summary 
 The results in this chapter partially answer the overall research question for this study 
about how experts from different disciplines communicate with each other about risk by 
providing insight into the second, third, and fourth research questions. In particular, the analysis 
with discursive psychology illustrates patterns by which participants drew on resources from two 
interpretative repertoires to characterize cesium chloride and express their views about whether 
or not to eliminate it.   
 The second research question considers what types of evidence and appeals experts rely 
on to articulate their characterizations of risk. The interpretative repertoires organize the answer 
to this question and demonstrate that participants have predictable patterns for drawing on NTIR 
or STIR depending on whether they want to characterize cesium chloride as a unique and useful 
isotope or a potential security threat.  NTIR is a resource that enables participants to characterize 
cesium chloride as a beneficial technology by reasoning deductively from scientific principles, 
operational information, and economic principles. When using NTIR participants appeal to 
external expertise of and organizational affiliation and values of medical need, safe use of 
equipment, and quality control of a product or service. NTIR relies on risk/benefit and 
acceptable risk logic and foregrounds the role of government to protect the public by regulating 
uses of technology. STIR is a resource that enables participants to characterize cesium chloride 
as a security threat by using inductive reasoning from professional knowledge, past events, and 
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economic consequences and deductive reasoning from scientific principles about dispersability 
and solubility. When using STIR, participants appeal to personal expertise, public interest and 
fear. STIR focuses on consequences of a risk and foregrounds the role of government to protect 
the public by minimizing security threats. 
 The third research question considers how experts from multiple disciplines negotiate 
and coordinate their different perspectives. One possible reason that user communities may have 
difficulty accepting the legitimacy of STIR is that they do not have a set of professional 
experiences with security-related issues to evaluate the inductive reasoning provided by the 
security specialists. Therefore, even though security specialists at the workshop made special 
efforts to reinforce the characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat in order to support 
NAS Recommendation #3, participants continued to use resources from NTIR to express 
disagreement through their nuanced positions. Additionally, some participants who disagreed 
with the characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat used STIR in an ironic manner to 
undercut its legitimacy.  
The fourth research question considers the strategies that experts use to legitimize their 
particular risk understandings and justify choices that result from the risk understandings. The 
analysis from discursive psychology explains how accounts about the characterization of cesium 
chloride become established as stable constructions of the world and how NTIR or STIR are 
constructed to appear as facts that can undermine the other interpretative repertoire. The ability 
of interview participants to draw on both interpretative repertoires when providing their 
summary views of the cesium chloride issues demonstrates that both repertoires are legitimized 
by structural rules and resources. NTIR is legitimized by structures such as the U. S. medical 
institution, regulatory bodies, national and international legislation and policies, and belief in 
technology. Enactment of these structures enables participants to perform more legitimate norms 
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such as rationality in decision-making and procedures for sharing information and creating 
policies. STIR is legitimized by the security institution. However, this structure also constrains 
participants due to secrecy about security information. Additionally, structural constraints about 
politics, emotion, and legal issues tend to be attributed to participants who use STIR in order to 
demonstrate how those users are constrained by a limited point-of-view. Ultimately, participants’ 
rhetorical devices to manage the paradox of using resources from both interpretative repertoires 
re-establishes NTIR as a more legitimate interpretative repertoire for communities who 
manufacture, use, and regulate cesium chloride technologies. Since I do not have any interviews 
with security specialists, I cannot provide insight into how that professional community uses 
rhetorical devices to manage the paradox of drawing on both repertoires.   
 Phillips and Jørgensen (2002) explain that people use interpretive repertoires flexibly 
which means that they can be both “identifiable entities that represent distinct ways to give the 
world meaning and malleable forms that undergo transformation in rhetorical use” (p. 107). 
Thus, it is not surprising that a year and half after the workshop, the interview participants drew 
on both interpretative repertoires to characterize cesium chloride both as a necessary technology 
and security threat. They managed this paradox with four categories of rhetorical devices that 
ultimately re-established the importance of NTIR: (1) colloquialisms, (2) risk logics, (3) timing 
and research, and (4) increased controls. Chapter VII builds on this transformative aspect of 
discourse and describes instances of how participants drew upon societal resources and 






RESULTS: CONFLICT AND COORDINATION OF DIFFERENT VIEWS 
  As established in the Chapters V and VI, workshop and interview participants draw upon 
societal resources and interpretative repertoires to characterize cesium chloride as a security 
threat or necessary technology, and to resist certain characterizations of cesium chloride. Chapter 
VII addresses the third and fourth research questions about coordination and legitimation by 
using Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory to unpack the conditions that gave rise to the 
particular characterizations of cesium chloride and demonstrate how meaning shifts over time 
were caused by creative appropriation of the societal resources and interpretative repertoires. In 
order to accomplish this analysis, the chapter (1) describes key signifiers that organize the 
relationship in the discourses, (2) describes possibilities for change in the field of discursivity 
and floating signifiers, (3) analyzes conflict and coordination about security, alternatives, 
acceptability, and benefits, and (4) discusses how the resources enabled paradigm shift for some 
participations.  
Key Terms, Floating Signifiers, and the Field of Discursivity 
 Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory focuses on abstract mapping of broader patterns 
of meaning in a shared context. The purpose of this analysis is to identify how key signifiers in a 
discourse become imbued with meaning and how different understandings of reality stand in 
relation to each other (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). This analysis allows for a coherent 
explanation of patterns of conflict and coordination regarding the meaning of key signifiers and 
floating signifiers. In essence, this analysis demonstrates what terms and concepts most shape 





 Key signifiers are important terms and concepts that have a privileged status in the 
discourse (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). Discourse about the cesium chloride issue is organized 
around six key signifiers that fall into the three general categories of nodal points, master 
signifiers, and myths. 
 Nodal points. Nodal points are terms around which the discourse is organized. The 
participants’ accounts are organized around their responses to the security concerns of cesium 
chloride (especially its dispersability) and Recommendation #3 of the NAS report to eliminate 
cesium chloride sources from use in the U. S. 
 For most participants, the security concerns about cesium chloride are the starting point 
for how they describe the situation.  In response to the first question asking her to describe her 
understanding of the situation, an interview participant said “essentially there was a plan to 
consider eliminating the use of cesium chloride in the US and the reason for this is because of 
risks involved for malicious use of cesium chloride, that it could be used in some sort of weapon 
developed by terrorists such as a dirty bomb or a similar thing.” Another participant opened his 
account with, “The National Academy did their study and came up with several 
recommendations … to see if you could phase out cesium chloride and go with some other… 
radioactive material with less of a potential hazard with terrorist or go to something that’s totally 
non-radioactive.” These accounts are typical of participants’ responses when asked to describe 
their understanding of the situation. The structure of these sentences reveals that participants 
viewed the security concerns as being externally imposed.  However, since these interviews 
occurred almost two years since the publication of the NAS report, the participants’ use of 
security concerns as a starting point indicates how it is well-established in the discourse and a 
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concept to which they must respond when discussing this issue. Thus, the security concern 
functions as a nodal point that organizes the discourse about cesium chloride. 
 Additionally, Recommendation #3 from the NAS report organized participants’ 
discourse. As described in Chapter V, participants used distinction shading at the workshop to 
articulate their views about security and alternatives in relationship to Recommendation #3. 
These shades of distinction are not apparent in the interviews because participants were able to 
be more straightforward in expressing their views. However, nearly all of their views about the 
cesium chloride issue were in relationship to the NAS Recommendation #3 and the subsequent 
NRC decision. As one interview participant summarized, “So, basically, what came later after 
that report was published, the NRC, I guess, took that into consideration together with other 
things and … they have to, make a decision or recommendation to see if this should be banned 
or not; the use of cesium chloride.”  Thus, Recommendation #3 of the NAS study functions as a 
nodal point that organizes the discourse about continued use of cesium chloride. 
 Master signifiers. Master signifiers are terms and concepts that organize identity. 
Concepts that organized participants’ identities in relationship to the cesium chloride issue were 
their professional background and their beliefs about themselves as having a rational point of 
view about the issue.  
 At the workshop, participants were required to identify themselves and their affiliated 
organizations before making comment. In addition to this record-keeping requirement, 
participants often went further to explain the mission or function of their organization and the 
importance of cesium chloride technology. An typical example of this is, “I'm a radiation 
physicist with Best Theratronics and formerly NDS Nordion [and] as such we are the largest 
manufacturer of blood irradiators, both x-ray and cesium based, in the world.”  During the 
interviews participants used their professional backgrounds and organizational affiliations to 
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organize their identity in relationship to the cesium chloride issue. Thus, participants’ 
professional background or discipline, often articulated through the mission of an organization, 
functioned as a master signifier to relate them to the functional uses of cesium chloride. 
 Participants also organized their identities around an idealization about rationality. They 
constructed their identities in relationship to other parties and the cesium chloride issue in terms 
of how they could bring better quality of information, more realistic experiences, a more holistic 
view of the situation, and an emotion-free disposition. For example one participant described 
how her experience provided a more detailed understanding of the situation: “I had actually 
seemed seen a lot more of these sources than some of the other people there and knew how they 
were used and how the radiation safety came into play and some of the security measures.” Thus, 
rationality functioned as a master signifier that enabled participants’ to consider themselves more 
reasonable and therefore, their views about cesium chloride to be more rational.  
 Myths. Myths are terms that organize a social space. In the participants’ accounts, the 
beneficial functions of cesium chloride technologies and regulatory logic create conditions by 
which participants view themselves and their preferred actions in relationship to each other. 
 The participants’ varied in their relationship to the functions of cesium irradiators and 
calibration equipment—some were state and federal regulators, some were manufacturers, some 
were representatives of professional organizations, and some used the equipment in their 
professional work. Regardless of their relationship to the equipment, all participants readily 
recognized the benefits of the technology—that cesium irradiators are responsible for saving 
lives. A representative of a professional organization observed that “if you don’t irradiate blood 
properly, that is a huge patient safety risk and patient safety is really what set the forefront of 
folks’ minds in the medical community.” Additionally, another interview participant noted that 
“they talk about the lives of young babies or premature babies that would have died if they 
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couldn’t have gotten the irradiator blood…What’s a more noble cause than that?” With this in 
mind a workshop participant expressed her view that “the standard of care that exists in this 
country will be compromised if the use of cesium chloride is prohibited or eliminated.”  
Participants’ emphasis on the functions of cesium chloride technology was embedded in 
statements about (1) the importance of not eliminating this beneficial technology, and (2) the 
importance of ensuring that any changes should be cost-effective and supported by and 
supportive of the market. Thus, the function of cesium chloride technology as a myth relates the 
radioactive source to the public as a technology with beneficial value. 
 This myth of beneficial function is not possible without the myth of regulatory logic that 
puts the user communities in a safe relationship with the public through government agencies. 
Regulatory bodies fulfill the responsibility of government to ensure safe uses of radioactive 
material. An important element of this myth is the logic of radiation protection, by which a series 
of controls and barriers are established to ensure that users and the public do not get a harmful 
dose of radiation from the beneficial use of sources. This logic is so assumed that it barely 
surfaces in participants’ comments; however, in the places that it does surface, it is in contrast to 
the thinking of terrorists who would risk a lethal dose in order to commit an act of violence. 
Thus, the function of the regulatory logic partly explains why user communities have a hard time 
fully accepting the characterization of cesium chloride as a security risk, but once they do, they 
simply apply the regulatory logic to increased controls in order to maintain a safe relationship 
between the public and cesium chloride technology via regulatory bodies.  
Floating Signifiers and the Field of Discursivity 
 An important element of the Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is that there is a field 
of discursivity—concepts and meanings that have the potential to become important in a 
discursive situation, but the conditions are not right for them. The notion of “articulation” 
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foregrounds the relationships among “elements,” which are polysemic signs whose meanings are 
not yet fixed within the discourse (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). Floating signifiers are signs to 
which different discourses struggle to assign meaning. In this section I describe the field of 
discursivity related to the cesium chloride issue based on participants’ passing references but do 
not appear prominently throughout the accounts. Additionally, a separate section describes 
floating signifiers. These are concepts that have moved from the field of the discursivity and are 
active in the discourse about the cesium chloride issue, but, as of yet, have not become key 
signifiers. However, these floating signifiers challenge the meanings and functions of key 
signifiers as I will illustrate in the later sections of this chapter.  
 Field of discursivity. The field of discursivity contains possible meanings for which 
discursive conditions have constrained them from becoming key or floating signifiers in the 
cesium chloride issue. They might be remnants of important ideas related to radiation source 
safety and security or possibilities for the future that are not well developed or legitimate. One 
concept that is referred to frequently is the idea of “banning” cesium chloride or other 
radioactive sources. As one participant said, “I'm sure as the sun rises that some people consider 
that.” The way participants talked about “banning” sources, they recognized it as a possibility, a 
hope that some people in this society may have. However, the interview participants pointed out 
that this possibility was constrained by current legislation that allows safe, civil uses of sources 
and historical precedent to not ban such materials. Therefore, the idea of “banning” sources 
remains in the field of discursivity even though it was mentioned frequently. 
 Some ideas that have historically been important for radiation source safety and security 
are concerns about security in other nations and non-proliferation programs. The international 
issues surfaced more frequently in the workshop—there was an entire session devoted to this 
topic. In general, participants agreed that developing nations had lower security and felt that 
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there was greater vulnerability for terrorists to get access to sources from these countries (in the 
fiction book about cesium poisoning in the water of Australia, the terrorists stole the cesium 
chloride from an irradiator in a developing country). This becomes especially tricky for cesium 
irradiators since their affordability, reliability, and low-energy consumption makes them a good 
medical device for developing countries. Additionally, several participants pointed out that if the 
U. S. eliminates cesium chloride, other nations will be pressured to follow suit, but they cannot 
afford alternatives like x-ray technologies for blood irradiation. 
 Related to international issues are non-proliferation issues, a historical effort among the 
U. S. and other nations to secure radioactive materials to prevent development or acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. This is a program rooted in the Cold War history but maintained a sense of 
urgency in light of credible intelligence that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have serious 
interest in getting a nuclear weapon. Cesium chloride is not a source that could be used for a 
nuclear weapon, but its potential for use in a radiological dispersal device provides a link for one 
participant to connect the cesium chloride issue with non-proliferation issues. 
 Finally, some ideas about alternatives to cesium chloride remain in the field of 
discursivity. Even though there was much talk at the workshop about the possibilities of 
developing an alternative form of cesium 137 (glass or ceramic), this topic rarely surfaced in the 
interviews and then only to point out that they would be in support of using the alternative form 
but they “don’t see anybody creating an economic incentive proposal for the [Russian] plant to 
make glass forms … maybe they are, I just haven’t heard about them.” In addition to the 
possibility of an alternative form, one interview participant mentioned his expectation that 
pathogen technologies for removing lymphocytes in blood could replace irradiation in about 
twenty years. Thus, these alternatives are attractive because they would enable irradiation user 
communities (not calibration communities) to continue their functions. Furthermore, these 
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alternative have scientific basis for belief in their possible development, they just have not had 
enough time to fully develop into marketable products.  
 Floating signifiers related to security. Even though the security concerns are a nodal 
point in the discourse throughout the history of the cesium chloride issue, concepts about 
dispersability and vulnerability caused transitions in the meaning that participants attribute to 
security concerns. Before the workshop, several participants were not aware of the chemical 
properties of cesium chloride that would make its use in a terrorist act have more severe 
consequences than other radionuclides. This information was made available in the NAS study 
and at the workshop and impacted the conditions for the characterization of cesium chloride as a 
security threat based on its consequences. Additionally, vulnerability is a floating signifier by 
which participants attribute different levels of belief about whether cesium chloride can or will 
really be stolen. Participants’ beliefs about the credibility of the characterization of cesium 
chloride as a security threat largely depend on the vulnerability floating signifier. 
 Floating signifiers related to functions of cesium chloride technologies. Throughout the 
workshop and partially in the interviews, participants expressed a lot of disagreement about the 
feasibility and possibility of using alternatives in order to achieve the beneficial functions 
currently provided by cesium chloride technologies. The issue about alternatives remains an 
important organizing element of the discourse, but the meanings and decisions about alternatives 
are in flux because of the continued debate about their feasibility. 
 Floating signifiers related to professional identity. As a violation of the norm of 
rationality, emotional expression is a floating signifier that challenges participants’ identities. 
Additionally, the societal emphasis on security is a floating signifier that potentially reorganizes 
users’ beliefs about the mission of their professional work. 
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 The floating signifiers about security concerns, beneficial functions, and professional 
identity create the conditions of change for the characterizations of cesium chloride and the 
decision implications that result from particular characterizations. The next step of analysis with 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is to investigate how participants combine key signifiers 
with other terms with “chains of equivalence” in ways that imbue the key signifier with meaning 
(Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). The following sections analyze interactions in which these floating 
signifiers organize participants’ discourse of conflict or coordination. As participants interact 
with each other instances of conflict and coordination, they draw on societal resources and the 
interpretative repertoires in ways that reproduce certain structures and challenge other structures. 
These moments of reinforcement or change are explained by key signifiers that organize the 
discourse and floating signifiers that create conditions for change. The following sections 
analyze instances of conflict and coordination about (1) security concerns, (2) the feasibility of 
alternatives, (3) risks and benefits, and (4) possibilities leading to a paradigm shift. 
  Conflict and Coordination About the Nature of Security Concerns 
 Participants held a variety of positions regarding the nature of the security threat 
associated with cesium chloride (see Table 5.3). The following examples analyze instances in 
which participants dealt with conflict about the characterization of cesium chloride as a security 
threat. These examples illustrate (1) how the floating signifier of dispersability and solubility is a 
point of coordination between NTIR and STIR but also disrupts the current regulatory 
framework, (2) how participants use scientific principles to draw distinctions between the 
powder form of cesium chloride and the solid form of cesium-137, and (3) how participants 




The Question of Dispersability and Solubility 
 The concepts of dispersability and solubility are floating signifiers that create conditions 
to change the characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat and the current 
classification system. Users of radioactive materials are familiar with the IAEA categorization 
that sorts materials into three categories based on the amount of danger an exposure could cause 
a person if the source is removed from its system of controls (International Atomic Energy 
Commission, 2005). However, this classification system does not currently take into account 
properties of dispersability and solubility—two characteristics that make cesium chloride more 
of a security threat than other radionuclides. Participants draw on both interpretative repertoires 
to try to establish them as key terms in the discourse. The principles of dispersability and 
solubility fit into STIR because they provide a scientific explanation for the severity of the 
consequences of the use of cesium chloride in a terrorist act. They fit into NTIR because these 
scientific principles can possibly be solved by technology and thus allow users to continue using 
the cesium-137. 
 A senior NRC manager mentioned the concepts of dispersability and solubility in the 
opening remarks of the workshop. He voiced these thoughts as belonging to third parties, 
alluding to previous conversations in which participants have been trying to establish what 
dispersability means in terms of existing safety and security codes and that this has not been 
resolved yet. 
There are those who believe that cesium chloride, because of its dispersability and 
solubility, deserve additional treatment, additional treatment from a security perspective, 
not necessarily because a certain curie amount could result in some kind of fatalities 
from radiation industry but from costs of cleanup, or contamination spreading. And 
socio-economic issues associated with any terrorist using cesium chloride. The chemical 
form of the material being very soluble and dispersible, in those people's minds, puts it 
on a different frame of reference than the traditional frame of reference in the [IAEA] 
Code of Conduct. 
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The concepts of solubility and dispersability were discussed frequently in the first panel session 
of the workshop that discussed alternate forms of cesium-137. Many of these comments focused 
on the science and the feasibility of developing a form that could minimize these concerns.  
 In the afternoon session of the first day a security analyst gave a memorable presentation 
using visual aids of capsules that would normally contain the radioactive sources.  
My role has been on the National Academies to really help inform the committee on the 
differences in the risk, the radiological terrorism risk, between the different 
radionuclides. So I brought this [holds up two capsules]…This is cesium chloride and if 
we filled up to about this level, that's about 1,000 curies of cesium chloride…This is 
about 1,000 curies of cobalt  … I thought this was kind of to frame the debate between 
two… Now we have two very interesting accidents that have occurred with both of these 
types of material. The one was mentioned before was in Goiania in `87 and it involved 
about 1400 curies of the cesium chloride. We know from that accident that because of 
the solubility of the cesium when it got onto the ground it went into solution, it mixed 
with dust particles, the dust went onto the tops of those nice Spanish tiles and, as was 
mentioned before, you can't just rub it off. It actually chemically bonds with these 
building surfaces. So a huge expense in clean-up. A large difference between that and 
cobalt. Seventy grams of the cesium chloride in that teletherapy unit in Goiania 
produced roughly 70 tons of rad[ioactive] waste that had to be disposed. About a year 
later, a cobalt teletherapy machine in Juarez, again similar problem. It was abandoned 
and people stole the material and sold it to a junkyard for scrap metal. Now the cobalt in 
the teletherapy machines, it's not this slug. It's actually little BBs about a millimeter in 
size. Some of those also got dispersed in the city. In that case, it was a matter of the 
responders going around with the radiation detector, finding the pellets, picking it up, 
putting it in a pig and the problem was solved, a huge difference in the consequence. Not 
even looking at the radiological terrorism and all the different mechanisms of dispersal, 
we know from those two datapoints there's a very significant difference in the 
consequence. So that's what has driven my concern about the cesium chloride. By 
switching to cobalt, we don't completely solve the problem as was mentioned by others. 
Anything can be dispersed if you work hard enough at it. The difference with the cobalt 
of course is there's much more work that has to be done. I hope that that frames the 
debate a little bit. 
 
This presentation demonstrated that cesium chloride is a greater risk than cobalt-60. It draws on 
STIR by using the risk logic that focuses on the consequences, reasons inductively from 
historical examples, and implies that the government has the responsibility to protect the public 
by removing cesium chloride technologies. Additionally, this presentation was persuasive to 
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several members of user communities because it also used scientific principles to explain why 
the consequences of a cesium chloride terrorist accident would be great.  
 By the time that participants were interviewed, about a year and half following the 
workshop, dispersability was a common explanation for the security of cesium chloride and only 
one interview participant expressed a view that it was not the most important dimension of the 
security concern. Most participants’ accounts of the cesium chloride issue began with the 
dispersability explanation for why it was considered a security threat, and one participant even 
vividly recalled that the security specialist’s presentation helped her understand the volume of 
the source inside the irradiator: “He got up there with a couple of little vials; he put up on the top 
of the podium…you know, that's a pretty good visual there, buddy.” 
 For participants from the user communities, the scientific principles underlying 
dispersability and solubility enabled them to discuss a possible technological solution to this 
dimension of the security threat.  With a direct reference to the presentation, a participant asked a 
follow-up question about benefits a new form of cesium-137 to address these scientific-based 
security concerns. This question draws upon NTIR by trying to deductively reason from 
scientific principles using a risk/benefit logic  
I would like to go back for the moment to the comment that I think [the security 
specialist] made regarding different forms of cesium that the pollucite or ceramic would 
only address part of the problem meaning the solubility, not necessarily the 
dispersability. Could you give us an idea or your opinion? If addressing both aspects 
would it fix 100 percent of our problems. Addressing the solubility problem only, how 
much of an improvement would that be if we only address that part with alternate forms 
of cesium? (3:96) … I guess the reason for that question was primarily to kind of assess 
the viability of the alternate form of cesium. Because if it doesn't really help us that 
much, then it's really maybe not worth doing. But my expectation was that addressing 
the solubility problems significantly and dispersability to some extent would get us quite 
a significant part of the way there. 
 
 In another example, a source manufacturer reframes the agenda question in terms of the 
security analyst’s presentation. The essence of his question is giving participants an opportunity 
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to articulate their preference for the unique characteristics of cesium-137.  
I guess the question we ought to ask ourselves is how do you stack up the comparison 
between cobalt-60 as one option and a less dispersable form of cesium-137 as another 
option.  
 
One participant quickly responds, “If nobody is going to answer that, I'll say the latter.” This 
provokes the audience to laughter because the reframed question was a leading question and the 
quick response provided an answer that a large part of the audience would agree with. The 
security analyst then responds:  
That's a very good point and I've talked a little bit with [source distributors] about the 
dispersability issue and whether if we were to start with pollucite form whether we could 
design it in such a way that it minimized certain dispersible effects. So one good thing 
about designing it from scratch is we could try to build some of those aspects into 
it…And by going to pollucite, you really do solve mainly the solubility issue and a 
pollucite behaves in terms of an explosive dispersal similar to ceramics and that really 
doesn't completely solve our dispersal problem. As we're looking through these different 
alternatives, again as I mentioned in the introduction, if we go to a radionuclide 
alternative to cesium we are reducing the risk because we're actually making it more 
difficult to disperse, but we're not eliminating the risk. The only way to eliminate the 
risk is to go to an non-radionuclide alternative like the x-ray machine. And being from 
my perspective, not being a user, but being a student of radiological terrorism, that 
would be my preferred option. 
 
 This statement initially draws upon NTIR by appealing to external sources, the belief in 
a technological solution, and deductive reasoning from scientific principles. However, at the end 
of his statement, he abruptly switches to STIR to express his professionally-based preference for 
non-radionuclide alternatives that will eliminate the risk. 
 A medical physicist attempted to summarize the comments about using technology to 
create a less-dispersible form of cesium-137 using NTIR.  
So it sounds like it is very, very much possible to come up with a solid, non-dispersible 
form of cesium, and it's -- probably with sufficient activity, in larger amounts, that 
would fulfill the tasks necessary… But the scientific issues, the technical challenges, 
sound like they're soluble. I mean, they're -- they can be resolved. (Laughter.) 
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His comments appeal to the others’ expertise and reason from scientific principles. He 
acknowledges that it is not yet ready, but his main point (made with an ironic slip of the tongue) 
emphasizes the belief in a technical solution to the problem. 
 Despite a growing belief about a technical solution to the dispersability issue, source 
manufacturers used NTIR to also address the fact that currently, there is not any regulatory 
guidance or policy about standards of dispersability that they will need to consider when 
designing, testing, and manufacturing sources. 
When it comes to discussion about dispersability, which of course is another concern, 
then I don't know that there is any very clear guidelines right now. And I think part of 
the process of developing the technology will be to develop an understanding of what is 
acceptable in terms of dispersability.   
 
Unfortunately, we have not the standards for dispersability properties of these materials. 
We have standards for leachability, we have standards for the mechanical properties 
study, for fire testing, but we have not -- IAEA regulation hasn't standards for 
dispersability. 
 
These statements allude to scientific principles and the belief in technology to solve a problem. 
Additionally, these examples have special emphasis on the lack of government standards that 
would guide development of the new forms. With these kinds of statements, it becomes clear 
that they are trying solve the security issue with technology. However, dispersability, the 
physical property of concern, is not yet a nodal point in regulatory discourse about cesium 
chloride. The regulatory logic comes from societal structures and is a myth that organizes the 
relationship between user communities and the public. The floating signifier of dispersability 
potentially disrupts the established regulatory framework and this challenges regulatory bodies 
to revisit their policies and guidance in light of a newly relevant concept.  
 Drawing Distinctions Between Cesium-137 and Cesium Chloride 
 During the workshop, some participants drew distinctions between cesium-137 as a 
radioisotope (which theoretically could be manufactured in different forms like glass and 
148 
ceramic) and the current form of cesium chloride which is a powder form. They recognize that 
the dispersability and solubility properties of cesium chloride make its consequences more 
severe than other radionuclides, but they also emphasize the functional importance and unique 
characteristics of the cesium-137 isotope. The strategy of drawing a distinction between cesium 
chloride (the powder form) and cesium-137 (potentially available in other forms) attempts to 
characterize cesium-137 as useful and unique and characterize the cesium chloride form as the 
potential security threat.  
 A series of interactions at the workshop shows how the distinction became an 
established premise. An oncologist is the first person to state the distinction in the early 
afternoon of the first day. He first draws the distinction in his opening comments as a panelist.  
I'll just pose a question first and it's obvious. But should we pursue safer forms of 
cesium-137 or technologies assuming they exist and are economically viable to the end 
user and I think all of you would agree that we should because if we don't the potential 
impact of not doing so could be substantial as already mentioned. 
 
This first attempt at establishing this distinction as a premise, draws more on STIR with his 
focus on consequences. Additionally, his terminology “it’s obvious” and “I think all of you 
would agree” are trying to create a sense of agreement. However, this participant makes three 
more statements using this distinction before another participant picks up on it. His second 
attempt is brief and nearly verbatim of his first statement. His third attempt contains more 
specific information, but still relies on the risk logic of focusing on consequences. His fourth 
attempt uses a different set of discursive resources from NTIR.  
The mechanisms of X-rays, low energy X-rays and higher energy, for example, photons 
or X-rays. I just jotted down some stuff as we were talking, but the mechanism of 
knocking out electrons is different between low and high photon energies … But, again, 
I think cesium, getting back to it, cesium does have a good depth dose profile for small 
animals and I don't personally think we should advocate eliminating it. Just the form of 
cesium 137 should be changed. 
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The NTIR resources include deductive reasoning from scientific principles, attention on the 
application of the technology, and appeal to external expertise. Using this information and the 
risk/benefit logic, he clearly demonstrates the benefits of cesium-137 for certain applications. 
Finally, he reiterates the premise that they should draw a distinction between cesium-137 and 
cesium chloride. 
 After a series of comments about feasibility of x-rays irradiators as an alternative, a 
security analyst is the first to echo the premise about distinctions between cesium-137 and 
cesium chloride to express his disagreement with a previous presentation. His statement uses the 
distinction with STIR. 
I was very disappointed with the attitude that I heard on a couple of people's part… 
Nobody is actually talking necessarily about taking away your cesium gamma spectrum. 
We're talking about taking away cesium chloride, and let me point out that the only 
nuclear or -- pardon me -- radiological terrorist scenarios you can dream up that kill a lot 
of people use and exploit cesium chloride. 
 
The oncologist immediately expressed agreement with the security analyst and used this as an 
opportunity to restate the distinction.  In the next turn, a medical physicist uses the distinction 
premise in his own statements. He used NTIR and concluded his comment by trying to create a 
sense of consensus.  
If it's a question of 662 keV photons, I don't see X-ray or anything else replacing it… 
And I also think the issue is going to translate less into what's the alternative for cesium 
as to what's the alternative for the chemical, you know, physical form of how the cesium 
is. I mean, that's my sense of where we're going. 
 
 As illustrated, the distinction between cesium-137 and cesium chloride is established by 
using both interpretative repertoires. The coordination among these participants to establish the 
distinction premise provides a useful trope for participants to advocate a solution to a security 
threat while also acknowledging the unique and useful characteristics of cesium-137. By the 
second day, participants frequently use this distinction as an important resource in pursuing a 
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response to NAS Recommendation #3 as illustrated in this quotation from a university radiation 
safety officer. 
So I think that one thing that we should do today is to make sure that the manufacturers 
and the vendors come away from this meeting with a realization that the problem is 
cesium chloride, the problem is not cesium, and that we really need to go to a different 
technology but still retain cesium as the primary source of calibration, because of all of 
the historical background between that source. 
 
Beliefs about Vulnerability of Theft 
 Once participants accepted the concept of dispersability, they understood the logic about 
the severity of consequences; however, several participants initially did not believe that these 
devices were vulnerable to theft and some still maintain this lack of belief. Interview participants 
remembered having the following objections when they first heard about the security concerns of 
possibility of theft of cesium chloride for the purposes of terrorist act: (1) the irradiators are too 
heavy, (2) a person would get a high dose of radiation in the act of theft, (3) it would be 
extremely difficult for someone to get to the irradiation area of the organization, (4) an irradiator 
would not be abandoned in the U. S., and (5) they do not believe that someone would really use 
cesium chloride in a terrorist act. Each of these reasons draws on years of professional 
experience working with radioactive materials and a deeply ingrained belief in the logic of 
radiation protection.  
 Weight of the irradiators. The first objection that interview participants would mention 
was the weight of the irradiator—they could not envision the theft because they did not know 
how someone could steal such a heavy machine.  One participant summarized the thinking of 
“most of the people at the blood clinics… when you say, ‘Well, a terrorist can get it,’ and they 
say, ‘They couldn’t move it, it’s so heavy.’” Another participant’s description was more vivid. 
Most of the people in my industry, me included,… are thinking…this thing weighs a 
couple of tons and … a guy is not just going to break in to a blood center … hump it on 
his back and take off with it. And so… the mystery piece in all of this … is they say, 
well, they can get in there and get into the source very quickly and trust us. 
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This quotation not only captures the belief about the heavy machine, it also demonstrates that 
secrecy about security-related information was a constraint that prevented this user community 
from fully understanding the nature of the threat and therefore not believes that the threat was 
legitimate. 
Another participants’ description is even more vivid and demonstrates how envisioning 
a theft of cesium chloride is completely counter to their professional experiences servicing 
irradiators.  
So, the idea of stealing one of these machines - the smallest of our machines, like a 
blood irradiator weighs … about 3000 pounds. It’s not like trying to steal an iPod or 
even a television. A guy can’t come in on his own and jack one of these things. You 
think it’s inconceivable. And then if they want to try and get the source, well, it would 
take them hours. And now that statement is based on our experience because we do 
occasionally have to recover these things from the field and dispose of them. And when 
we dispose of them, what we usually do is dismantle the device. Some of the workers I 
know try outside the radiation hot cell but they actually have to go into the hot cell for 
reasons of radiation safety. The workers then with remote manipulators-say the plug 
comes out from the device. The source comes out, it goes into the storage. It’s quite an 
elaborate process and if you were to not to take any breaks from work for the whole 
process non-stop, it will easily take us a day. I mean like a working day, eight hours, 
from start to finish. And so, that’s not much of a liquor store robbery kind of thing, if 
we’re trying to envision it. But mostly the reason the process takes so long is because we 
have rules and procedures with respect to lifting heavy equipment and grinding and 
cutting into steel and lead, paints and fumes and respirators, inherent protection and then 
obviously, the big one is the radiation protection. 
 
In this account, this participant draws on his professional experience working with the 
equipment, following regulatory guidance, and adhering to principles of radiation protection. He 
also makes vivid comparisons to common knowledge thefts such as a television, iPod, and liquor 
store. Each of these thefts must occur quickly so that the perpetrator will not get caught. 
However, based on the weight of the machine and experience with radiation protection, this user 
community cannot envision a quick theft of cesium chloride. 
 Increased controls and hardening. In addition to not being able to envision a quick theft 
of cesium chloride, participants felt that the increased controls and in-device delays made this 
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source less vulnerable to theft. As one participant stated “they weren't going to run away with it 
anyway, but [then we put] it into a cage so they couldn’t access it.” At the workshop, one 
participant specifically made the argument that the NAS study did not account for the increased 
controls which now make cesium chloride less of a threat.  
Since the National Research Council's report raising the concerns about these units, 
several things have changed that are not a part of that report. One is the security of the 
users has been enhanced through the requirement of background checks and 
fingerprinting, and this is in response to orders issued by NRC, increased controls and 
security in orders or amendments by the agreement states. The security of the facilities 
has been enhanced following the directives of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That 
means we've gone in and required the facility to make additional security capabilities to 
prevent access to these devices, and it has also been enhanced and should be enhanced 
through a hardening situation where we can actually go in and prevent the source from 
being removed from the irradiator. Following these three security enhancements, the 
units present little hazard for unauthorized source removal or disruption. The lack of 
such security was a major factor for the production of the original national academy of 
science report. 
 
She uses NTIR to deductively reason from operations principles, with an acceptable risk logic 
and an emphasis the regulatory role of government. These elements of NTIR enable her to draw 
the conclusion that cesium chloride is now less vulnerable to theft and is therefore less of a 
security concern. Since these increased controls were not accounted for in the NAS study, then 
Recommendation #3 has less validity. During an interview, another participant extends this logic 
by arguing that “an external terrorist would have to have amazing knowledge of the technology 
[and] the individual center…the only conceivable event would be the disgruntled employee 
within the center.”  By this reasoning, this participant believes that the only vulnerability threat 
is an internal threat, but he then enumerates the same list of background checks and access 
authorization processes that they have initiated to prevent internal threat.  
 The U.S. has better accountability for sources. Additionally, a couple of interview 
participants also felt that cesium chloride was not vulnerable to abandonment, like the incidents 
in Brazil or Mexico, because the U. S. has better regulatory controls about decommissioning 
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technologies with radioactive sources. When asked to address his views on the historical 
accident in Brazil, one interview participant responded with this differentiating argument: 
That was a case of -- there was nothing malicious, but the fact that the Brazilian 
government did not have the appropriate controls, or the regulation of their equipment 
and the machines. It was not handled properly by the owner, you know, at the end of this 
decommissioning of this facility... And, that’s where it fell down. And then you get end 
users or you get the public, probably very uneducated public. I know that I can’t speak to 
the educational background of the individuals that were harmed, but I’m certain they 
were uneducated in radiation and radiation protection. And obviously, they harmed 
themselves…So, I’m not sure if the breakdown’s at the public level as opposed to a 
breakdown at the government level and not having the appropriate controls in place, 
which, we here, certainly do. 
 
 Terrorists would do something else. Finally, the most fundamental objection to the 
vulnerability of theft is that some users do not believe that terrorists would use cesium chloride 
in a violent act. The interview participants generally attributed this belief to their colleagues. As 
one interview participant explains, “everybody I work with is in a state of denial… they do not 
believe - they cannot accept the possibility that one of these things would be used for malevolent 
proposition.” Another “very common” objection to vulnerability is “they would never do that” or 
“they would do something else.” Another interview participant became quite detailed in 
developing this argument, and this was his personal belief, not attributed to other parties. 
But I've always argued that if I want to do terrorism, I wouldn't do something hi-tech… 
even the stupid explosive, this Detroit guy, the shoe bomber -- now, they tried twice they 
haven't been able to ignite it…it's so easy to do some other things… I would basically 
get smaller chunks of the solid stuff, put it under seats, stealthily deploy, like you did the 
anthrax in a number of locations; some of them lethal quantity, some of it not so lethal 
quantities. 
 
A quotation like this may seem disconcerting on the surface, but this participant is not plotting a 
terrorist attack. Rather, he is using STIR in an ironic manner to discount the vulnerability of 
cesium chloride to theft by a terrorist.  
The fact that some members of the user community do not fully accept the vulnerability 
of cesium chloride as a security threat leads to disagreement among members about how far to 
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implement increased controls. Clearly, user communities will follow the actions prescribed by 
regulatory bodies, but the question then becomes whether or not to take additional measures to 
ensure security of devices with cesium chloride. One participant recounted a memorable 
argument that he had with a colleague about whether or not to implement security measures 
beyond those prescribed by DHS and NRC (I have chosen to not include the details of this 
argument in order to obscure the identity of this participant). When he described why the 
positions in this argument were so important he described the contrasting values of profit and 
protecting the public. 
Because of our respective interests, right? … He’s interested in the bottom line. And 
he’s looking at me going, hey, … look, we got all these guys working … We have to 
remain profitable or we all lose our jobs… He’s interested in the dollars. And I’m 
interested in doing what I would consider the morally responsible thing. The safe thing 
that’s right for the public. And where we really, really differ in opinion is I think what’s 
right for the public is to implement the security. If we are going to be responsible [users 
of this technology], I feel we have an obligation to make sure that it’s safe and secure… 
Arguably, they’re both valid positions but we’ve come out of it with completely 
different angles. 
 
In this conflict, the interview participant draws on the resources of STIR which reinforces the 
security concern nodal point. However, the other person draws on resources of NTIR because of 
the implied belief that if regulatory bodies do not require the additional action then the current 
state of affairs is safe enough. This belief allows the other person to reinforce the master 
signifiers of function and regulation so that he can continue to use cesium technology for 
economic gain. 
Coordinating Details of the Feasibility of Alternatives 
 Much of the content of the workshop addressed the feasibility of alternatives for using 
cesium chloride and most of the time participants provided comments by drawing on NTIR. 
Despite the fact that most participants agreed about not wanting to see a near-term elimination of 
cesium chloride, they expressed and coordinated different views about the exact nature of the 
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feasibility of alternatives (see Table 5.2). In particular, the nodal point of beneficial function 
organized their discourse about whether or not alternatives could perform the necessary task in a 
reliable and affordable way. As a floating signifier, the possibility of alternatives has the 
potential to change the methods and technologies by which user communities perform their 
functions of calibration, blood irradiation, and research. Disagreements about alternatives were 
common at the workshop and also recounted by interview participants. As one participant said, 
“most of the disagreement I saw was on … very, very technical levels of discussion … they 
would get into very sort of wonky technical discussions about alternatives, the cesium chloride, 
or irradiators, and whether or not they could be used for …very specific applications and what 
the benefits and cost were.” Sometimes participants were able to coordinate their differences by 
exclusively relying on the resources of NTIR. However, if claims did not appear to convince 
other parties to agree to their view about alternatives, participants used inductive reasoning as a 
strategy to highlight the faulty reasoning and premises of the other party. 
Can Alternatives Perform Necessary Function? 
 The issue of whether or not alternatives can perform a particular task was important 
because the beneficial function nodal point prioritized the necessity of gaining the benefits of 
cesium chloride technology. The NAS study recommended using X-ray irradiators as an 
alternative for blood irradiation, but this is not an option for calibration because it requires a very 
specific level of energy in order to ensure that dosimetry and other devices are set to the correct 
detection levels. The standard measurement of energy for this application is called a kilo-
electron volt (keV). The following example from the workshop illustrates how a calibration 
physicist and x-ray equipment manufacturer managed a disagreement using resources from 
NTIR. Prior to this exchange, the calibration physicist had expressed his views that he prefers 
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cesium for several applications, especially calibration due to the fact that the unique 
characteristics of cesium make x-ray alternatives unsuitable.  
Calibration Physicist: Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe the maximum voltage, the 
state of the art today, is around 300, 400 kilovolts for X-rays, and that translates if you 
filter such a spectrum to get a monochromatic spectrum, you can get maybe up to 200-
something, 250 keV. So can you go higher than that? And if not, what do you think 
about that in the future, if that's possible or not?  
 
The calibration physicist’s initial question draws on NTIR by using deductive reasoning from 
scientific principles about energy, with the implication that even the new x-ray irradiators could 
not get to the 662 keV range of energy that cesium produces. The x-ray manufacturer responded 
by expressing his view that an x-ray alternative is possible with his new higher energy x-ray 
irradiators.  
X-ray Manufacturer: Well, hint, hint, we have written a grant request to put together a 
machine that will operate at 500 KeV, and at 500 KeV with this new technology we're 
using, you have enough photons that you can filter very, very hard and still have enough 
left to do something with. So, yes, we believe it's possible. Is it today? Is it tomorrow? 
No, it's probably in the same time range as anything else.  
 
The manufacturer’s response draws on NTIR and timing and research rhetorical device. 
However, as the turns become shorter, it becomes clear that the calibration physicist is forcing 
the manufacturer to concede that even in a few years with new technologies, the x-ray irradiators 
will not be able to reproduce the 662 keV energy level of cesium needed for calibration.  
Calibration Physicist: Okay, I guess, but what would be the main energy then? We 
would be talking around 400 tops, right, or maybe even less than that?  
X-ray Manufacturer: Yeah, if you were to go to 500, then you would probably have a 
distribution from maybe 275 to 380 or depending on what you were filtering with 
and if you could optimize that.  
Calibration Physicist: So is it correct to say then that the technology is not there today or 
— 
X-ray Manufacturer: Oh, no, I'm just saying it will be three to four years before you can 
even get to that level.  
Calibration Physicist: To that level, but not to 600 KeV.  
X-ray Manufacturer: I think that --  
Calibration Physicist: I think that it's a fair question since this morning when we were 
talking about the other alternative about the cesium form, right, we were asking, 
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okay, if this would be available and we had an answer for that. So I think we should 
explore that question, too, for this other alternative.  
X-ray Manufacturer: I think it would be difficult to go much beyond 500 keV as a peak.  
Calibration Physicist: As a peak.  
X-ray Manufacturer: As a peak.  
Calibration Physicist: Yeah, okay.  
 
Can Alternatives Achieve Similar Output and Reliability? 
The issue about whether or not x-ray alternatives can achieve similar output and 
reliability as cesium irradiators is also organized by the beneficial function nodal point. This 
aspect of the issue about alternatives draws upon economic and business principles. Industries 
must find it profitable in order to make x-ray alternatives widely available to users. 
Organizations must find x-ray irradiators affordable, capable of equivalent output, and reliable. 
These points are discussed in great detail at the workshop and also over meals during the 
workshop. One participant explained why her organization and a similar organization had 
different views about the feasibility of changing. She said “we had the advantage having cost 
information. So, I think that was the difference in our approaches. We said, ‘we can do it, and 
this is how much of a cost,’ where they said, ‘It’s not feasible.’” And while at the workshop they 
discussed these differences when “we went to lunch with them… and I think it's a matter of, we 
had different information than they had.” 
 The following analyses illustrate how participants were unable to use NTIR to resolve 
disagreements about output and reliability of x-ray irradiators. The participants probably argued 
about these details because the details could make a difference between the positions that 
“alternatives can work”, “alternatives can work but…” and “alternatives are not suitable” (see 
Table 5.2).  The first view lends partial support to NAS Recommendation #3 (given enough 
time), whereas the latter views treats cesium-137 as unique and irreplaceable.  
 Interactions About Output. The first set of exchanges focuses on the output of x-ray 
irradiators compared to cesium irradiators (i.e., the amount of unit of blood that can be irradiated 
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in a given time). A participant from a university hospital begins the numerical comparison by 
asking about how many x-ray irradiators he would need to match his current output.   
University Hospital Participant: We're a Level 1 trauma facility for seven counties in 
central-western New York. We choose to irradiate all blood products. That's 28 to 
30,000 units a year. So my question for the manufacturers are: how many of your 
irradiators would I have to purchase to meet that 28 to 30,000 units a year, assuming 
a rate of 75 to 90 units a day, you know, 365 days a year?  
 
The first response comes from a representative of a blood bank and gives an explicit logic for 
answering the question.  
Blood Bank Representative A: I'm not a manufacturer, but I know that the irradiation 
time for one of the X-ray devices is about five or six minutes, and you can fit 
basically three blood bags in at a time. So I'm a little bit slow at math, but I guess 
you can go through it yourself and sort out how many you would need for your 
facility. 
 
Then the x-ray manufacturer provides an answer based on his soon-to-be approved, higher 
energy x-ray irradiator. 
X-Ray Manufacturer: … the device that we used to develop the unit would probably do 
somewhere around five, 500 mL bags of blood in the three minute range. 
 
A few turns later, a security analyst offers an answer to the original question by calculating out 
the math and concluding that one x-ray irradiator could meet that person’s need.  
Security Analyst: The gentleman behind me … suggested that he needed to do 30,000 
units of blood a year. Thirty-six thousand five hundred would be 100 units a day. So 
let's take that number. One of the source manufacturers said he could do five bags in 
three minutes. He needs to do 20 times that to keep up with a day. Twenty times 
three minutes is an hour. Let's take another hour for in and out time. That means that 
basically between two and three hours of duty a day on the X-ray machine is 
perfectly adequate. I seriously doubt that you'll have to buy more than one blood 
irradiator to handle that load. 
 
This statement draws upon NTIR and makes the security analyst seem that he understands the 
user-groups’ needs. However, participants recognize that his statement implies that alternatives 
can work and this position implies that it would not be detrimental to phase out cesium 
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irradiators. A different representative of blood banks speaks immediately after the security 
analyst. 
Blood Bank Representative A: I'd just like to point out that lean and disaster 
preparedness are inimical. While we try to have as efficient systems as possible, and I 
cannot gainsay the elegant mathematics of our recent presenter, we do not function as a 
constant steady state manufacturer, but rather we need to be prepared for the bus 
accident and generating a lot of stuff fast. So in certain cases, but no means all, there 
may be reasons either for reliability or throughput that one might need additional X-ray 
devices. This is not a matter of feasibility. This is, however, a matter of economics. 
 
This statement draws on NTIR to demonstrate that, based on operations principles and data 
about the inconsistent workload at a hospital, it would require more x-ray irradiators to produce 
the same output as one cesium irradiator. Thus, he counters the security specialist’s calculations 
with professional knowledge about using irradiators and inductively reason that x-ray irradiators 
could work, but it would cost more because users would need to purchase back-up x-rays. 
 Overall, this exchange draws on NTIR by using deductive reasoning from operations 
principles and using numerical calculations. Statements that cesium irradiators produce more 
output carry the implication of the usefulness of this technology. Alternatively, statements that 
claim that x-ray irradiators can match the output carry the implication that alternatives can meet 
the needs. 
 Interactions About Reliability. The next set of exchanges focus on disagreements that 
compare the reliability of the two alternative technologies.  
Radiation Safety Officer: In the case of your machine irradiation of blood products, in 
the places where there's a single machine and that machine is not working and 
perhaps it takes a week to bring back into service, how is that problem remedied?  
Blood Bank Representative: I guess now is as good a time as any to talk about 
breakdown just for a moment. Among our 32 cesium-137 chloride irradiators, there 
have been 51 instances of breakdowns during the last three years. For the X-ray 
devices, there have been 21 occurrences of breakdowns of the Raycells in the last 
three years. Of course, we have fewer devices, and when you do it per device and 
figure out the breakdown rate, there's about a 66 percent increase in the breakdown 
rate when comparing the Raycell devices to the cesium devices. For the most part, in 
66 percent of the breakdowns the device could be repaired within one day, usually 
by on-site staff or a local contractor. However, two repairs took 26 and 37 days to 
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complete and probably involved off-site, non-local service. The average time for 
repairs that were greater than one day was 15.5 days, plus or minus 12.2 days, and 
this compares to 37 percent of breakdowns that could be repaired in one day for the 
gamma irradiators. And in addition, those irradiators took more than one day to 
repair, averaged 15.4 days plus or minus 12.3 days for the gamma irradiators, again, 
indicating probably that off-site service was necessary, and of course, this makes 
sense because as we know, the gamma irradiators are a regulated device with safety 
concerns and require specialized staff many times to fly in sometimes from other 
countries to repair the device. 
 
This exchange begins with a question that is answered by drawing upon NTIR. The level of 
detail about operating history from the blood bank representative is compelling and ultimately 
concludes that cesium irradiators are subject to less down-time due to repairs. Even though it is 
not explicitly stated, the implication of the question and the answer is that a cesium irradiator is a 
more reliable machine, with less down-time, better serves the medical needs.  
 At this point a manufacturer speaks up to add additional information to the blood bank 
representative’s comments. He directs attention to the age of the devices and implies that cesium 
irradiators have longer length of service which makes them an attractive purchase. The blood 
bank representative agrees with the equipment manufacturer and directs attention the fact that 
users know that cesium irradiators last for decades, but the length of service of x-ray irradiators 
is unknown. These arguments support the position that cesium is preferred due to reliability 
issues. Notably, the participants make several references to money, such as “if you want to make 
a donation to the Red Cross then we can [afford to buy an x-ray irradiator].” These kinds of 
comments provoke the audience to laughter because they highlight shared beliefs about the 
reliability and relative affordability of cesium irradiators and concern about the possible expense 
of having to buy x-ray irradiators as replacements. 
 At the conclusion of the output and reliability comparisons, a medical physicist connects 
these topics. He apparently disagrees with the points made about the inability of x-ray irradiators 
to match cesium output or the lower reliability of x-ray irradiators. He appears to disagree with 
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the “alternatives can work but…” position and supports a “preference for cesium” position. His 
opening phrase emphasizes his rationality and attempt to overcome the limited point-of-view 
constraint. 
I've got to add balance back to this discussion. Those of you who understand X-ray 
technology, some of the high output computed tomography X-ray tubes, the 
reproducibility and accuracy of modern medical imaging technology and output, the 
technology is clearly here and has been here for many, many years. So to imply that the 
technology is not capable to put reproducible output over a period of time is, in my 
opinion, just wrong. However, maintenance and quality control, if you neglect a high 
quality car, it's not going to last as long as a less expensive car that's maintained on a 
regular basis. So the issue with electronic products more so than the radioactive sources 
is to require long-term maintenance and calibration and so on. But to imply that the 
technology is not up to the task is wrong. It's the human factor, the maintenance, the 
calibration. So there's little doubt in my mind. Energy aside, unless you can come up 
with an X-ray source that can generate a 662 keV photon, that for scientific applications 
the non-radioactive technology is clearly… capable. 
 
In this statement he deviates from the deductive reasoning of NTIR and introduces inductive 
reasoning from analogy to make a point about maintenance. This use of inductive reasoning 
helps to differentiate his position about feasibility of alternatives by redirecting attention away 
from the operations problems of x-ray irradiators and focusing on the unique energy of cesium.  
 After this turn, another participant uses an analogy of a light bulb to discuss reliability of 
x-ray irradiators. A manufacturer of high energy x-ray machines is the first to respond to the car 
and light bulb analogies about maintenance and advancement of technology.  
Actually we think we have hit on a relatively good solution. It's a matter of having the 
availability of being able to open up the tube, repair it, close it up again and reuse it. 
Again, this is a brand new concept. The best we've been able to do so far is somewhere 
less than 1,000 hours of use. We think we can get considerably higher than that, but even 
at 1,000 hours, if you think about the calculations that were just done here a little while 
ago, two hours a day or whatever they were, 1,000 hours is a year and a half before you 
have to do anything to the tube, and that's a huge, huge operation to irradiate that type of 
blood.  
 
This statement draws on NTIR and supports an “alternatives can work” position. The facilitator 
observes that several participants disagree with this statement.  The first person to respond is an 
agricultural researcher who provides considerable numerical information about the operations 
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and expenses of the USDA’s irradiation needs. He drew on NTIR with the typical deductive 
reasoning from economic principles, strong appeals to the public good provided by these 
operations, and scientific reasons why they cannot allow long downtimes for their irradiation. 
The x-ray manufacturer has the next turn and he disagrees with the researcher’s statement but he 
does not provide specific reasons for it. His use of the phrase, “I would like to remain 
professional about this,” indicates that he probably feels upset by the previous comments but he 
wants to maintain norms of rationality by not expressing his emotions. After this comment, other 
participants, offer statements that further counter the x-ray manufacturer’s estimates of usage 
time with operations data from their respective organizations. A participant from a blood bank 
concludes the comments with a statement about the reliability of x-ray irradiators with economic 
principles. “So they're selling, but if they were as cost efficient obviously they'd be selling 
more.” At this point the facilitator invites further comments but no one responds, so they move 
to the next agenda question. 
 Throughout these examples of disagreements about alternatives, the beneficial function 
of irradiation for blood transfusion and research is a key signifier that organizes the question of 
the feasibility of x-ray irradiators regarding their output, reliability, and cost. Generally, 
participants managed the conflict with resources of NTIR and demonstrated rationality by 
sharing specific information about scientific or operations principles and refraining from 
expressing emotion (although anger was on the surface at some points). Instances of deviation 
from NTIR are when participants used analogic reasoning to differentiate their position in 
relation to Recommendation #3 from the slightly different positions about alternatives. 
Coordinating Agreement About Balancing Risks and Benefits 
 Even though floating signifiers created potential for change in the discourse about 
cesium chloride the key signifiers of function and regulation were also reinforced through 
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participants’ coordination about risk logics and benefits. The key signifier of regulation was 
reinforced through the fact that most participants relied on acceptable risk and risk/benefit logics. 
The acceptable risk logic maintains that society can bear risks of certain technologies. The 
risk/benefit logic adds the reasoning that this acceptability must be in proportion to the benefits 
the technologies provide. The risk/benefit logic also reinforces the beneficial function signifier 
because it attends to the benefits of a technology. Sometimes participants expressed the 
risk/benefit logic explicitly in statements such as “you start making a sort of risk-benefit 
analysis…I think the benefit is higher than the risk and I think the risk in this case is very small 
because NRC has been doing an excellent job making sure that all facilities operate securely.” 
Participants also implied the risk/benefit logic contextually in statements like this: “There really 
is a health issue and it really is something that has to be taken care of…and whatever we do, we 
can’t just eliminate it because of the consequences there of real health issues versus a perceived 
terrorist risk are outweighed because you really have …big consequences if you didn’t irradiate 
the blood.” Thus, participants used risk logics to reinforce the beneficial function and regulation 
key signifiers. This can be seen in an example at the workshop that began with disagreement the 
elimination of cesium chloride based on RDD consequences and ended with a tacit agreement 
about basing a decision on an acceptable risk logic. Additionally, the interview participants 
provided insight into how user communities built agreement about making a decision based on 
the beneficial functions of cesium chloride technologies. 
Coordination of Risk Logics 
 Even though the final session of the workshop was designed to address risk analysis, in 
the early afternoon of the first day, participants began describing their positions using the risk 
logics. This session created tension and disagreement and ultimately, a senior NRC manager felt 
the need to step in to frame the talk about risk by drawing on the regulatory structure of the 
164 
NRC’s task and mission. This exchange about risk began when a security analyst made an 
explicit reference to “eliminate” risk and expressed a preference for non-radionuclide 
alternatives. It is the use of the word “eliminate” that seems to provoke the subsequent 
exchanges (I have italicized the use of “eliminate” or synonyms in the quotations).  
If we go to a radionuclide alternative to cesium we are reducing the risk because we're 
actually making it more difficult to disperse, but we're not eliminating the risk. The only 
way to eliminate the risk is to go to an non-radionuclide alternative like the x-ray 
machine. And being from my perspective, not being a user, but being a student of 
radiological terrorism, that would be my preferred option… After 9/11 we got a lot of 
complaints that the government didn't connect the dots. So here's a case where we're 
really trying to connect the dots and look where the holes are in our security, where our 
gaps are, and trying to plug them and that's one of the reasons why we're trying to look 
at other options for cesium chloride.  
 
The security analyst’s set of statements draws upon STIR by using a risk logic that focuses on 
consequences and inductively reasons from his professional knowledge. He also draws on the 
security institution by referencing the terrorist attacks on 9/11 to justifying this effort as a 
conscientious attempt to prevent another terrorist attack. In the comment that immediately 
follows, a medical physicist picks up the word “eliminate” and uses the risk/benefit logic with 
NTIR to suggest that phasing out cesium chloride is an extreme action.  
Are you talking about eliminating cesium from all commerce for all calibration 
applications just because of its chemical and mechanistic form? I think you would be 
doing the scientific community a disservice by taking this specific nuclide out of the 
picture completely. If you're talking about terrorism and being afraid of things… when 
do you block yourself up in a corner with a wall and just not expose yourself to 
anything? The NRC has a tough task here. There are societal benefits of cesium. There 
are scientific benefits of cesium with its unique energy. It's used as the nuclide for many, 
many calibration applications. But then again, in its current form, it also raises some 
risks. But I think … you're going to create a hole if you eliminate cesium-137. 
  
 Several participants were provoked by the use of the word “eliminate” which they 
consider to be a violation of the precedent of using nuclear technologies for beneficial purposes. 
Many responded by using STIR in an ironic manner to demonstrate their view that the focus on 
consequences is a faulty premise for a decision. After a few attempts to keep the conversation on 
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the agenda, the facilitator recognizes a senior NRC manager who has been waiting a while to 
make a comment about risk and security. This is only the second NRC comment since the 
opening remarks and it occurs in the early afternoon of the first day. At this point, the audience 
of nearly 200 people becomes very quiet to listen to this comment.  
One of the things that the NRC has to ponder when formulating our decision making is 
… how far do we go as a regulator… Nothing that we're going to do is going to give 
zero risk except complete elimination of radionuclides. I think that's recognized. So the 
question becomes what is an acceptable risk and that's something we should be thinking 
about as we go through and formulate our comments… We don't live in a zero risk 
society. We're not going to get there as I said. So therefore … if we were to go forward 
and promulgate some kind of ruling-making on this activity, part of our rule-making 
activity requires a regulatory analysis which has to factor in cost/benefit of the actions 
that were taken. It's important for us to have that information so that we make informed 
decisions as we go forward.  
 
 After general acknowledgement of several perspectives, the NRC manager explicitly 
says that the only way to achieve “zero risk” is to have a complete “elimination of 
radionuclides.” He then continues by using the acceptable risk logic to explain the NRC’s intent 
to gather information that would support rule-making. In the course of this comment he hints at 
the use of a PRA logic that could help determine which alternatives do the most to minimize risk 
and bring it to the acceptable level. The function of this statement is to establish the acceptable 
risk logic as a guiding premise for the NRC’s decision and perhaps the remainder of the 
workshop. 
 At least one participant focused on the statement about the elimination of radionuclides 
and posed a question indicating concern about this extreme action. 
Equipment Manufacturer: You said getting rid of radionuclides. Are you talking only 
about the high level or what level or --  
NRC Manager: Yes … if you were removing the risk completely of using cesium 
chloride or cobalt or any radionuclide, the only way you eliminate that risk 
completely is not to use it at all from a radionuclide perspective. So there's a 
recognition --  
Equipment Manager: But get rid of low level radionuclides as well?  
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NRC Manager: That's all it's going to take. Yes, any utilization of it at all in any form is 
going to give some form of risk. The question becomes what's that accepted level 
which I think is the point that we're trying to ponder.  
 
 Apparently the participant was concerned that the NRC manager’s remark was literal, 
when in fact the NRC manager was using it as a trope to establish the premise that such action 
would be extreme and therefore warranted a discussion of “acceptable risk” instead of “zero 
risk.” In this example of coordination the two participants probably hold similar views, but the 
manufacturer interprets the regulator’s comments in a literal fashion and perceives a 
disagreement.  
 Immediately following this exchange, a member of one of the NRC’s advisory 
committees expresses agreement with the NRC manager’s comments.  
I couldn't applaud you more for bringing up the issue of risk. On the one hand … we've 
[presumed that] cesium doesn't work. How about we ask the other question? What would 
it take to make a cesium irradiator have a risk profile that was acceptable by whatever 
metric you wanted to use? Asking the alternate question is a way to analyze how do you 
make it better, rather than what can we substitute. And I think when you do that in a 
risk-informed way and think about all the risks, the risk of a terrorist, the risk of them 
getting to the material, the risk of them getting it and doing something bad with it and all 
those things which is the event side and then thinking carefully and systematically about 
protections that you have or don't have now or should have or might have, we can really 
kind of sort it out. But I would just urge that we focus on the risks. What are the risks 
we're trying to mitigate and how can we systematically mitigate them and then how do 
we ask the questions? Instead of presuming cesium has to go away, we can say if we 
really want to keep cesium, what does it take to give it the risk profile that would be 
acceptable from a risk-informed regulatory view?  
 
This statement uses the vocabulary of “risk profile” instead of “acceptable risk” and this allows 
him to reframe the overall workshop question from being about “the continued use of cesium 
chloride” to creating an acceptable risk profile for cesium chloride. He then used the term “risk-
informed” which invokes the PRA logic. The use of PRA logic focuses attention on the 
probabilities of events (in addition to the focus on consequences) that could lead to a terrorist 
attack and ranks these risk contributors. Ultimately, the use of PRA logic and acceptable risk 
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logic functions to reframe the questions in direct response to the recommendations of NAS 
Recommendation #3. 
 Following this comment, an oncologist draws a distinction between cesium-137 and 
cesium chloride and focuses on the consequences of a terrorist attack. This begins coordination 
between these two individuals about reframing the overall question of the workshop.  
Oncologist: I haven't heard anybody including the NRC or NAS advocating elimination 
of cesium-137, but I think at least according to the NAS report they do suggest to 
eliminate of cesium-137 chloride, at least, category 1 and 2 and just one reason is 
just due to the solubility and that's a significant economic impact it would have on 
society if a terrorist event happened.  
NRC Advisory Committee Member: It is true it is soluble. I agree 100 percent. It is salt. 
But where is the evidence that says on a risk metric that that's the most important 
thing about cesium-137? If it's properly secured, properly confined, properly 
contained, by whatever mechanism you want to think up so that it prevents that 
action, that solubility may become less significant from a risk point of view and I 
think we're giving that up too quickly.  
Oncologist: I agree with you, but can we mitigate the risk and is it still economically 
viable?  
NRC Advisory Committee Member: That's exactly the question we're posing.  
Oncologist: That's our question.  
NRC Advisory Committee Member: Exactly the question. I think we need to 
systematically think that through before we throw it away. 
 
This coordination drew upon distinctions between cesium-137 and cesium chloride, the issue of 
solubility, scientific principles, and economic principles. In the end, the participants expressed 
agreement about asking the same question, but it took three rounds of expressed agreement for 
them to believe each other. The reason is subtle, but lies in the fact that the oncologist is 
convinced by scientific explanations of solubility and dispersability to use a risk logic that 
focuses on consequences. His use of distinctions between cesium-137 and cesium chloride 
shows both his understanding of the uniqueness of cesium and his concern for the security threat. 
On the other hand, the member of the NRC advisory committee uses to PRA logic to focus on 
probabilities of the security threat and the acceptable risk logic to lay a foundation that allows for 
the continued use of cesium chloride. Therefore, they may have reached agreement about the 
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wording of the question, but the function of the disagreement may be rooted in their different 
risk logics. 
 This process of coordination about the risk/benefit and acceptability of risk logic 
reinforces the concept of regulation as a key signifier in the discourse about cesium chloride. 
These individual actions are reciprocally reinforced by the regulatory and legislative structures 
from a society that has some level of trust in government agencies to protect the public. 
However, these resources are not available in all countries and regulatory bodies often do not 
have trusting relationships with the public or their regulated communities. This process of 
coordination about risk logics is also an action that corrects a violation of talking about 
elimination of radionuclides. With this reframing of the overall purpose of the workshop, user 
communities can think about ways to keep cesium chloride technologies while also improving 
security.  
Coordination About Beneficial Functions of Cesium Chloride Technologies 
 As interview participants reflected on their interactions about the cesium chloride issue, 
many of them told stories about how easy it was for them to coordinate agreement with other 
user communities wanting to keep cesium chloride technologies because of their beneficial 
functions. Their praise about the NRC decision reflects their belief that the best basis for the 
decision was a risk/benefit logic that accounted for its impact on user communities.  
 Several participants recounted how each professional group had similar views about the 
NAS study Recommendation #3, but for different reasons based on how they used cesium 
chloride. When commenting on her organization’s ability to partner with other organizations, 
one participant said they were “able to tie sort of research uses as well as the clinical use in 
medical facilities and I think that was sort of a very powerful one-two punch, if you will, on this 
issue.” This professional collaboration gave the user communities strength in the face of what 
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they considered a fear-based, politicized issue about banning cesium chloride. As one participant 
recounted, when the members of their professional organization initially heard about 
Recommendation #3, they protested on their chat rooms and list serv. Then, the president of the 
organization coordinated their responses into the official statement that they made at the 
workshop.  
 This process of coordination seemed straightforward to many of the interview 
participants because to them the right decision seemed apparent and according to one participant, 
“it was quite clear that [NRC officials] felt quite constrained on to be able to point out the 
obvious.” The “obvious” in the eyes of the user communities was to take into consideration the 
impact of the decision on the beneficial functions of cesium chloride technologies. As one 
participant noted, “I agreed with the original panel that said that it’s safest to ban Cesium. That is 
true. That is from a purely scientific perspective and safety perspective, too. But, then the NRC 
went out and said, ‘What's the impact of this?’ Then they listened.” Another interview 
participant talked about his experience interacting with different disciplines on sub-committees 
and he said, “To see all the different aspects that you really have to try make it as safe as you can 
and yet not inhibit the use that is so vital until --if there’s an alternate that could be used.” 
Coordination Leading to a Paradigm Shift 
 Several participants recounted how they were initially resistant to the characterization of 
cesium chloride as a security threat. The five main reasons for this resistance were discussed in 
the section about vulnerability of theft. Participants who felt that they made a paradigm shift to 
accepting the security risk about cesium chloride, attributed this shift to immersion in security 
studies and interactions with different professional groups. The participants who made the shift 
acknowledged that at the beginning they were constrained by their own limited point-of-view 
and when they got new information, this helped them change their perspective. Participants also 
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admitted that it took time for the information and experiences to sink in enabling them to make 
the shift.  
Immersion 
An important reason that participants did not believe the vulnerability of the security 
threat was the lack of information. The interview with one participant, who I refer to as Smith, 
went into great detail about he had adjusted his beliefs about the security threat and he 
recognized that “the security culture is very, very new to us” and “people haven’t fully made the 
adjustment to the new world, the new reality that I think that we live in.” In his account, Smith 
explained how, “[I had] developed my own sort of personal security culture” because “I spent 
quite a bit of time working in the area of security in recent years and I’ve read papers” and “from 
the work I’ve done mostly with the Department of Energy in the United States.”  In his own 
words, the participant felt like he had undergone a “paradigm shift” based on his immersion in 
thinking about safety and security issues related to his industry. This section uses this 
participants’ account to demonstrate how key signifiers and floating signifiers were coordinated 
in a manner to enable a paradigm shift through immersion.  
 Smith recounted how he first received the information about the security threat of 
cesium chloride—a reaction that was similar to nearly all interview participants. 
I’ll tell you, when I first heard about the possibility of using one of these devices to 
make a dirty bomb, I thought that’s absolutely ridiculous. I thought that’s the stupidest 
thing I’ve ever heard… So, why was it hard to believe? Just because of the fight. My 
experience. 
 
 Based on his experience with cesium irradiators, Smith found it difficult to envision how 
they could be used in a terrorist attack. However, based on his professional commitment to “read 
the book,” he “studied the historical facts … long before 9-11 from a safety point of view 
…because [he] felt it was the important part of the engineering that [he] was doing [and] now 
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[he does] the same thing with respect to security.” This immersion in security studies enabled 
him to adopt the 9/11 logic. 
This was something that 9-11 taught us was if you - we were using our common sense 
and our rational experience… You think it’s inconceivable…And now that statement is 
based on our experience because we do occasionally have to recover these things from 
the field and … the reason the process takes so long is because we have rules and 
procedures … the big one is the radiation protection. What 9-11 taught us was all those 
rules go out the door… the terrorist actually is happy to die. And that breaks all the 
rules. All the sudden, common sense is gone out the door. It took awhile for me 
personally to imagine this change of perspective about those rules and think of it from 
that perspective. 
 
Once Smith believed that terrorists might really want to use cesium chloride in a violent act, he 
began to use 9/11 logic to understand that a terrorist would not be concerned about radiation 
protection procedures and therefore would simply steal the source from the irradiator and get a 
high dose. This account demonstrates how the security threat nodal point shapes the discourse 
and how the radiation protection logic initially constrained Smith’s ability to believe the 
credibility of the security scenarios. Additionally, the master signifiers of his professional 
identity and rationality enable Smith to justify his choices to study security scenarios and 
understand that point-of-view. 
For Smith, the next barrier to overcome was the disbelief that anyone could steal the 
source from the irradiator quickly. The following excerpt demonstrates how his exposure to the 
“Red Team” videos changed his point-of-view about the vulnerability aspect of the security 
threat. 
 What the big eye opener was … “Red Teams.” The folks at Sandia National Lab…got 
their hands on some machines … and then they were allowed to study these machines 
and figure out how they work, reverse engineer them. And then they were put in the 
room with a set of tools and a video camera and they started the clock and these guys got 
the stuff out in a matter of minutes. And I saw the video, I watched it and I couldn’t 
deny it, but it just defied my life’s experience--what these guys did. And even then, my 
… first reaction was to scoff and say, do you know what kind of a dose that guy just got 
from a radiation dose? But even then I knew about the dose he didn’t get. It wasn’t 
lethal. It wouldn’t quite the kill him immediately. And it might never have killed him. 
The point is, they got the source out of the machine and now it’s gone…It has [entered] 
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the public domain, we lost track and we don’t know where it is. So, that whole process 
for me took a couple of years. The video itself obviously was the turning point for me to 
see that but it just defies our common experience.  
 
For Smith, viewing the “Red Team” videos was a “turning point” for him, but even this 
information took a while to sink in because it “defied [his] life’s experience” as a professional 
working under the logic of radiation protection.  Later in the interview Smith revisited the 
importance of viewing the videos.  
I think it was probably a defining point of my career to see that because it really did 
shatter all the notions of what was conceivable. I saw what they were doing. I witnessed 
it. I could understand absolutely every step that they took in the process but to put it all 
together and to see it unfold in front of me was a really truly an eye opening experience. 
… Probably because it was in a matter of a half hour meeting, it changed the direction of 
my career and made me realize that the step is possible whereas previously… I was not 
concerned. 
 
The visual image of a person stealing the source “in a matter of minutes” was a powerful 
piece of information that came from a credible source and therefore, it was not a violation of 
rationality for Smith to accept this information and use it to expand his point-of-view.  
Another element of Smith’s paradigm shift was his involvement with the In-Device 
Delay program—a DOE and DHS program that re-engineered cesium irradiators to make it 
physically more difficult for someone to get the source out of the machine. This new role caused 
him to incorporate elements of security work into his previous professional identity of working 
with the functional benefits associated cesium irradiators.  Smith had been given permission to 
view the videos because of his role in the In-Device Delay (“hardening”) program. Smith said, “I 
think I could conduct my job without having seen that, but having seen that and been exposed to 
that information makes my job not necessarily easier but a lot clearer.”  
Even though Smith articulated a belief in the security threat and recounted how his 
paradigm shifted through his immersion in studying the issue and the In-Device Delay program, 
he still firmly believed in the beneficial function of cesium irradiators. His account about the 
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cesium chloride issue was also organized around the beneficial function nodal point. This was 
illustrated in a story he shared after describing his involvement with hardening. 
When we’re doing this upgrade, we strip the machines down to the skeletons and we end 
up rebuilding it. The machine is out of service for a good four to twenty-four hours… 
One of the very first machines we were doing, we had just got the machine back together 
and were running it. We were literally running it through its first few cycles. And a 
woman in the blood bank came in and she just burst into the room and she said , ‘Is that 
machine running? … I’ve got a new born baby upstairs that’s hemorrhaging to death.’ 
… I told the story to somebody and I said… ‘the baby was bleeding to death [and] that 
machine is about to save that baby’s life.’ 
 
Throughout the account of his paradigm shift, Smith drew on resources in both NTIR 
and STIR. Smith drew on values of the benefit of the technology and the importance of 
protecting the public. Additionally, his account draws on the belief in technology to provide a 
solution to the security threat through the In-Device Delay program. Smith’s involvement in the 
hardening program emphasizes both responsibilities of government to protect the public and 
oversee safe uses of technology. In an interesting reverse usage of reasoning, Smith’s initial 
resistance to the security threat was based on inductive reasoning from professional experience 
and the legitimacy he attributed to the security threat was based on careful reasoning about 
credible evidence. Thus, Smith’s account of the paradigm shift provides evidence of a potentially 
new repertoire that merges NTIR and STIR in an attempt to negotiate the tension of a security 
threat that has the potential to phase out a beneficial technology. 
Interaction 
 Another element of participants’ accounts of a paradigm shift is interaction with other 
professional communities. Smith’s account tells of his interactions with security specialists 
through his involvement in the In-Device Delay program. Two other interview participants 
provided in-depth accounts of interactions among user communities, regulators, and security 
personnel. These extended interactions provided opportunities for the different communities to 
overcome the constraint of a limited point-of-view. In the first account, told by Jones, state 
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regulators created forums for interactions between themselves, the NRC, and their licensees. In 
the second account, told by Jackson, a university radiation safety officer created forums for 
researchers and security personnel to interact.  
 A State Regulatory Conference. Similar to other participants, Jones recognized that user 
communities did not feel that additional security measures were necessary for cesium chloride. 
He felt that it was important to impress upon them that they took this issue seriously, so they 
made violations of the increased controls the highest possible for this state. 
Since we felt it was something that NRC thought was important, we made our violations 
severity levels 1 and 2, which is the highest severity level. So, many of the blood 
facilities came in, had to pay a thousand, two thousand dollars penalty for not 
implementing quickly, and it got their attention really soon. So, we were able to learn a 
lot from there that they -- and them too, they almost thought, “Well, you can’t remove it 
from the facility.” And once they realize that no it’s more about removing the source and 
I think that they came around.  
 
This account is organized by regulatory logic, that an external agency should oversee and 
enforce the safe use of a technology. However, Jones recognized that some of the licensee 
organizations did not completely understand the extent of the requirements. For example the 
licensees would have access badges and background checks for blood bank personnel “but they 
didn’t check the people in IT who control entry” which is important because “you had to make 
sure you checked everybody who could possibly have access to that area.”  In order to address 
these kinds of issues, the state used their bi-annual conference as a time to provide information 
about the increased controls. 
We had a regulatory conference…And we tried to get these folks in and what we did, 
after the increased controls, is we focused that conference on the whole increased control 
side of it … And then, we had stakeholder meetings, where we invited the individuals to 
come to Austin to really go through and work with them on what the issues were. And it 
was working so well that we involved the NRC [since] we were all kind of on a learning 
curve ourselves. And I think the only part that was frustrating to the users was none of us 
has some of the answers when we first started, and it took a while… and it kept evolving 
because initially it was just increased controls, then it added fingerprinting. And so the 
fingerprinting though was all at NRC… And so over time working through the states and 
the NRC, we’ve been able to develop a good set of questions and answers. We put them 
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in our Web site so that any of our licensees can go there and see easily; track what they 
need to do. 
 
Clearly, Jones’ account is organized by the regulation key signifier. However, this account 
highlights a weakness of the regulatory logic—it requires these agencies to understand what 
counts as safe and secure use of materials. In the case of the cesium chloride issue, this was an 
evolutionary understanding. These interactions between licensees and regulators helped improve 
understanding of what was expected from increased controls. Additionally, Jones used the 
conference to emphasize the importance of the security issues. 
At that point with the workshops, we would … explain to them that there’s a whole 
culture of change. They’re going to have to really assume now that someone would want 
to steal those sources and they would have to protect them. And they would have 
multiple ways to make sure that they understood that they needed to work with local law 
enforcement. Because they had to make sure that if there was an attempt to break in or 
even a successful theft, they needed to do certain things. So, we went through all the 
different scenarios and all of the new requirements that they were going to be held to. 
 
Based on this account, the state regulators used the conference as an opportunity to provide 
additional information to the user community. Jones believed that this approach was effective 
and resulted in much improved compliance with increased controls.   
 Meetings at a University. Much like the accounts of other interview participants, 
Jackson, who is a radiation safety officer at a university, recognized that “many scientists didn’t 
believe that there was a terrorism risk.” However, Jackson recounts his own experience of 
undergoing a paradigm shift and connects this belief with a position about whether or not 
alternative should be imposed on user communities. 
I kind of thought there might be but was able to prove to myself through scientific study 
that there was and, you know, that kind of changes some of your reality but more 
importantly on the other side, I was of the opinion that, you know, you can use an 
alternative radiation source and x-ray machine is a whole lot easier.  
 
Even though Jackson began with this position about the feasibility of using alternatives, he 
sought input from the researchers about how this decision would impact their work. Jackson 
176 
recalls that “as I worked with the scientists more, I became more convinced that they needed it 
rather than did not, which was contrary to what I was hoping to do.” Jackson recognized the 
constraint of his limited point-of-view and followed a rational process of gathering and testing 
evidence about the importance of cesium irradiators to researchers.  
I went to them and I asked them to make their case why they needed them. And then I 
challenged them to prove it scientifically, and then I took their literature and I went to 
their colleagues without referencing them and asked their colleagues if it was a valid 
point… And I was quite surprised to find that the scientists were supportive of this other 
viewpoint which I was hoping to shoot down…I was able to find that here and by 
making phone calls to colleagues at other institutions, they pretty much universally said 
when there was a technique that required, for instance, using more irradiators, it was 
really because they needed to do it for a scientific reason whether it was all of the data 
that’s based there or that particular reaction is what I need. 
 
  The development of his position about alternatives was the first set of interactions that 
Jackson recounted. He then began to tell about how researchers and security personnel interacted 
with each other to form a collective view about increased controls. At first he recalls some of the 
scientists’ initial angry reactions to the increased controls and how he responded by explaining 
that terrorists would be willing to take radiation doses in order to steal the cesium chloride. 
When we went around to our users, the comments that we were getting were, “You're 
violating my civil rights.” And they would throw things at us and I've known these 
people for 20 years and they were throwing things at us. And we finally solved that 
problem by bringing some of the university police officers for this. So, it's definitely full 
of energy… I explained it to them is when you change your reference point to not 
worrying whether or not you have breakfast tomorrow morning, it really doesn’t matter, 
does it? And then they started to think a little differently when they finally heard that 
message. 
 
This type of account demonstrates how users were initial unconvinced that cesium chloride was 
vulnerable to theft by a terrorist. However, Jackson recognized that his user community included 
“some very, very smart individuals here.” He acknowledged their expertise and provided forums 
for them to interact with each other and form their own views about this issue. 
We had some pretty spirited discussions with them about why they needed to have these 
sources…. and it actually took pretty clear academic discussion style where the users 
were arguing with themselves about whether one was right versus one was wrong, or if 
177 
their points were valid or points were not valid. And it got to the stage where we were 
actually reserving lecture halls to these discussions because it better fit the forum that we 
wanted to have with them. And [when] they would start off … one side of the room was 
adamant that you could live without these sources and we shouldn’t have to worry about 
them and just get rid of them. And the other half [felt that basically] petty rules are 
ridiculous, and we wound up with the consensus of the audience where these sources 
were valuable and that we needed to do whatever we could to secure them before the 
rule book changed, and then later that we come up with new security systems. And as 
result of that, we actually had a new security system that met the regulations before the 
regulations came out. 
 
Jackson recalls that the earlier meetings were held in small classrooms and this was problematic 
because “they were jockeying for position which changed the dynamic in the room because 
when a senior faculty member stands up and starts arguing, people are going to keep quiet 
because they don’t want to…challenge him or her in public.” Jackson addressed this by moving 
the forum to a lecture hall [where] they can actually sit down in their chairs and then they could 
have a dialogue around the room because the lecture halls have slanted floor and so they could 
see each other…it became more of a format they were used to.” The lecture hall forum gave the 
different groups “the opportunity to question each other and that kind of goes back to the 
dynamic of the room is they were more put on an equal basis rather than a hierarchy.” The 
dynamic that caused the need for a change of forum was a result of the master signifier of 
professional identity that organized the researchers’ relationships to each other. This constrained 
the flow of information and therefore violated the norm of rationality. The change of forum 
improved the quality of conversation and created the possibility for the researchers to overcome 
the constraint of the limited point-of-view by listening to each other and adapting their views. 
Additionally, Jackson invited the campus police officers, the security personnel, to these 
forums to describe their role in the cesium chloride issue. He recalled that “some of these 
[scientists] are really super-animated, energetic … and when we brought the officers with us, 
they kind of toned it down and had them see this is not really just an entire academic discussion; 
this is one of the consequences.”  Jackson explains how the interaction between these groups 
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created an opportunity for dialogue that led to ways that they could help each other achieve both 
research with cesium irradiators and security controls. 
The police officers didn’t really have an opportunity to interact with these people and … 
they got to experience [the researchers] and how they really were thoughtful about what 
they were working with and that they were trying to do something of value with it…The 
research on the other side… were actually able to see that these guys weren’t the bad 
guy and they were here to help us understand how to fix this problem so they can do the 
science. And it was interesting dialogue watching the two different kinds of mindsets on 
-- interact…And so the next thing you’d see is they were actually talking about what 
each side wanted. And they were able to work out things that helped the -- the 
researchers figure out why the police officers/regulators were looking at certain things to 
increase security and why for certain things an approach were important to them and the 
same thing applied in reverse. 
 
Ultimately, as a result of these interactions, the scientists “were relieved that the 
regulators were not completely without thought but they didn’t like it and they turned that into 
regretful acceptance [of the increased controls].” Thus, the outcome of these interactions may 
not be a complete paradigm shift, as in the case of Smith or Jones, but rather a sense of 
“whatever it takes” meaning that users follow increased controls in order retain access to the 
cesium irradiators they need to do their research. It is a similar rhetorical device that several 
participants used to manage the paradox between NTIR and STIR as their view of the cesium 
chloride issue became more complex. 
Summary 
The results in this chapter complement the answers from Chapters V and VI to the 
overall research for this study about how experts from different disciplines communicate with 
each other about risk. Chapter VII has explained the conditions that gave rise to the particular 
characterizations of cesium chloride and demonstrate how shifts over time led to creative 
appropriation of the societal resources and interpretative repertoires. Key signifiers organize the 
discourse about cesium chloride and create conditions for characterizing it both as a beneficial 
technology and a security threat. The nodal points of the security concerns and Recommendation 
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#3 from the NAS study organize the discourse because most participants are positioning their 
views in relation to these key signifiers. The master signifiers of professional and organizational 
affiliations and rationality organize participants’ identities in relationship to each other and the 
cesium chloride issue. The myths about beneficial functions of cesium technology and the 
regulatory bodies relate the user communities to public who expect safe use of beneficial but 
hazardous technologies. Even though these key signifiers are well established, the conditions for 
meaning are always in flux and this can be seen through the activity of floating signifiers. 
Concepts of dispersability and vulnerability keep meanings about the security threat in flux. 
Different beliefs about the feasibility of alternatives position participants’ in relationship to 
Recommendation #3 and indeterminacy about this issue largely prevents the NRC from deciding 
to phase out cesium chloride technologies. Finally, politics, the expression of emotion, and 
shifting professional cultures destabilize participants’ professional identities and characterization 
of each other as rational. 
The bulk of this chapter addresses the third research question that considers how experts 
from multiple professions and disciplines negotiate and coordinate their different perspectives. 
The key signifiers and floating signifiers provide entry points to examine how participants use 
societal resources and interpretative repertoires, identified in Chapters V and VI, to coordinate 
their conflict and agreement about security issues, alternatives, and risks and benefits. Conflict 
about security issues demonstrates that the concept of dispersability creates a possibility for 
coordination because it fits within both NTIR and STIR—it explains the consequences of a 
cesium RDD and also creates the possibility for a technological solution to the security threat. 
Additionally, the distinction between cesium chloride and cesium-137 draws on NTIR to allow 
cesium-137 to remain characterized as a necessary and useful isotope while attributing the 
security concerns to the particular form of cesium chloride. Finally, participants’ disbelief about 
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the vulnerability challenges the legitimacy of the characterization of cesium chloride as a 
security threat. Participants most frequently relied on NTIR by emphasizing the processes of 
increased controls and hardening within their organizations to justify why cesium irradiators now 
pose less of a threat. Additionally, participants questioned the vulnerability of theft by deviating 
from the NTIR and using inductive reasoning from their operational experiences to question the 
premise that terrorists want to use cesium chloride or could steal such a heavy machine. 
Talk about alternatives was a floating signifier that had the potential to create conditions 
for legitimizing a decision that the NRC can phase out the use of cesium chloride because the 
beneficial functions could be achieved through x-ray irradiators, other radionuclides, or other 
forms of cesium-137. This topic was a frequent point of disagreement among users and without 
paying close attention to the nuances of their positions, these disagreements may seem like much 
ado about nothing. However, as Table 5.2 demonstrates, participants’ statements about the 
feasibility of alternatives positioned their views in relationship to Recommendation #3. 
Examples of coordination about alternatives demonstrate how participants use NTIR to 
coordinate different views, and in these cases the use of scientific principles legitimized the 
beneficial functions because they are reproducing structures based on the precedence of science 
and technology and the norms of rationality. Additionally, participants coordinated their 
different views about alternatives by deviating from NTIR and using analogic reasoning to 
demonstrate faulty premises of other positions. 
Participants coordinated agreement about a risk logic that enabled them to continue to 
use cesium chloride technologies for beneficial functions. Coordination about risk logics began 
with reactions to the norm violation of an expressed position to eliminate cesium chloride. By 
drawing heavily on the structure of regulatory bodies, participants coordinated agreement about 
the acceptable risk logic. Throughout interactions leading up to and following the NRC 
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workshop, participants coordinated agreement that the NRC decision should be based on its 
impact to users—an agreement that was legitimized by reproducing structures of the U. S. 
medical institution and beliefs in technology. These two processes of coordination explain why 
risk/benefit logic is the most common risk logic expressed among participants—a system of 
reasoning that assumes society will accept certain levels of risk from a technology if the benefits 
outweigh the risk.  
Embedded in the conflict and coordination are insights to the fourth research question 
about strategies experts use to legitimize their particular risk characterizations and justify choices 
that result from the risk characterizations. Interpretative repertoires help identify how 
participants attempt  “to establish accounts as factual and stable and deconstruct other accounts 
as the product of personal or group interests” (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 113). In terms of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, the “factual and stable” accounts are key signifiers that have 
achieved closure, fixed taken-for-granted meanings that provide clues to shared ideologies and 
assumptions (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). These taken-for-granted meanings create a sense of 
objectivity that “appears given and unchangeable” and “seemingly does not derive its meaning 
from its difference from something else” (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002, p. 36-37). The key 
signifiers that have meanings which are taken-for-granted are: (1) rationality, (2) beneficial 
technology, and (3) regulatory principles. The master signifier of rationality is a basis for 
information gathering and decision making that participants do not question as a key assumption. 
Indeed, rationality is one of the norms identified in Chapter V and participants often take great 
pains to highlight violations of rationality that they see in other expert groups such as operating 
from a limited point-of-view, expressing emotion, or being motivated by politics.   
Participants also take for granted the myths of beneficial technology and regulatory 
principles. Both of these key signifiers draw on resources from NTIR and societal institutions 
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like the medical institution, legislation, and belief in technology. Participants repeatedly 
reinforce the legitimacy of these key signifiers by drawing out the certainty of harm to patients if 
medical providers cannot irradiate blood in comparison to the uncertainty of terrorist theft and 
subsequent RDD attack. Additionally, the legitimacy of these key signifiers is further bolstered 
by the risk/benefit logic that participants repeatedly draw on when characterizing cesium 
chloride as a useful and unique source. The taken-for-granted nature of the myths of beneficial 
technology and regulatory principles are reflected in the agreement that interview participants 
expressed with the NRC’s “obvious” decision to allow continued use of cesium chloride with 
increased controls.  
Finally, even though the imperative for the government to protect the U. S. from security 
threats has a taken-for-granted status, the application of this key signifier to cesium chloride has 
not yet attained a taken-for-granted status. Floating signifiers that draw on scientific principles, 
such as dispersability and solubility, legitimize the security concern. Additionally, Congressional 
interest in securing radioactive sources to prevent their use in terrorism and NAS Report 
legitimizes the characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat. However, some 
participants deconstruct the rationality accounts as politicized, emotional responses—both of 
which are violations identified in Chapter V.   
In conclusion, all of these coordination and conflict processes create conditions for a 
paradigm shift to which workshop participants alluded and interview participants described in 
more detail. The interview participants’ accounts demonstrate that the key components of the 
paradigm shift are immersion in security information and interaction across professional groups 
over extended periods of time. When recounting their stories of paradigm shifts, the participants 
draw on both NTIR and STIR and use the tropes identified in Chapter V to manage the tension 
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that seems to result when a person characterizes cesium chloride both as a necessary technology 




SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 Discursive analysis of the cesium chloride issue suggests that experts from different 
professional and disciplinary communities partially accept each others’ risk characterizations 
during the workshop and the interviews. This integration of the two characterizations of cesium 
chloride is reflected in the NRC decision to write a policy that allows the continued use of 
cesium chloride but simultaneously encourages the enhancement of security programs at the 
organizations and encourages research for alternatives. This decision integrated divergent 
positions about the unique and useful character of cesium chloride as well as the expense and 
time required to change out irradiators with comparable alternatives while maintaining a level of 
concern for security threat. Participants constructed the conditions for this decision through the 
reciprocal use of societal resources and interpretative repertoires at an NRC-sponsored workshop 
and in other sites such as professional meetings, conference calls, and exchanges over the 
internet. This chapter revisits the answers to the research questions and then integrates those 
responses with Bakhtin’s dialogism. It then discusses the limitations of this study, how research 
about expert risk communication fits in the academy, and opportunities for future investigations 
of this topic. 
Revisiting the Research Questions 
 Chapter V used structuration theory to analyze the societal and discursive resources 
participants drew on when characterizing cesium chloride. Chapter VI used discursive 
psychology to explore the way participants employed resources from two interpretative 
repertoires to characterize cesium chloride and express their views about whether or not to 
eliminate it.  Chapter VII used Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory to explain the conditions 
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that gave rise to the particular characterizations of cesium chloride and demonstrate how shifts 
over time led to creative appropriation of the societal resources and interpretative repertoires. 
RQ1:  What are the societal resources that enable and constrain expert's talk about risk? 
Structures such as the U. S. medical institution, regulatory bodies, national and 
international legislation and policies, and belief in technology provided rules and resources that 
enabled participants to legitimize norms such as rationality in decision-making and as well as 
particular procedures for sharing information and creating policies. Most interview participants 
recognized that they were constrained by a limited point of view but they balanced this 
constraint with their view of themselves as rational. The emerging security institution enabled 
participants to take action to protect the public from terrorist threats—the impetus for the 
concerns about cesium chloride. The structural constraints equated norm violations with 
decisions based on politics and emotion, distortion of information, sharing too much security-
related information, and expressed desires to ban radioactive materials. These structural 
constraints also limited participants regarding the kind of information they could disclose due to 
security issues.  
RQ2: What types of evidence and appeals do experts rely on to articulate their characterizations 
of risk? 
Participants used characterizations of cesium chloride as a beneficial technology or as a 
security threat as an implicit way to express agreement or disagreement with Recommendation 
#3 of the NAS study. Through their talk about the feasibility of alternatives and security issues, 
they expressed nuanced positions related to the elimination of cesium chloride such as “since 
different applications require different technologies, there are instances when alternatives might 
be preferable” and “we could use an alternative technology but there are large obstacles to this 
possibility such as expense and reliability.” The interpretative repertoires organized participants’ 
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use of evidence, appeals, and reasoning and highlighted that participants have predictable 
patterns for drawing on NTIR (Necessity of Technology Interpretive Repertoire) or STIR 
(Security Threat Interpretive Repertoire) depending on whether they want to characterize cesium 
chloride as a unique and useful isotope or as a potential security threat.  NTIR was a resource 
that enabled participants to characterize cesium chloride as a beneficial technology by reasoning 
deductively from scientific principles, operational information, and economic principles. When 
using NTIR participants appealed to external expertise and organizational affiliation, as well as 
values of medical need, safe use of equipment, and quality control of a product or service. NTIR 
relies on risk/benefit and acceptable risk logics and foregrounds the role of government to 
protect the public by regulating uses of technology. STIR was a resource that enabled 
participants to characterize cesium chloride as a security threat by using inductive reasoning 
from professional knowledge, past events, and economic consequences and deductive reasoning 
from scientific principles about dispersability and solubility. When using STIR, participants 
appealed to personal expertise, public interest and fear. STIR focused on consequences of a risk 
and foregrounded the role of government to protect the public by minimizing security threats. 
RQ3: How do experts from multiple disciplines negotiate and coordinate their different 
perspectives? 
Answering this question focuses attention on the conditions that gave rise to particular 
characterizations of cesium chloride and how shifts over time led to the creative appropriation of  
societal resources and interpretative repertoires. The coordination and conflict processes created 
conditions for a paradigm shift to which some participants briefly alluded at the workshop and 
more fully described by several interview participants.  
 The analysis using discursive psychology demonstrated that even though security 
specialists at the workshop tried to reinforce the characterization of cesium chloride as a security 
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threat in order to support NAS Recommendation #3, participants from user communities drew on 
resources from NTIR to express disagreement by creating nuanced positions. For example, 
representatives of blood banks shared detailed operational and economic information to support 
the distinctive position that they “could use an alternative technology but there are large 
obstacles to this possibility such as expense and reliability.” Additionally, some participants who 
disagreed with the characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat used STIR in an ironic 
manner to undercut its legitimacy. For example, one participant’s hypothetical scenario about x-
ray irradiators on parade floats was intentionally extreme in order to highlight his disagreement 
with the focus on consequences risk logic.   
The analysis with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory illustrated how key signifiers 
organized the discourse about cesium chloride and created conditions for characterizing it both 
as a beneficial technology and as a security threat. Even though key signifiers were well 
established, the conditions for meaning were always in flux which can be seen through the 
activity of floating signifiers. The concepts of dispersability and vulnerability kept meanings 
about the security threat in flux by creating possibilities for coordination while also challenging 
the premise of the security threat. Different beliefs about the feasibility of alternatives positioned 
participants in relationship to Recommendation #3 and this lack of certainty about the feasibility 
of alternatives to replace workload of cesium irradiators and calibrators largely prevented the 
NRC from deciding to phase out cesium chloride technologies. Finally, politics, the expression 
of emotion, and shifting professional cultures destabilized participants’ professional identities 
and characterization of each other as rational. 
These key signifiers and floating signifiers provided entry points to examine how 
participants used societal and discursive resources to coordinate their conflict and agreement 
over cesium chloride. Conflict about security issues illustrated how participants used and 
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responded to the floating signifiers about the concepts of dispersability and solubility, the 
distinction between cesium-137 and cesium chloride, and disbelief about vulnerability of theft. 
The floating signifiers about dispersability and solubility and the distinctions between forms of 
cesium-137 created possibilities for coordination because they could be supported by resources 
from both NTIR and STIR and they legitimized both the characterization of cesium chloride as a 
security threat while opening up a possibility for use of another form of the necessary cesium-
137. The floating signifier of user communities’ disbelief about vulnerability challenged the 
legitimacy of the characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat by using NTIR to 
emphasize the processes of increased controls and hardening and also deviating from the NTIR 
by inductive reasoning from their operational experiences or appropriating STIR resources in an 
ironic manner.   
Talk about alternatives was a floating signifier that had the potential to create conditions 
for legitimizing a decision that the NRC can phase out the use of cesium chloride because the 
beneficial functions could be achieved through x-ray irradiators, other radionuclides, or other 
forms of cesium-137. However, this topic was a frequent point of disagreement among users 
because participants’ positions about the feasibility of alternatives positioned their views in 
relationship to Recommendation #3. Participants coordinated their differing views by using the 
NTIR resources of scientific or operations principles or deviating from NTIR by using analogic 
reasoning when they wanted to demonstrate the faulty premises of another position. Finally, 
participants coordinated agreement about a risk logic that enabled them to continue to use 
cesium chloride technologies for beneficial functions. The coordination processes show that 
participants relied on risk/benefit logic most frequently because it created a system of reasoning 
that assumes society will accept certain levels of risk from a technology if the benefits outweigh 
the risk.  
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RQ4: What strategies do experts use to legitimize their particular risk understandings and justify 
choices that result from the risk understandings? 
The analysis from discursive psychology explains how accounts about the 
characterization of cesium chloride become established as stable constructions of the world and 
how NTIR or STIR were constructed to appear as facts that could undermine the other 
interpretative repertoire. NTIR was legitimized by structures such as the U.S. medical institution, 
regulatory bodies, national and international legislation and policies, and belief in technology. 
Enactment of these structures enabled participants to legitimate norms such as rationality in 
decision-making and procedures for sharing information and creating policies. STIR is 
legitimized by the security institution. However, this structure also constrained participants due 
to secrecy about security information. Additionally, structural constraints about politics, 
emotion, and legal issues tended to be attributed to participants who used STIR in order to 
demonstrate how those users were constrained by a limited point-of-view. The ability of 
interview participants to draw on both interpretative repertoires when providing their summary 
views of the cesium chloride issues demonstrated that both repertoires were legitimized by 
structural rules and resources. However, interview participants’ use of rhetorical devices to 
manage the paradox of using resources from both STIR and NTIR ultimately re-established 
NTIR as a more legitimate interpretative repertoire for communities who manufacture, use, and 
regulate cesium chloride technologies. Ultimately, these coordination and conflict processes 
created conditions for a paradigm shift that was briefly alluded to at the workshop and more fully 
described by several interview participants. The interview participants’ accounts demonstrate 
that the key components of the paradigm shift were immersion in security information and 
interaction across professional groups over extended periods of time.  
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Analysis with Laclau and Mouffe’s theory revealed three key signifiers that have taken-
for-granted meanings and created a sense of objectivity that “appears given and unchangeable” 
(Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 36-37): (1) rationality, (2) beneficial technology, and (3) 
regulatory principles. The master signifier of rationality was a basis for information gathering 
and decision making and participants often took great pains to highlight violations of rationality 
that they saw other expert groups exhibiting such as operating from a limited point-of-view, 
expressing emotion, or being motivated by politics. Participants also took for granted the myths 
of beneficial technology and regulatory principles. Participants repeatedly reinforced the 
legitimacy of these key signifiers by drawing out the certainty of harm to patients if medical 
providers could not irradiate blood in comparison to the uncertainty of terrorist theft and 
subsequent RDD attack. Additionally, the legitimacy of these key signifiers was further bolstered 
by the risk/benefit logic that participants repeatedly drew on when characterizing cesium 
chloride as a useful and unique source. Finally, even though the imperative for the government 
to protect the U. S. from security threats has a taken-for-granted status, the application of this 
key signifier to cesium chloride had not yet attained a taken-for-granted status. Floating 
signifiers that drew on scientific principles, such as dispersability and solubility, legitimized the 
security concern. Additionally, Congressional interest in securing radioactive sources to prevent 
their use in terrorism and the NAS Report legitimized the characterization of cesium chloride as 
a security threat. However, some participants deconstructed the rationality accounts as 
politicized, emotional responses.    
Contributions of a Dialogic View on Expert Risk Communication 
In Chapter III, I argued that a dialogic framework was necessary to address three main 
criticisms within the expert risk communication literature: (1) Risk communication research 
historically treats expert groups as uniform and does not consider the processes by which they 
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construct and legitimize risk understandings. (2) Risk communication research tends to privilege 
transmissive and message-centered approached to communication rather than examine the 
discursive management and coordination of different risk understandings, and (3) Rather than 
assuming the taken-for-granted position that objective scientific knowledge is the source of 
legitimacy for technical risk understandings, risk communication research should examine the 
way that expert groups legitimate their knowledge claims and emphasize the transparency of 
norms and values in public discourse.  
The multi-perspectival framework enabled entrance into the discourse of experts’ risk 
communication from different vantage points. Three main implications emerge from this study 
as seen through the lens of dialogism. (1) Expert risk communication in cross-disciplinary 
situations is a tension-filled process. (2) Experts who interact in cross-disciplinary situations 
manage the tension between discursive openness and closure through the use of shared resources 
between the interpretative repertoires, immersion and interaction with other perspectives, and the 
layering of risk logics with structural resources. (3) The emergence of security risk Discourse in 
a post-9/11 world involves a different set of resources and strategies that risk communication 
studies need to address.  
Dialogical Tensions in Expert Risk Communication 
 Traditional approaches have tended to minimize the contradictory, paradoxical, and 
tension-filled qualities of risk communication.  This omission is odd as the communication field 
generally and organizational communication studies specifically have embraced the notion that 
communication practices are riddled with dualities, oppositions, and contradictions (Trethewey 
& Ashcraft, 2004).  This study takes an important first step in addressing this omission by 
identifying four main tensions that experts must manage in cross-disciplinary risk 
communication: (1) contradictions from historical layering, (2) tensions among disciplinary and 
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professional groups, (3) tensions within personal and professional identities, and (4) tensions 
among realist and constructivist ontologies. 
 Contradictions from historical layering. Experts demonstrated that they are socially 
responsive to each other through their interanimation of other voices and ability to construct 
utterances that respond to outward criteria for usage of words. Bakhtin (1981a) writes that, “The 
living utterance…cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by 
socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance” (p. 276). The object of 
the utterances in this study is the characterization of cesium chloride. The socio-ideological 
consciousness consists of the societal resources and constraints, the interpretative repertoires that 
create conditions to assign meaning and legitimize decisions about cesium chloride. Because of 
this dialogic characteristic of discourse, utterances contain “criteria for the social usage of 
words” that imply the views of other social actors’ positions and carries meanings about 
responses to past positions and anticipation of future responses. The socio-ideological 
consciousness, with its criteria for social usage of words, is an “activating principle [that] 
presupposes the ground for active and engaged understanding” (Bakhtin, 1981a, p. 282). Thus, 
meaning lies in the interaction between the speaker and the anticipated response.   
 The structuration analysis in Chapter V demonstrates that the way experts related to the 
cesium chloride issue were responsive to a context including historical precedents, legislation, 
political forces, other professional groups, and beliefs in technology to address patient needs and 
radiation protection needs. The experts in this study were knowledgeable actors who used a 
diverse repertoire of strategies and information and societal resources in order to meet the 
“criteria for social usage of words” by adapting to the social conditions of the cesium chloride 
issue. However, experts were not always successful due to constraints and violations of norms. 
For example, participants demonstrated awareness of criteria for social usage of words in their 
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responses to the different but equally legitimate values that were underlying the two primary 
characterizations of cesium chloride: as beneficial technology or a security threat. These 
contradictory values represent “the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions” (Bakhtin, 
1981a, 291) because the beneficial technology characterization is legitimized by historical 
precedent of the civil use of radioactive materials and this ideology is becoming layered with the 
relatively new ideology that considers how terrorists would use technology in harmful ways. 
Thus, these two historical ideologies become layered in the discourse, and the social criteria for 
usage of words prevented participants from completely discounting either view, so they had to 
carefully manage the paradox through rhetorical devices. Additionally, participants’ 
characterizations of the NRC decision as “rational” or “obvious” illustrated their awareness of 
criteria that a rational decision, made by following norms of information gathering and policy-
making procedure, would be considered legitimate. The legitimacy of rationality arises from the 
historical layering of beliefs about objective decision-making of the rational-actor model in 
policy-making (Garvin, 2001) positioned against the participants’ view of others as having fear-
based or limited points of view. Given the contradictions that arise from historical layering of 
ideologies, this study offers insight into conditional state of characterizations of risk and 
strategies by which participants legitimatize or de-legitimatize characterizations.  
Tensions across disciplinary and professional groups. A dialogic view of expert risk 
communication invites exploration of traces of value judgments and other social issues layered 
in the discourse that led to nuanced disagreements in expert risk communication. Analyses of 
conflict in Chapter VII demonstrate that participants recognized the nuanced positions in 
relationship to Recommendation #3 and also responded to slightly different appropriations of 
interpretative repertoires. For example, at the workshop, calibration physicists, representatives of 
blood banks, and equipment manufacturers challenged each others’ nuanced positions about the 
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feasibility of alternatives (Table 5.3). The analysis of these exchanges in Chapter VII 
demonstrates that, in general they all drew on resources of NTIR, but when they could not 
achieve their goals, the participants used inductive or analogic reasoning to challenge the 
premise of the other parties’ position. In another example, the user community implicitly 
considered that Recommendation #3 was based on the risk logic that focuses on consequences. 
Thus, from their point of view, Recommendation #3 violated rationality because the NTIR 
resource enabled a rational characterization and decision about cesium chloride based on a 
risk/benefit logic. In actual interactions, these risk logics rarely surfaced explicitly in the text, but 
were layered into the discourse and recognizable by other knowledgeable actors. Moral 
“accents” of risk communication exist in expert risk talk because the traces of other voices are 
always present (Wertsch, 2001). From a dialogic point-of-view, the nuanced disagreements have 
an evaluative accent and therefore are about morality, responsibility and blame—even if the 
surface of the language appears to consist of detailed technical, scientific, or operational data. 
External observers may find the source of disagreement difficult to ascertain but experts are 
knowledgeable actors within the context of the cesium chloride and have awareness of the 
nuanced distinctions. Thus, this study offers an explanation for conflict across disciplinary and 
professional groups because it foregrounds the complex layering of the discourse that gives rise 
to different positions that is readily recognizable and challenged by knowledgeable actors.  
 Tensions within personal and professional identities. A dialogic view of expert risk 
communication demonstrates that professional and personal identities are in a tensional 
relationship that participants manage in order to build and maintain credibility. Chapter V 
demonstrated that NTIR and STIR use different discursive resources for formulating credibility 
appeals. Of particular note, the NTIR strategy of appealing to external expertise and 
organizational affiliation is a response to the normative criteria of rationality. However, in some 
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ways this creates a constraint for the experts who may have professional, individual views. This 
is evident in the last session of the workshop when participants deconstructed their professional 
selves by “taking off their hats” and expressing their personal views. Their statements prefaced 
with phrases such as: “I would like to add a personal comment, not from CRCPD,” and “I'm 
going to speak for myself since everybody else is taking hats on and off.” This symbolic change 
in identity demonstrates participants’ awareness that a change in the criteria for usage of words 
had occurred and they were now allowed to fully express their views about the cesium chloride 
issue. Additionally, the tension within professional identities is apparent in accounts of the 
paradigm shift, especially Smith whose security-related assignment caused a shift in his 
professional identity which helped him to make a paradigm shift to embrace both 
characterizations of cesium chloride.  This suggests that it is important for expert risk 
communication to pay closer attention to the way personal and professional identities come into 
play during the negotiation of risk understanding. 
 Tensions between realist and constructivist ontologies. A dialogic view of expert risk 
communication helps understand the legitimacy of divergent characterizations of cesium 
chloride because one can see how threads of meaning negotiate the tensions between realist and 
constructivist ontologies. Most expert risk talk consists of physical cause and effect relationships 
about hazards—scientific and technical discourse underscored by the realist ontology. However, 
if the hazards have not yet manifested then the experts’ talk also contributes to the social 
construction of the risk’s meaning by making claims about priorities that are underscored by 
political, economic, or moral values. In this way, expert risk talk imbues the possibility of risk 
and its perceived causal agents with values and expectations (Douglas, 1990; Taylor & Kinsella, 
2007). In the cesium chloride issue the participants frequently referenced the physical properties 
of material reality such as the chemical forms of cesium-137, the engineering principles of 
196 
equipment, and actions to implement increased controls in their organizations. These physical 
realities constrain social constructions, but social constructions have implications for what 
people plan to do to change the material reality, if anything. 
 One example of this mutual constraint can be seen in the physical properties of the 
chemical form of cesium chloride in its current powder form. The current form of the isotope is 
relatively affordable and used in reliable irradiators and is therefore a good medical technology 
that meets the needs for patient health. However, this same form is very soluble and dispersible 
which makes it a security concern that could be used in a dirty bomb to harm the public. The 
characterization of these “real” properties imbues the isotope with values that become a 
legitimate premise for a decision. In particular, user groups use the social construction of time to 
argue that an elimination of cesium irradiators would cause certain harm to patients whereas the 
actual probability of a cesium security event is less certain. The argument about certainty 
legitimizes a decision to allow continued use of cesium chloride. Furthermore, experts must 
continue to manage this ontological tension because discussion about the chemical form of 
cesium chloride both explains the potential security-related consequences and the basis for a 
technological solution. And as the physical property of cesium chloride becomes more 
constructed as a critical dimension of its security concern, regulators will have to revisit their 
current scheme of categories. 
 Another example of the mutual constraint of the realist and constructivist ontologies can 
be seen in the ways that participants talk about increased controls. Participants from user groups 
work in an environment of physical barriers, access authorization, and background checks. They 
reference this physical reality to help them socially construct sense of invulnerability to theft. 
Additionally, since the belief in radiation protection is based on scientific properties of exposure 
to radioactive sources, this physical reality makes it difficult for user communities to construct a 
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belief that terrorists would not be concerned with an overexposure. Alternately, security 
specialists refer to the real historical record of failed security controls to construct a belief that no 
amount of increased controls could eliminate the vulnerability risk of theft of cesium chloride. 
They use the “Red Team” video to make this vulnerability seem “real.” However, they must rely 
on analogic arguments to 9/11 to help user communities believe that terrorists would do anything 
to carry out their plans—even risk high exposure to a radioactive source. 
 A final example of the mutual constraint of the realist and constructivist ontologies is 
how user communities talk about alternatives to cesium chloride. Some alternatives, such as a 
ceramic glass form of cesium-137, pathogen technologies, or high energy x-ray irradiators have 
scientific basis for belief in their possible development, they just have not had enough time to 
fully develop into marketable products. Thus, these alternatives do not physically exist, but the 
alternative form of cesium-137 is attractive because it would enable user communities to 
continue their functions. Other alternatives, such as current x-ray irradiators or cobalt-60 
irradiators, have capabilities to perform the same physical function as cesium irradiators, but 
these alternatives are constructed as possible but not reliable or cost effective. Thus, the first set 
of alternatives do not physically exist but are constructed as an attractive option whereas the 
second set of alternative do physically exist but are constructed as a less attractive option. This 
complicated negotiation of the realist and constructivist ontologies can be seen in how 
participants labeled cesium-137 as a “workhorse,” “gold standard” and “perfect isotope” based 
on its physical properties. Alternately, x-ray irradiators are frequently labeled as “back-up” and 
“unreliable.”   A dialogical perspective toward risk communication allows theorists and 
researchers to move closer toward exploration of the interconnection between realist and 
constructionist ontologies and tease out the ways they may simultaneously oppose and join with 
each other. 
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Managing Discursive Openness-Closure Duality in Expert Risk Communication 
 The previous section highlights four main tensions present in cross-disciplinary expert 
risk communication. This section explores how experts keep these tensions in living reflexive 
relationships (internally persuasive discourse) while also creating discursive closure through 
boundary building activities (authoritarian discourse). This tension between discursive openness 
and closure is not surprising as Bakhtin notes that processes to centralize or decentralize 
meaning are always at work within discourse. To the degree that discourse permits other voices 
to interact, Bakhtin writes that “language is transformed from the absolute dogma it had been 
within the narrow framework of a sealed-off and impermeable monoglossia into a working 
hypothesis for comprehending and expressing reality” (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 61). The degree to 
which discourse creates boundaries to isolate meaning or expands connections among meanings, 
largely determines the outcomes of centripetal or centrifugal forces. Laclau and Mouffe maintain 
that this exploration of ideology is important to examine because it masks the contingencies of 
knowledge and hides alternative possibilities of meaning (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). The 
workshop and other interactions enabled these encounters across professional and disciplinary 
groups and the decentralization of meaning around the characterization of cesium chloride. 
These possibilities for internally persuasive discourse overcome strong and still-existent 
tendencies of authoritarian discourse and reification of cesium chloride as either a beneficial 
technology or as security threat. There are three main explanations for how cross-disciplinary 
expert risk communication manages the tension between discursive openness and closure: (1) 
shared resources between the interpretative repertoires create opportunities for shared meaning, 
(2) immersion and interaction with other perspectives create conditions for maintaining 
discursive openness, and (3) the layering of risk logics with structural resources reinforce 
discursive closures. 
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 Shared resources create opportunities for shared meaning. In the cesium chloride issue, 
participants were able find opportunities for internally persuasive discourse when floating 
signifiers created conditions for change and resources of the interpretative repertoires 
overlapped. However, when key signifiers mutually reinforced each other by drawing on societal 
resources and interpretative repertoires did not overlap, experts maintained disagreement about 
characterizations of cesium chloride and the security implications of those characterizations. The 
analysis from Chapter VII demonstrated that floating signifiers gained some level of legitimacy, 
which decentralized meaning and created a tension and paradox that remain unresolved in the 
discourse. The root of tension is that not all participants attribute legitimacy to floating signifiers 
about security concerns of cesium chloride—although, very few interviewees expressed 
disagreement with security concerns. Rather, they attributed this disagreement to other 
colleagues. Chapter VI demonstrates that participants created a paradox when they drew on both 
interpretative repertoires in a single statement and used one of four rhetorical devices to manage 
the felt inconsistency. These rhetorical devices are resourced by structural resources and 
institutions and ultimately reaffirm legitimacy of NTIR. 
 The most obvious shared resource among the interpretative repertoires is the use of 
deductive reasoning from the physical properties of dispersability and solubility described in 
Chapter VII. A more nuanced shared resource is the 9/11 logic. It may be that when participants 
from user communities appropriate STIR in an ironic manner, they seem to be building 
boundaries to reinforce the risk logic of NTIR. However, using another interpretative repertoire 
paradoxically may open the discourse to the 9/11 logic which lends some legitimacy to the 
characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat. Thus a “working hypothesis” for 
expressing risks about cesium chloride can be seen in the paradoxes that become apparent when 
participants draw on both interpretative repertoires.  
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 Immersion and interaction create conditions for discursive openings. Another “working 
hypothesis for comprehending and expressing reality” can be seen through interview 
participants’ accounts of moving through a paradigm shift. A dialogic view of the three accounts 
of paradigm shifts in Chapter VII explains that the participants intentionally moved into different 
conversations about cesium chloride and in doing so created conditions for internally persuasive 
discourse through the immersion and interaction with different disciplines and professional 
groups. The activity of floating signifiers analyzed in Chapter VII decentralized the taken-for-
granted values of beneficial technology that was legitimized by legislation, regulation, radiation 
protection logic, and precedence of civil uses of radionuclides. At the beginning of the cesium 
chloride issue, the characterization of cesium chloride as security concern was a completely new 
concept to most of the user community. The authority of the National Academy of Sciences and 
Congressional interest legitimized the characterization of cesium chloride as a security threat. 
The NRC workshop and other sites of interaction (Table 5.1) created opportunities for cross-
disciplinary interaction and the internally persuasive discourse. Over time experts from the user 
communities appear to be incorporating security concerns into their discourse and even if they 
continue to disagree with aspects of security concerns, they couch their statements very carefully 
because of the societal sources that legitimate security concerns. The implications of the 
ideological struggle for the characterization of cesium chloride ultimately manifest through the 
construction of a security-minded culture within the user communities. Even though Chapter VII 
demonstrated that conditions for a paradigm shift exist, not all members of user communities 
have access to the requisite information, interactions, and professional work.  An important 
question for expert risk communication is how these conditions of immersion and interaction can 
be developed and whether other conditions might also create the construction of a constructive 
tension between internally persuasive and authoritarian discourse. 
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 Discursive closures reinforced by norms, government, and risk logics. Even though 
floating signifiers and shared resources from interpretative repertoires created opportunities to 
keep the tensions in living reflexive relationship, these opportunities for interplay of meanings 
were only allowed within the parameters of normative rationality, government responsibility, 
and the risk/benefit logic.  
 Initially in the cesium chloride issue, participants from user communities were very 
upset and reinforced their beliefs about the beneficial use of cesium chloride using resources 
from NTIR in an authoritarian manner that did not permit interplay with meanings and 
understandings from the STIR—especially the view that security concerns about cesium chloride 
merited the elimination of this technology. These boundaries were built because 
Recommendation #3 violated their norms and was not supported with resources from NTIR. 
Furthermore, these participants constructed the security-related view as being irrational and 
motivated by fear and politics. However, participants also recognized the Congressional interest 
about the security concerns and accounted for NRC’s deliberative process as having to legitimize 
their decision to allow for the continued use of cesium chloride to these political forces. As 
demonstrated in Chapter V and Chapter VII, experts built boundaries by taking up nuanced 
positions.  Throughout the workshop and interviews, they expressed agreement and 
disagreement with each other based on criteria of rationality. Participants constructed their 
expertise as rational, especially in the relationship to limited points-of-view and fear-based 
premise. Chapter VII suggested that rationality is key signifier that participants treat as taken-
for-granted and, as such, objective. Since participants treated rationality as objectively given and 
considered their views as more rational than other views, then they acted as if they were 
constrained by this key signifier.   
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 Chapter III argued that in situations that have a strong tendency toward centralized 
meaning statements that align with the authorities are viewed as more legitimate because the 
combination of ideological values with scientific discourse centralize meaning. As demonstrated 
in Chapter VII, this clearly happened with the layering of the key signifiers of regulatory logic 
and beneficial technology to legitimize the risk/benefit logic as a basis for rationality. The 
rationality based on risk/benefit logic acts as a screen to filter out positions based on the risk 
logic that focuses on consequences. The risk/benefit logic and government responsibility to 
regulate are resources in NTIR that are crucial to the logic of increased controls and hardening 
programs. These organize user communities’ definition of the problem and what counts as a 
reasonable solution. Clearly meaning is centralized around these concepts which are fundamental 
to risk management (Löfstedt, 2005). Additionally, views about security concerns also 
centralized meaning by aligning with societal resources of the security institution, Congressional 
interest, and public interest to avoid terrorist attacks. However, the cesium chloride issue 
demonstrates that concerns about security meet resistance when they challenge technological 
benefits and economic values because these key signifiers are more taken-for-granted and 
embedded in the discourses.  As a result, members of user communities can believe it is perfectly 
rational to, at least partially, discount security concerns and maintain current safe use of 
radioactive sources since they believe the benefits outweigh the risks. In the meantime, the 
authoritarian discourse of security that keeps information secret for important national security 
reasons, also constrains users from gaining access to information and cross-disciplinary 





Emergence of Security Discourse in Risk Communication 
 This study demonstrates that security risk discourse may be distinct from other 
Discourses that are traditionally present in the risk communication literature and has gained 
prominence since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Chapter II describes the historical 
efforts to identify patterns of risk communication among lay and expert groups and argues that 
more research is needed about cross-disciplinary expert interactions. Additionally, Garvin (2001) 
draws distinctions between policy-makers, scientists, and the public. However, the data from this 
study demonstrates how the communication of security concerns for the purpose of managing 
risk is legitimized by political institutions and have their own repertoire of patterns and 
strategies. The category of risk communication creates a new “other” to which experts must 
address and legitimize their risk characterizations. Even though, this study did not include 
interviews with security specialists, the security perspective is interanimated through all the 
respondents as they positioned their views in relation to the security concern about cesium 
chloride and Recommendation #3 of the NAS study.  
The implication of security Discourse is that it relies on a different cultural mindset than 
the safety culture mindset. Members of user communities are accustomed to attending to safety, 
the prevention of accidental exposures, when working with radioactive material; however, 
security culture considers exposures from a different vantage point, that a terrorist is 
intentionally seeking to cause harm (Kripunov, 2005). As can be seen in the transition that user 
communities are making to the 9/11 logic, the mindset and values associated with a security 
culture are in the process of being constructed and incorporated. In conjunction with this 
development, traditional studies of technical and public Discourses of risk are having to respond 
to the security Discourse that is becoming more pervasive in society (O’Hair & Heath, 2005).  
As security Discourse becomes more prevalent, the public will most likely respond the to risk 
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logic that focuses on consequences whereas experts from different disciplines and professions 
will behave like the participants in this study and draw on risk/benefit and acceptable risk logics. 
The premise of Larsen’s (2007) book Our Own Worst Enemy, that in order to ensure homeland 
security we must learn to ask the “right questions,” implies that talk about these risks socially 
constructs our knowledge about them and the “question” trope invokes a dialogic, conversation 
view of these interactions. One of the workshop participants invoked this kind of thinking, “we 
should strive to ask the right questions to the extent that that is possible.” Thus, individuals 
involved in risk talk about security inevitably find themselves strategically drawing on or 
responding to discursive resources of STIR or other security-related repertoires and this has 
implications for how these instances of risk communication construct knowledge about and 
legitimize or de-legitimize security risks (Ayotte, Bernard, & O’Hair, 2009). 
Furthermore, the security discourse faces challenges due to the constraint of secrecy. 
The barrier building activity of the authoritarian discourse of security that keeps information 
secret for important national security reasons constrains users from gaining access to information 
and cross-disciplinary interactions that could enable a paradigm shift to embrace both 
characterizations of cesium chloride. Larsen (2007) calls this security constraint “the wall”—a 
description of “laws, policies, and cultural barriers that prevent or hinder the flow of information 
and other efforts in the fight against international terrorism” (p. 149). Larsen attributes the 
complexity of this subject to the ever-changing laws, policies, and interpretations that lead to 
honest mistakes or intentional misrepresentation. One interview participant explicitly describes 
how this constraint affected her: “That was the most frustrating part…it’s been the piecemeal 
part to say that we’re doing this to mitigate the risk. We can't tell you what the risk is. Just trust 
us. That’s what's been hard for my industry to deal with.” This participant had a background in 
the military and fully respected secrecy for national security, but she could not help but feel the 
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impact of this secrecy on how she and her industry were able to understand and mitigate security 
risks. One implication of the secrecy is there are probably at least two different interpretative 
repertoires for security threats: a public one that has been discussed here and a private one that 
has a different set of resources and this is inaccessible to the public.   
Limitations and Future Opportunities 
Limitations 
 Any one case study has a natural limitation—that it has only examined one instance of a 
particular phenomenon. As such, the case study approach is not designed to be generalized to 
other situations, but rather to gain local, contextual knowledge that foregrounds the 
particularities and tensions of the phenomenon of cross-disciplinary expert risk communication 
(Chen & Pearce, 1995). Additionally, the in-depth investigation of this case of cesium chloride is 
appropriate because this study explores the explanatory power of a dialogic theory (Titscher, 
Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2002) and provides detailed insights that can guide future research 
about cross-disciplinary expert risk communication.  
 Another limitation of this study is that I was the only coder of the data. However, I was 
able obtain a form of member checks (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) by sharing initial findings of the 
study with nuclear engineers and security specialists at a mid-winter meeting of the American 
Nuclear Society. The feedback following this presentation provided encouragement and 
additional insight for the analysis of that project. Additionally, as an employee of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, a typical feature of my work involved conversations with NRC about a 
wide variety of nuclear risks and I became accustomed to patterns of talk in scientific, 
engineering, and regulatory communities.  
  The third limitation of this study is that I was not able to secure an interview with 
security specialists. As noted in the methods section, despite my insistence that I would not ask 
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for any security-related information, several potential participants declined to participate in 
interviews due to the security dimension of this project. Most refusals came with general 
statements about how their organizations’ general counsel or public affairs office discouraged or 
forbade participation. The supervisor of one potential participant said they he preferred that they 
only communicate about this issue with individuals or groups authorized by the Federal 
government and referenced me to publically available information. In order to ensure my 
trustworthiness, another potential participant requested that my security clearance be transferred 
before granting an interview, but NRC refused to transfer my clearance since I was doing this 
work as part of my doctoral program and not for the NRC. This is a typical constraint for doing 
security work (Chess & Johnson, 2009)—especially about a policy issue that is still under 
development. Chess and Johnson (2009) argue that this constraint can be partially overcome by 
incorporating well-developed research in organizational communication theories into the limited 
available data for security-related issues. Additionally, one potential participant told me when 
she declined to be interviewed that she would be glad to participate in the research topic of 
expert risk communication given its importance and relevance to her work, but since I was 
studying a very specific issue under policy-development and with Congressional interest she 
could not participate. She suggested that I could get more interview participants if I set up my 
study on a more general study of cross-disciplinary expert risk communication. 
Future Opportunities 
 Insights about how a topic, such as cesium chloride, becomes characterized largely 
determines the implications of risk decisions about that topic. Post-hoc analyses of every major 
accident discover the possibility for people to recognize the danger in time to take mitigative 
actions. The security concerns of the cesium chloride issue represent a case when officials are 
trying to characterize a danger in order to prevent an accident or attack. 
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 Future research about cross-disciplinary expert risk communication can examine 
additional cases to look for shared patterns and how the idiosyncrasies of the cases shape 
discourse. Shared patterns across cases would have broader theoretical implications about what 
discursive and societal resources are layered into expert risk communication. As further research 
identifies the idiosyncrasies of different cases of expert risk communication, comparisons of 
these cases may create a vocabulary of cross-disciplinary situational categories that experts may 
find themselves having to coordination and legitimize different risk characterizations. For 
example, cases of expert risk communication within an organization may be different than cases 
that occur in public context. Additionally, further cases of expert risk communication could 
explore whether or not there are typical sets of complementary or contradictory values that are 
layered into expert risk discourse that must be negotiated during their interactions.  
 Future research can also examine the transformative learning aspect of cross-disciplinary 
expert risk communication. Several authors advocate how surfacing values contribute to social 
learning in risk communication (Funtowitz & Ravetz, 1992; Strydom, 2008; Wynne, 1992). 
These values can be surfaced during interactions within organizations. In this environment, a 
dialogic view of expert risk communication can contribute to theories of organizational 
knowledge and communities of practice (Iverson & McPhee, 2002). Values can also be surfaced 
in public spaces, such as public meetings, and for these environments a dialogic perspective can 
examine how the public space shapes expert interactions across disciplines and professions, with 
an eye toward creating a transformative learning experience (Barge, 2006; Hamilton & Wills-
Toker, 2006; Peterson & Franks, 2006; Walker & Daniels, 2004). 
 Finally, a dialogic view of expert risk communication may provide additional 
explanation about the phenomenon of collective minding in high reliability organizations 
(Weick, 1987; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Conversely, the emphasis on maintaining active 
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engagement of the tensions in expert risk communication may provide insight how organizations 
build and maintain safety and security culture, especially organizations responsible for managing 
complex, high stakes risks. Finally, the tension between realist and constructivist ontologies in 
expert risk communication may extend the work of “materializing” organizational 
communication, especially related to materiality evident in organizational objects, sites, and 
bodies that contribute to or mitigate risks (Ashcraft, Kuhn, & Cooren, 2010). 
Summary 
 This project demonstrates how security risks shapes organizational decisions and 
priorities in both policy-making and regulatory organizations and private-sector and functional 
organizations. In order to address these risks, both types of organizations need expertise across 
professional disciplines. How these experts characterize a risk largely determines policy 
development and the implementation of mitigation measures at the functional level. In the case 
of cesium chloride issue, the interaction of experts negotiated conflict about the characterization 
of this isotope as a security threat or as being useful and unique. Even though participants and 
organizations vary in their how they characterize cesium chloride, most maintained some level of 
balance between both characterizations—a balance that was constructed through their 




Adair, R. K. (2002). Models and their limitations. Physics of baseball (pp. 1-4). New York: 
Harper. 
Ale, B. J. M. (2005). Living with risk: A management question. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, 90, 196-205. 
Alvesson, M., & Karreman, D. (2000). Varieties of discourse:  On the study of organizations 
through discourse analysis. Human Relations, 53, 1125-1149. 
Apostolakis, G. E., & Pickett, S. E. (1998). Deliberation: Integrating analytical results into 
environmental decisions involving multiple stakeholders. Risk Analysis, 18(5), 621-
634. 
Ashcraft, K. L., Kuhn, T. R., & Cooren, F. (2010). Constitutional amendments: "Materializing" 
organizational communication. The Academy of Management Annals, 3(1), 1-64. 
Ayotte, K. J., Bernard, D. R., & O'Hair, H. D. (2009). Knowing terror: On the epistemology 
and rhetoric of risk. In R. L. Heath & H. D. O'Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis 
communication (pp. 607-628). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Bakhtin, M. (1981a). The dialogic imagination: Four essays by M. M. Bakhtin. Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press. 
Bakhtin, M. (1981b). The problem of speech genres (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.). In M. 
Holquist (Ed.), Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (pp. 60-102). Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press. 
Banks, S. P., & Riley, P. A. (1993). Structuration theory as an ontology for communication 
research. In S. Deetz (Ed.), Communication yearbook 16 (Vol. 16, pp. 167-197). 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Barge, K. (2006). Dialogue, conflict, and community. In J. G. Oetzel & S. Ting-Toomey (Eds.), 
210 
The Sage handbook of conflict communication: Integrating theory, research, and 
practice (pp. 517-544). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Barge, K., & Little, M. (2002). Dialogic wisdom, communicative practice, and organizational 
life. Communication Theory, 12, 365-397. 
Barke, R. P., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (1993). Politics and scientific expertise: Scientists, risk 
perception, and nuclear waste policy. Risk Analysis, 13(4), 425-439. 
Barley, S. R., & Tolbert, P. A. (1997). Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the links 
between action and institution. Organization Studies, 18, 93-117. 
Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity (M. Ritter, Trans.). London: Sage. 
Bier, V. M. (2001). On the state of the art: Risk communication to the decision-makers. 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 71, 151-157. 
Billig, M. (2001). Discursive, rhetorical, and ideological messages. In M. Wetherall, S. Taylor 
& S. J. Yates (Eds.), Discourse theory and practice: A reader (pp. 210-221). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Bolger, F., & Wright, G. (1994). Assessing the quality of expert judgment: Issues and analysis. 
Decision Support Systems, 11, 1-24. 
Bostrom, A., Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., & Read, D. (1994). What do people know about 
global climate change? Risk Analysis, 14(6), 959-970. 
Boswell, R. (2008, February 22). Canadian firm a potential source for dirty-bomb material. The 
Montreal Gazette, p. A12. Retrieved March 7, 2010 from LexisNexis at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.lib-
ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do. 
Brewer, J. D. (2005). Risk perception and stragic decision making: General insights, a new 
framework, and specificl application to electricity generation using nuclear energy. 
211 
Albuqueque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. SAND2005-5730. 
Candlin, C. N., & Candlin, S. (2002). Discourse, expertise, and the management of risk in 
health care settings. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 35, 115-137. 
Ceccarelli, L. (2001). Rhetorical criticism and the rhetoric of science. Western Journal of 
Communication, 65(3), 314-329. 
Chen, V., & Pearce, W. B. (1995). Even if a thing of beauty, can a case study be a joy forever?: 
A social constructionist approach to the theory and research. In W. Leeds-Hurwitz 
(Ed.), Social approaches to communication (pp. 135-154). New York, NY: Guilford. 
Chess, C. (2001). Organizational theory and the stages of risk communication. Risk Analysis, 
21(1), 179-188. 
Chess, C., & Johnson, B. (2009). Risk communication by organizations: The back story. In R. 
L. Heath & H. D. O'Hair (Eds.), Handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 323-
342). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Chess, C., Saville, A., Tamuz, M., & Greenburg, M. (1992). The organizational links between 
risk communication and risk management: The case of Sybron Chemical, Inc. Risk 
Analysis, 12, 431-438. 
Chhibber, S., Apostolakis, G. E., & Okrent, D. (1992). A taxonomy of the use of expert 
judgments in safety studies. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 38, 27-46. 
Clark, T. V., Caruso, M., Parry, G., & Mrowca, L. (2008). Fostering a risk-informed 
environment in nuclear reactor regulation. Paper presented at the American Nuclear 
Society Probabilistic Safety Assessment Topical Meeting. Knoxville, TN, September 7-
11. 
Cochran, M. E. (2007). A tale of two labs: Ethos and risk communication in the public rhetoric 
of US national labs. (Doctoral dissertation, Iowa State University, 2007). Dissertation 
212 
Abstracts International, 68(04). (UMI No. 3259479) 
Collins, J. P. (2002). May you live in interesting times: Using multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary programs to cope with change in the life sciences. BioScience, 52, 75-
83. 
Conrad, C. (1993). Rhetorical/Communication theory as an ontology for structuration research. 
In S. Deetz (Ed.), Communication yearbook (Vol. 16, pp. 197-208). Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Conrad, C. (2004). Organizational discourse analysis: Avoiding the determinism-volunteerism 
trap. Organization, 11(3), 427-440. 
Covello, V. T. (1991). Risk comparisons and risk communication: Issues and problems in 
comparing health and environmental risks. In R. E. Kasperson (Ed.), Communicating 
risks to the public: Technology, risk, and society (pp. 79-126). Norwell, MA: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Covello, V. T. (2006). Risk communication and message mapping: A new tool for 
communicating effectively in public health emergencies and disasters. Journal of 
Emergency Management, 4(3), 25-40. 
Covello, V. T., & Mumpower, J. L. (1985). Risk analysis and risk management: A historical 
perspective. Risk Analysis, 5(2), 103-120. 
Crable, R. E., & Vibbert, S. L. (1983). Mobil's epideictic advocacy: “Observations” of 
Prometheus-bound. Communication Monographs, 50(4), 380-394. 
Craig, R. T. (1999). Communication theory as a field. Communication Theory, 9(2), 119-161. 
Dake, K. (1992). Myths of nature: Culture and the social construction of risk. Journal of Social 
Issues, 48(4), 21-37. 
de Borchgrave, A. (2006, March 24). Al Qaeda's nuclear option. The Washington Times, p. 
213 





Dionisopoulos, G. N., & Crable, R. E. (1988). Definitional hedgemony as a public relations 
strategy: The rhetoric of the nuclear power industry after Three Mile Island. Central 
States Speech Journal, 39(2), 134-145. 
Dolley, S. (2008a, May 12). Commissioners cite proliferation of materials working groups. 






Dolley, S. (2008b, August 18). NRC seeks comment on options to regulate cesium chloride 






Dolley, S. (2008c, December 22). Staff suggests more security for cesium chloride. Inside 






Dolley, S. (2009, April 27). Commission rejects near-term ban of cesium chloride radiation 






Douglas, M. (1990). Risk as a forensic resource. Daedalus, 119(4), 1-16. 
Elliot, M. (2003). Risk perception frames in environmental decision making. Environmental 
Practice, 5, 214-222. 
Farrell, T. B., & Goodnight, G. T. (1981). Accidental rhetoric: The root metaphors of Three 
Mile Island. Communication Monographs, 49, 271-300. 
Fessenden-Radden, J., Fitchen, J. M., & Heath, J. S. (1987). Providing risk information in 
communities: Factors influencing what is heard and accepted. Science, Technology, 
and Human Values, 12, 94-101. 
Finucane, M. L., & Satterfield, T. A. (2005). Risk as narrative: A theoretical framework for 
facilitating the biotechnology debate. International Journal of Biotechnology, 7, 128-
146. 
Fiorino, D. J. (1989). Environmental risk and democratic process: A critical review. Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law, 14(2), 501-547. 
215 
Fiorino, D. J. (1990). Citizen participation and environmental risk: A survey of institutional 
mechanisms. Science, Technology and Human Values, 15, 226-243. 
Fischhoff, B. (1995). Risk perception and communication unplugged: Twenty years of process. 
Risk Analysis, 15(2), 137-145. 
Freudenburg, W. (1988). Real risk, perceived risk: Social science and the art of probabilistic 
risk assessment. Science, 242, 44-49. 
Funtowicz, S. O., & Ravetz, J. (1992). Three types of risk assessment and the emergence of 
post-normal science Social theories of risk (pp. 251-274). Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Garrick, B. J. (2004). Nuclear power: Risk analysis. In C. J. Cleveland (Ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Energy (pp. 421-422). St. Louis, MO: Elsevier. 
Garvin, T. (2001). Analytical paradigms: The epistemological distances between scientists, 
policy makers, and the public. Risk Analysis, 21(3), 443-456. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Berkley, CA: University of California Press. 
Gilbert, G. N. & Mulkay, M. (1984). Opening Pandora’s box: A sociological analysis of 
scientists’ discourse. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Goodnight, T. (1982). The personal, technical, and public spheres of argument: A speculative 
inquiry. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18, 214-227. 
Goodnight, T. (1987). Public discourse. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 4(4), 428-
432. 
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action: Vol. 1. Reason and the 
rationalization of society (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston, MA: Beacon. 
Hall, M. (2008, September 24). Government to secure potential 'dirty bomb' source: Plan makes 







Hamilton, J. D. (2003). Exploring technical and cultural appeals in strategic risk 
communication: The Fernald radium case. Risk Analysis, 23(2), 291-302. 
Hamilton, J. D. (2007). Convergence and divergence in the public dialogue on nuclear weapons 
cleanup. In B. Taylor, W. J. Kinsella, S. P. Depoe & M. S. Metzler (Eds.), Nuclear 
legacies: Communication, controversy, and the U.S. nuclear weapons complex (pp. 41-
72). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Hamilton, J. D., & Wills-Toker, C. (2006). Reconceptualizing dialogue in environmental public 
participation. The Policy Studies Journal 34(3), 755-775. 
Heracleous, L. (2006). Discourse, interpretation, organization. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Horlick-Jones, T. (1998). Meaning and contextualisation in risk assessment. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 59, 79-89. 
Horlick-Jones, T., & Sime, J. (2004). Living on the border: Knowledge, risk and 
transdisciplinarity. Futures, 36(4), 441-456. 
International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005). IAEA safety standards for protecting people and 
the environment: Categorization of radioactive sources. IAEA Publication No. RS-G-
1.9) Vienna, Austria: Author. Retrieved January 21, 2010 from http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf. 
Iverson, J. O. & McPhee, R. D. (2002). Knowledge management in communities of practice: 
Being true to the communicative character of knowledge. Management Communication 
217 
Quarterly, 16, 259-266. 
Janasoff, S. (1990). American exceptionalism and the political acknowledgement of risk. 
Daedalus, 119(4), 61-81. 
Joffe, H. (2003). Risk: From perception to social representation. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 42, 55-73. 
Jones, E. (1995). Risk assessments: From reactor safety to health care. Risk Assessment, 8, 12-
21. Retrieved on February 23, 2009 from https://www.llnl.gov/str/Risk.html. 
Juanillo, N. K., & Scherer, C. W. (1995). Attaining a state of informed judgments: Toward a 
dialectical discourse on risk. In B. R. Burleson (Ed.), Communication Yearbook (Vol. 
18, pp. 278-299). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Kadak, A. C., & Matsuo, T. (2007). The nuclear industry's transition to risk-informed 
regulation and operation in the United States. Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety, 92, 609-618. 
Kasperson, R. E., Golding, D., & Tuler, S. (1992). Social distrust as a factor in siting hazardous 
facilities and communicating risks. Journal of Social Issues, 48, 151-187. 
Kasperson, R. E., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H. S., Emel, J., Goble, R. et al. (1988). The 
social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework. Risk Analysis, 8, 177-187. 
Keller, W. & Modarres, M. (2005). A historical overview of probabilistic risk assessment 
development and its use in the nuclear power industry: A tribute to the late Professor 
Norman Carl Rasmussen. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 89, 271-285. 
Khripunov, I. (2005). Nuclear security: Attitude check. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 61(1), 
58-64. 
Kinsella, W. J. (1999). Discourse, power, and knowledge in the management of "big science": 
The production of consensus in a nuclear fusion research laboratory. Management 
218 
Communication Quarterly, 13(2), 171-208. 
Kinsella, W. J., & Mullen, J. (2007). Becoming Hanford downwinders: Producing community 
and challenging discursive containment. In B. Taylor, W. J. Kinsella, S. P. Depoe & M. 
S. Metzler (Eds.), Nuclear legacies: Communication, controversy, and the U.S. nuclear 
weapons complex (pp. 73-108). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Klinke, A., & Renn, O. (2002). A new approach to risk evaluation and management: Risk-
based, precaution-based, and discourse-based strategies. Risk Analysis, 22(6), 1071-
1094. 
Kostoff, R. (2002). Overcoming specialization. BioScience, 52(10), 937-941. 
Kristensen, V., Aven, T., & Ford, D. (2006). A new perspective on Renn and Klinke's approach 
to risk evaluation and management. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 91, 421-
432. 
Kunreuther, H., Easterling, D., Desvousges, W., & Slovic, P. (1990). Public attitudes toward 
siting a high-level nuclear waste repository in Nevada. Risk Analysis, 10, 469-484. 
Laclau, E. (1993). Discourse. In R. Goodin & P. Pettit (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to 
contemporary political philosophy (pp. 431-437). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publisher. 
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (2001). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical 
democratic politics (2nd ed.). London, UK: Verso. 
Larsen, R. J. (2007). Our own worst enemy: Asking the right questions about security to proect 
you, your family, and America. New York, NY: Grand Central. 
Latour, B. (2004). Politics of nature: How to bring the sciences into democracy. (C. Porter, 
Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Leiss, W. (1996). Three phases in the evolution of risk communication practice. The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 545, 85-94. 
219 
Lidskog, R. (2008). Scientised citizens and democratised science: Re-assessing the expert-lay 
divide. Journal of Risk Research, 11(1-2), 69-86. 
Lindlof, T. R., & Taylor, B. (2002). Chapter 6: Asking, listening, and telling. Qualitative 
communication research methods (2nd ed., pp. 170-208). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Linell, P., Adelsward, V., Sachs, L., Bredmar, M., & Lindstedt, U. (2002). Expert talk in 
medical contexts: Explicit and implicit orientations to risks. Research on Language and 
Social Interaction, 35, 195-218. 
Littlejohn, S. (2006) Moral conflict. In J. G. Oetzel and S. Ting-Toomey (Eds.), The Sage 
handbook of conflict communication: Integrating theory, research, and practice (pp 
395-417). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lobsenz, G. (2008, February 21). NAS urges phase-out of cesium sources due to dirty bomb 
risks. Defense Daily. Retrieved March 7, 2010 from LexisNexis. 
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. 
Psychological Bulletin, 127, 267-286. 
Löfstedt, R. E. (1996). Risk communication: The Barsebäck nuclear plant case. Energy Policy, 
24, 689-696. 
Löfstedt, R. E. (2005). Risk management in a post-trust society. New York, NY: Palgrave 
McMillan. 
Markey, E. (2005a, January 19). Markey calls for security upgrades for "dirty bomb" materials.  
Retrieved March 7, 2010, from 
http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=675&Itemid=
242. 
Markey, E. (2005b, July 19). Energy conference committee adopts measure to protect nuclear 




Markey, E. (2006, June 22). Markey and Clinton push for tighter controls on nuclear materials 
that could be used to make a dirty bomb.   Retrieved March 7, 2010, from 
http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1743&Itemid
=242. 
Markey, E. (2008a, February 20). Dirty bomb materials should be re-assessed, says report: Rep. 




Markey, E. (2008b, December 12). Markey: NRC reluctance to restrict dirty bomb material 
could be catastrophic.   Retrieved March 7, 2010, from 
http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3496&Itemid
=242. 
Martin, D. R., O’Brien, J. L., Heyworth, J. A., & Meyer, N. R. (2008). Point counterpoint: The 
function of contradictions on an interdisciplinary health care team. Qualitative Health 
Research, 18(3), 369. 
McComas, K. A. (2003). Citizen satisfaction with public meetings used for risk 
communication. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 31, 164-184. 
McComas, K. A. (2006). Defining moments in risk communication research: 1996-2005. 
Journal of Health Communication, 11, 75-91. 
McComas, K. A., & Trumbo, C. W. (2001). Source credibility in environmental health-risk 
controversies: Application of Meyer’s credibility index. Risk Analysis, 21, 467-480. 
221 
McPhee, R. D. & Iverson, J. (2002). Discourse systems structurate organizations and their 
discursive resources.  Paper presented at National Communication Association, New 
Orleans, LA, November 21-24.  
Metlay, D. (1999). Institutional trust and confidence: A journey into a conceptual quagmire. In 
G. Cvetkovich & R. E. Löfstedt (Eds.), Social trust and the management of risk (pp. 
100-116). London: Earthscan. 
Metzner-Szigeth, A. (2009). Contradictory approaches? On realism and constructivism in the 
social sciences research on risk, technology and the environment. Futures, 41, 156-170. 
Meyer, J. W. & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth 
and ceremony. The American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363. 
Milligan, R. A., Gilroy, J., Katz, K. S., Rodan, M. F., & Subramanian, K. N. S. (1999). 
Developing a shared language: Interdisciplinary communication among diverse health 
care professionals. Holistic Nursing Practice, 13(2), 47-53. 
Mirel, B. (1994). Debating nuclear energy: Theories of risk and purposes of communication. 
Technical Communication Quarterly, 3(1), 41-55. 
Morgan, E. L. (2007). Regional communication and sense of place surrounding the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant. In B. Taylor, W. J. Kinsella, S. P. Depoe & M. S. Metzler (Eds.), 
Nuclear legacies: Communication, controversy, and the U.S. nuclear weapons complex 
(pp. 109-133). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Murdock, G., Petts, J., & Horlick-Jones, T. (2003). After amplification: Rethinking the role of 
the media in risk communication. In N. Pidgeon, R. E. Kasperson & P. Slovic (Eds.), 
The social amplification of risk (pp. 156-178). Cambridge, U. K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Myers, G. (2007). Commonplaces in risk talk: Face threats and forms of interaction. Journal of 
222 
Risk Research, 10(3), 285-305. 
National Academy of Sciences. (2008, February). Government should spur replacement of 
radioactive cesium chloride in medical and research equipment. Retrieved July 21, 
2009, from 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11976. 
National Research Council, Committee on Radiation Source Use and Replacement. (2008). 
Radiation source use and replacement: Abbreviated version. Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press. 
Nearly 100 machines flagged as fodder for 'dirty bombs'. (2008, March 1). The Montreal 






O'Hair, H. D., & Heath, R. L. (2005). Conceptualizing communication and terrorism. In H. D. 
O'Hair, R. L. Heath & J. Ledlow (Eds.), Community preparedness, deterrence, and 
response to terrorism: Communication and terrorism (pp. 1-12). Westport, CT: 
Praeger. 
Ortiz, N. R., Wheeler, T. A., Breeding, R. J., Hora, S., Meyer, M. A., & Keeney, R. L. (1991). 
Use of expert judgment in NUREG-1150. Nuclear Engineering and Design, 126, 313-
331. 
Perin, C. (2005). Shouldering risks: The culture of control in the nuclear power industry. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
223 
Peters, E., & Slovic, P. (1996). The role of affect and worldviews as orienting dispositions in 
the perception and acceptance of nuclear power. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
26(16), 1427-1453. 
Peters, E., Lipkus, I., & Diefenbach, M. A. (2006). The functions of affect in health 
communications and in the construction of health preferences. Journal of 
Communication, 56, S140-S162. 
Peters, R. G., Covello, V. T., & McCallum, D. B. (1997). The determinants of trust and 
credibility in environmental risk communication: An empirical study. Risk Analysis 
17(1), 43-54. 
Peterson, T. R. & Franks, R. (2006). Environmental conflict communication. In J. G. Oetzel 
and S. Ting-Toomey The Sage handbook of conflict communication: Integrating 
theory, research, and practice (pp 419-450). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Peterson, T. R. (2003). Social control frames: Opportunities or constraints? Environmental 
Practice, 5, 232-238. 
Peterson, T. R. (2007). Nuclear legacies and opportunities for politically and ethically engaged 
communication scholarship. In B. Taylor, W. J. Kinsella, S. P. Depoe & M. S. Metzler 
(Eds.), Nuclear legacies: Communication, controversy, and the U.S. nuclear weapons 
complex (pp. 367-393). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Peterson, T. R., Peterson, M. N., & Grant, W. E. (2004). Social practice and biophysical 
process. In S. L. Senecah (Ed.), Environmental communication yearbook (Vol. 1, pp. 
15-32). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Phillips, L. (2000). Mediated communication and the privatization of public problems: 
Discourse on ecological risks and political action. European Journal of 
Communication, 15(2), 171-201. 
224 
Phillips, L., & Jørgensen, M. W. (2002). Discourse analysis as theory and method. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Plough, A., & Krimsky, S. (1987). The emergence of risk communication studies: Social and 
political context. Science, Technology, and Human Values, 12, 4-10. 
Poole, M. S., & DeSanctis, G. (1992). Microlevel structuration in computer-supported group 
decision making. Human Communication Research, 19, 5-49. 
Poole, M. S., & McPhee, R. D. (2005). Structuration theory. In S. May & D. K. Mumby (Eds.), 
Engaging organizational communication: Theory and research (pp.). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Porter, L. (2007, August 12). Reality and fiction collide as terror comes to town. Sunday Age, p. 





Potter, J., & Wetherall, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and 
behaviour. Los Angeles, CA: Sage. 
Potter, J., & Wetherall, M. (2001). Unfolding discourse analysis. In M. Wetherall, S. Taylor & 
S. J. Yates (Eds.), Discourse theory and practice: A Reader (pp. 198-209). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Prelli, L. (1997). The rhetorical construction of scientific ethos. In R. A. Harris (Ed.), 
Landmark essay on rhetoric of science: Case studies (pp. 87-105). Mahwah, NJ: 
Hermagoras Press. 
Ratliff, J. N. (1997). The politics of nuclear waste: An analysis of a public hearing on the 
225 
proposed Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository. Communication Studies, 8, 359-
380. 
Renn, O. (1998). Three decades of risk research: Accomplishments and new challenges. 
Journal of Risk Research, 1, 49-71. 
Reyna, V., & Brainerd, C. J. (2008). Numeracy, ratio bias, and denominator neglect in 
judgments of risk and probability. Learning and Individual Differences, 18(1), 89-107. 
Rosa, E. (1998). Metatheoretical foundations for post-normal risk Journal of Risk Research, 
1(1), 15-44. 
Rowan, K. E. (1994). The technical and democratic approaches to risk situations:  Their appeal, 
limitations, and rhetorical alternative. Argumentation, 8, 391-409. 
Rowe, G., & Wright, G. (2001). Differences in expert and lay judgments of risk: Myth or 
reality? Risk Analysis, 21(2), 341-357. 
Sandman, P. (2003). Four kinds of risk communication. The Synergist, April 26-27. Retrieved 
on October 5, 2007 from http://www.psandman.com/col/4kind-1.htm. 
Sandman, P., & Paden, M. (1979). At Three Mile Island. Columbia Journalism Review, 18(3), 
243-258. 
Sarangi, S., & Candlin, C. N. (2003). Categorization and explanation of risk: A discourse 
analytic perspective. Health, Risk, & Society, 5, 115-124. 
Satterfield, T., Slovic, P., & Gregory, R. (2000). Narrative valuation in a policy judgment 
context. Ecological Economics, 34(3), 315-331. 
Scherer, C. W., & Juanillo, N. K. (2003). The continuing challenge of community health risk 
management and communication. In T. Thompson, A. Dorsey, K. Miller & R. Parrot 
(Eds.), Handbook of health communication (pp. 221-240). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum. 
226 
Scott, W. R. (1987). The adolescence of institutional theory. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
32, 493-511. 
Sellnow, T. L., Ulmer, R. R., Seeger, M. W., & Littlefield, R. S. (2009). Effective risk 
communication: A message-centered approach. New York, NY: Springer. 
Silva, C. L., Jenkins-Smith, H. C., & Barke, R. P. (2007). Reconciling scientists’ beliefs about 
radiation risks and social norms: Explaining preferred radiation protection standards. 
Risk Analysis, 27(3), 755-774. 
Skinner, J. (2008). The text and the tale: differences between scientific reports and scientists’ 
reportings on the eruption of Mount Chance, Montserrat. Journal of Risk Research, 
11(1-2), 255-267. 
Slimak, M. W., & Dietz, T. (2006). Personal values, beliefs, and ecological risk perception. 
Risk Analysis, 26(6), 1689-2005. 
Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236, 280-285. 
Slovic, P. (1999). Trust, emotion, sex, politics, and science: Surveying the risk-assessment 
battlefield. Risk Analysis, 19, 689-701. 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. (2004). Risk as analysis and risk as 
feelings: Some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and rationality. Risk Analysis, 24, 
311-322. 
Stewart, J., Zediker, K. E., & Black, L. (2003). Relationships among philosophies of dialogue. 
In R. Anderson, L. A. Baxter, & K. N. Cissna (Eds.) Dialogue: Theorizing difference in 
communication studies (pp 21-38). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.   
Strydom, P. (2008). Risk communication: World creation through collective learning under 
complex contigent conditions. Journal of Risk Research, 11(1-2), 5-22. 
Tansey, J., & O’Riordan, T. (1999). Cultural theory and risk: a review. Health, Risk, and 
227 
Society, 1(1), 71-90. 
Taylor, B. (1996). Make bomb, save world: Reflections on dialogic nuclear ethnography. 
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 25(1), 120-143. 
Taylor, B. (1997). Shooting downwind: Depicting the radiated body in epidemiology and 
documentary photography. In M. Huspek & G. P. Radford (Eds.), Transgressing 
discourses: Communication and the voice of other (pp. 289-328). Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press. 
Taylor, B., & Freer, B. (2002). Containing the nuclear past: The politics of history and heritage 
at the Hanford Plutonium Works. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 
15(6), 563-588. 
Taylor, B., & Kinsella, W. J. (2007). Introduction: Linking nuclear legacies and communication 
studies. In B. C. Taylor, W. J. Kinsella, S. P. Depoe & M. S. Metzler (Eds.), Nuclear 
legacies: Communication, controversy, and the U.S. nuclear weapons complex (pp. 1-
40). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2008). Sociological approaches to risk: Strong in analysis but weak in policy 
influence in recent UK developments. Journal of Risk Research, 11(7), 863-878. 
Thompson, J. L. (2007). A systems approach to characterizing and understanding 
communication in interdisciplinary research teams.(Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Utah, 2007). Dissertation Abstracts International, 68 (03). (UMI No. 3256963). 
Thompson, J. L. (2009). Building collective communication competence in interdisciplinary 
research teams. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 37(3), 278-297. 
Titscher, S., Meyer, M., Wodak, R., & Vetter, E. (2002). How to obtain material for analysis-
An overview. In Methods of text and discourse analysis (pp. 31-49). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
228 
Tompkins, P. (1977). Management qua communication in rocket research and development. 
Communication Monographs, 44, 1-26. 
Tompkins, P. (2005). Communication as the geometry of human organization: A rhetorical 
analysis of risk. Paper presented at the International Conference of Systems Engineers, 
Las Vegas, NV, August 18. 
Trethewey, A., & Ashcraft, K. L. (2004). Practicing disorganization: The development of 
applied perspectives on living with tension. Journal of Applied Communication 
Research, 32(2), 81-88. 
Tuler, S. (2000). Forms of talk in policy dialogue: Distinguishing between adversarial and 
collaborative discourse. Journal of Risk Research, 3(1-17). 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2008a, July 31). Request for comments on the security 
and continued use of cesium-137 chloride sources and notice of public meeting. 
Federal Register, 73(148), 44780-44783. NRC–2008–0419. Retrieved on July 21, 2009 
from http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-17545.pdf. 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2008b, August 19). NRC seeking roundtable 
participants for September public meeting on the use of radioactive cesium-127 
chloride sources. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC. Retrieved 
July 21, 2009 from http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2008/08-
153.html. 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2008c, September 15). NRC encourages the public to 
attend a meeting on the use of radioactive cesium-137 chloride sources. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC. Retrieved July 21, 2009 from 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2008/08-169.html. 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2009a). NRC: About NRC. Retrieved on July 21, 2009 
229 
from http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html. 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2009b, April 15). NRC directs staff to enhance security 
of cesium chloride radiation sources while alternatives are explored. Retrieved on July 
21, 2009 from http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2009/09-074.html. 
Uggla, Y. (2008). Strategies to create risk awareness and legitimacy: the Swedish climate 
campaign. Journal of Risk Research, 11(6), 719-734. 
Visschers, V. H. M., Meertens, R. M., Passchier, W. F., & deVries, N. K. (2007). How does the 
general public evaluate risk information? The impact of associations with other risks. 
Risk Analysis, 27(3), 715-727. 
Walker, G. B., & Daniels, S. E. (2004). Dialogue and deliberation in environmental conflict: 
Enacting civic science. In S. L. Senecah (Ed.), Environmental communication 
yearbook, 1 (pp. 135–152). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Wardman, J. K. (2008). The constitution of risk communication in advanced liberal societies. 
Risk Analysis, 28(6), 1619-1638. 
Weick, K. E. (1987). Organizational culture as a source of high reliability. California 
Management Review, 24(2), 112-127. 
Weick, K. E., & Roberts, K. H. (1993). Collective mind in organizations: Heedful interrrelating 
on flight decks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(3), 357-381. 
Wertsch, J. (2001). The multi-voicedness of meaning. In M. Wetherall, S. Taylor & S. J. Yates 
(Eds.), Discourse theory and practice: A reader (pp. 222-235). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Wetherall, M., & Potter, J. (1988). Discourse analysis and identification of interpretive 
repertoires. In A. Antaki (Ed.), Analyzing everyday explanation (pp. 168-184). London, 
UK: Sage. 
230 
Wildavsky, A., & Dake, K. (1990). Theories of risk perception: Who fears what and why? 
Daedalus, 119, 41-60. 
Wright, G., Pearman, A., & Yeardly, K. (2000). Risk perception in U.K. oil and gas production 
industry: Are expert loss-prevention managers different from those of the public? Risk 
Analysis, 20(5), 681-690. 
Wynne, B. (1992). Risk and social learning: Reification to engagement. In S. Krimsky & D. 
Golding (Eds.), Social theories of risk (pp. 275-297). Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Zimmerman, P., Acton, J., & Rogers, B. (2007, August 1). Seize the cesium. The New York 
Times, p. A19. Retrieved March 7, 2010 from LexisNexis at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.lib-
ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do. 
Zio, E., & Apostolakis, G. E. (1997). Accounting for expert-to-expert variability: A potential 
source of bias in performance assessments of high-level waste repositories. Annals of 
Nuclear Energy, 24(10), 751-762. 





1. Please describe your understanding of the situation. 
a. What do you see as the risks and the benefits associated with the situation? 
b. What scientific and technical information do you feel is critical for 
understanding the situation? 
c. Are there other relevant non-technical aspects of the situation? 
2. What event stands out in your mind as critical to develop your current understanding of 
the situation? 
a. Did the event act as a turning point in which you changed some of your 
thinking? If so, what aspects of the situation prompted the change? 
b. Did the event function to solidify your understanding of this issue? If so, what 
aspects of the situation reinforced your thinking? 
3. Please describe an interaction that you have had with a colleague in which you expressed 
disagreement regarding this issue. 
a. How would you characterize the different points of view?  
b. How would you characterize the emotional quality of the interaction?  
c. What would you say to someone who disagreed with you for [this reason]? 
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APPENDIX B  
QUESTIONS AT NRC WORKSHOP 
Issue No. 1.1: Feasibility of the Use of Other Forms of Cs-137  
Q1.1–1. Are manufacturers currently considering the use of other forms of cesium (other than 
CsCl)? If yes, what are such considerations? 
Q1.1–2. Is the use of other forms of cesium feasible? If so, please describe desired methods and 
discuss any benefits or obstacles (e.g., intended function of source, costs, timeframe). 
Q1.1–3. (a) Would the effect of density loading with different forms of cesium preclude their use 
in existing devices? 
(b) Would it require modification of existing devices? 
Q1.1–4. Is it feasible that high-activity (e.g., IAEA Category 1 and 2) cesium sources will be 
available in alternative material forms? If so, what is the estimated timeframe for 
manufacturing? 
Q1.1–5. Since all the CsCl is manufactured in Mayak, Russia, is it known if the cesium source 
producer can modify its production process? 
Q1.1–6. Would other entities (in the U.S. or worldwide) engage in manufacturing sources with 
alternative forms of Cs-137? 
Issue No. 1.2: Feasibility of the Use of Isotopes Other Than Cs-137 
Q1.2–1. (a) Can cobalt-60 (Co-60) be substituted for radioactive CsCl for any applications? (b) 
If so, what types of applications? (c) If not, why not? 
Q1.2–2. Can the shielding challenges for Co-60 be addressed by switching from lead shields to 
more effective tungsten or depleted uranium shielding? 
Q1.2–3. What are the attendant risks associated with Co-60 source transportation? 
Issue No. 2—Use of Alternatives Technologies 
Q2–1. Are X-ray generators already commercially available as substitutes for applications that 
do not require the gamma rays with Cs-137 and Co-60? 
Q2–2. Are X-ray tubes cost-effective considering the initial cost, operating costs, and 
requirements for more maintenance for periodic calibration and replacement than 
radioactive sources? 
Q2–3. Is there any indication that the performance of the alternatives will change (improve or 
worsen) with respect to Cs-137? 
Q2–4. Regarding the availability of alternative technologies, (a) what is the timeframe of future 
availability of each alternative, and (b) what is the cost for each of the alternative 
technologies (capital costs, operation costs, cost to users)? 
Issue No. 3.1: Potential Rulemaking Issues and Justification for Regulatory Change 
Q3.1–1. (a) What would be the medical consequences if CsCl was to be banned for medical 
(e.g., blood) irradiators? (b) What would be the impact to existing and future biomedical 
research using these devices? (c) Can alternative technologies be used for medical 
applications and/or biomedical research (research on animals and tissue?) 
Q3.1–2. (a) What would be the consequences if CsCl was to be banned for irradiators that are 
used for industrial and calibration purposes? (b) What is the impact on existing 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards and licensee conditions that 
require the use of Cs-137 for calibration purposes? 
Q3.1–3. What would be the economic consequences to users if CsCl was to be banned? 
Q3.1–4. What would be the economic consequences to vendors if CsCl was to be banned? 
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Q3.1–5. (a) Should the NRC discontinue all new licensing and importation of these sources and 
devices? (b) What is the regulatory basis? (c) Who (NRC, DHS, or jointly) should 
conduct the risk analysis? 
Issue No. 3.2: Transportation and Storage Issues Associated With Removal of CsCl 
Sources From Licensee Facilities 
Q3.2–1. (a) Are there transportation packages available for transportation? (a) Who should bear 
the transportation costs? 
Q3.2–2. (a) How could the current CsCl sources be disposed given that CsCl is defined as a 
‘‘Greater Than Class C’’ source and currently has no disposal mechanism in the U.S.? 
(b) If disposal was made available by DOE, what would be the cost of disposal? 
Q3.2–3. (a) Where could the decommissioned sources be stored? (b) What disposition options 
are needed in the United States? 
Issue No. 3.3: Consideration of Government Incentives and Voluntary Actions by Industry 
and Manufacturers 
Q3.3–1. Should the Federal government issue incentives to implement replacements? 
Q3.3–2. (a) Are there feasible incentives to shift users away from radioactive CsCl for users? (b) 
Manufacturers? 
Q3.3–3. (a) What incentives should the Federal government provide to licensees to 
decommission their existing sources or devices because the devices still have use value? 
(b) For licensees that are defined as ‘‘not-for-profit’’ (e.g., hospitals), what type of 
incentives could be made available to change technologies? 
Q3.3–4. How can the Federal government compensate licensees when they are forced to 
decommission these sources? Should compensation include the cost of the replacement 
technology? Decommissioning? 
Issue No. 3.4: Impact of Potential U.S. Changes to Regulating CsCl on the International 
Community 
Q3.4–1. How can the U.S. prevent recovered sources from decommissioned devices (or the 
devices themselves) from being sold outside the U.S.? 
Q3.4–2. (a) If the U.S. decides to ban the use of CsCl sources, should the U.S. have a position in 
denying or eliminating after-market sales of CsCl irradiators outside the U.S.? (b) Would 
this be potentially denying medical care to developing countries? 
Q3.4–3. What should the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) be in assisting 
the U.S. in ensuring the safe and secure use of CsCl sources and devices? 
Issue No. 4—Additional Requirements for Enhanced Security of CsCl Sources 
Q4.1. Should the NRC and Agreement States require more stringent security measures than 
those currently mandated (e.g., should additional requirements be implemented for 
IAEA Category 1 and 2 sources)? 
Q4.2. Should the NRC and Agreement States require more stringent security measures for lower 
than Category 2 CsCl sources and devices (e.g., Category 3 sources)? 
Q4.3. Would additional security requirements for CsCl create a disincentive for owning them? 
Issue No. 5—Role of Risk Analysis in Potential Future CsCl Requirements 
Q5.1. (a) How should the NRC determine the economic and social disruptions/impacts to the 
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